

FONDAZIONE
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**IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION DURING
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN THE EU:
a focus on Italy and Parma**

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DEDICATION

"In memory of Andrea Borri, who tirelessly worked for social justice,
european integration and to further international cooperation"

"In memoria di Andrea Borri, che ha operato intensamente
per lo sviluppo del suo territorio in una proiezione europea ed internazionale"

PREFACE

The unprecedented 2007 global financial crisis has led to the most severe global recession since the end of the Second World War. For people and communities the world over, the resulting unemployment and financial uncertainty has drastically impacted their livelihoods especially in Today's world when the global economy is globalized and interlinked politically, financially and economically. This has contributed to spreading and accelerating the recession. International immigration is an integral part of the global economy and has not been spared.

This study is specifically focused on the effect of the global financial crisis on immigrant integration in Europe. After many years of sustained economic and employment growth, the current financial crisis is threatening to reverse the gains achieved since the 1950s. Europe is among the regions hardest hit by the global economic crisis.

Unemployment is on the rise and in many countries unemployment among migrants is more than double that of the local population (in Spain 28% compared to 15.2%, France 18.5% compared to 9%, Portugal 17.2% compared to 8.5%). Evidence shows that migrant workers are among the first to lose their jobs because of their concentration in worst affected sectors such as construction, manufacturing, wholesale and hospitality and because of low local language skills in many countries of the EU.

This study set out to understand the impact that the financial crisis has had on immigrants as individuals but also as global actors since they are not only active in the economies where they live, work and pay taxes, but also in their home countries which depend and receive huge amounts of money in remittances.

Although it is still too early to pinpoint what the long term effects of the crisis will be for instance on immigrant stocks, the short term effects so far such as rising unemployment, declining remittances flows and growing levels of xenophobia across Europe have been equally devastating and need urgent policy and programmatic intervention at the regional, country and global level.

"Migration flows have been, and continue to be, important vectors of social, economic and cultural change. The relationship between migration and history is dynamic. Migration has made history, and history has created the circumstances for varied and complex forms of migration. Migration is part of history and history is part of migration. Lessons from migration and history are valuable for migration managers who will address the challenges and opportunities of migration in an increasingly mobile world".

IOM (n.d)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The financial crisis that hit the global economy since the 2007 summer has no precedent in all post world war economic history. Europe is among the regions hardest hit by the global economic crisis although the depth, extent and effects vary from country to country as from region to region. While German and the Scandinavia countries have been better insulated from the global economic downturn, others such as Spain, Greece, Italy and Ireland are among those hardest hit by the crisis.

While it is too early to have a clear view of the full impact of the unfolding economic crisis specifically on net migration flows, the already evident consequences on labour market are unquestionable. If the past economic crises are anything to go by, history has shown that immigrants are often the most vulnerable and worst affected as soon as labour market failures emerge. In the last six years since the onset of this crisis in 2007, available evidence shows the dramatic effect it has had on unemployment the world over, but specifically for the European Union, the statistics are alarming. Unemployment is on the rise and in many EU countries unemployment among migrants is more than double that of the local population. In April 2010, Agramunt (2010) showed that in Spain, France and Portugal, immigrant unemployment was 28% compared to 15.2%, 18.5% compared to 9% and 17.2% compared to 8.5% for natives respectively.

These are just a few examples but the trend is very similar for many other Eurozone countries. Immigrants are proportionally more affected, as they tend to be concentrated in boom-bust sectors like construction, manufacturing, wholesale and hospitality, which have been worst hit by the crisis. More still, they often have less work experience; less secure contractual arrangements in their jobs hence may be subject to layoffs as the economic situation worsens. The other problem is that many also often lack local language skills while for those recently arrived, they lack social capital, job networks and family support structures and systems.

This thesis is based on a desk review of reports, study documents, journals and academic publication on the theme of Immigrant integration in Europe in these times of the economic crisis. The study was conducted over a period of 13 months from October 2012- 30th November 2013. a main challenge I encountered during this study was the lack of up uniform todate data to be able to make concrete comparison. For instance in the case of Parma, I was able to access very up todate data yet in the case of the EU and Italy, the latest info dated between 2009 and 2011. Never the less, I have attempted to work as best as I could with the information available to me. Unfortunately I was not able to access the source document for information on immigrant remittances in Parma so relied on a number of newspaper articles.

I have relied on a number of reputable and credible organisations as data sources, prominent among these is the Eurostat reports and publications, European Commission reports and publications, ISTAT reports and data reports, CARITAS reports and publications, OECD publications and reports, IMO reports and the Migration Policy Institute research studies and publications. These are only a few of the sources reviewed. A full bibliography is attached to this thesis and all sources have been acknowledged.

The research questions that I set out to answer are:

1. How has the global economic crisis affected the immigrants' population in Europe in general, and more specifically in Italy and Parma.
2. What short term and long term effects of the economic crisis on immigration are already evident so far?
3. What coping strategies have immigrants adopted during this financial crisis?
4. How has the economic crisis impacted on public perceptions about immigrants?
5. How has the financial crisis impacted on immigrant integration policies, activities and initiatives at the EU level, country (Italy) and province (Parma) level?
6. What lessons and conclusions need to be drawn from the above analysis and what implications for the future?

The research highlighted the following key responses to the above questions:

- It is right now near impossible to measure or quantify the overall impact of the economic crisis especially as regards the flows of immigrants between source and destination countries. The main reason is the lack of reliable information in sending countries and their eventual countries of settlement at the end of their migration journey. The effect already manifested today is that labour migration inflows as well as inflows of irregular migrants to Europe have generally declined since the onset of the financial crisis.
- It is not entirely true that the economic crisis has resulted in en masse returns of international migrants to their countries of origin. Available data shows that immigrants do not return en masse to their countries of origin unless they have the security of being able to return once the economic situation improves.
- In the last five years, available data indicates a decline in the rate of growth of remittances sent by immigrants back to their home countries.
- The acceptance levels of immigrants in host communities and how the activities aimed at immigrant integration have been affected.
- An increase in xenophobia based on the fears that immigrants take away scarce jobs has been documented in many parts of Europe. This has been fueled by the rise in popularity of the extreme right political parties across Europe although available statistics and academic reports suggest otherwise.

The above are only a summary of the findings documented in this study. This report is organized in chapters as follows:

Chapter 1: Immigration: An Introduction, global statistics and a historical overview of immigration in Europe.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Context and Analysis of Migration

Chapter 3: Europe and Immigration

Chapter 4: EU laws and Policies on Immigration and integration

Chapter 5: The Global Financial Crisis: Impact on Migration in the EU.

Chapter 6: Integration of Immigrants in times of the financial crisis in Italy

Chapter 7: Italy and Immigration Integration in Times of the Financial Crisis

Chapter 8: Parma and Immigrants; an overview and strategies for integration

Chapter 9: Conclusions

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABI	Italian Bankers Association
CGIL	Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro
CISL.....	Confederazione Italiana Sindacato Lavoratori
CNEL	Consiglio Nazionale dell'Economia e del Lavoro
CTP	Centro Territoriale Permanente
EC	European Commission
EERP.....	European Economic Recovery Programme
EFTA.....	The European Free Trade Association
EU –SILG	The European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions
EU	European Union
EU-LFS	The European Union Labour Force Survey
EUROPOP.....	European Population Projections
EUROSTAT	European Statistics
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FRONTEX.....	The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HDI	Human Development Index
IOM.....	International Organisation for Migration
ISMU	Initiatives and Studies on Multi-Ethnicity
ISTAT	The National Institute for Statistics

JHA..... Justice and Home Affairs
OECD..... Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PCA..... Principle Component Analysis
PISA Programme for International Students Assessment
TFEU..... Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UK..... United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNCRC..... United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
UNDP..... United Nations Development Programme
USA..... The United States of America

CHAPTER I

IMMIGRATION

AN INTRODUCTION

I.1 WHAT IS IMMIGRATION

Immigration has become one of the widely discussed development topic of all times (Suárez-Orozco & Suárez-Orozco 2001). and the topic of migration and development is increasingly of interest to policy makers, politicians and scholars the world over (Kapur 2003, Ratha 2003). As a matter of fact, the last quarter of the twentieth century has been referred to as the age or era of immigration considering the number of people globally living out of their country of birth (Castle and Miller 1993, Demeny 2002, Tsimbos 2006). Immigration is a remarkably broad and multi-faceted topic embracing a wide range of issues and must be looked at as a permanent phenomenon rather than a temporary movement (Goran 1992).

Immigration is rooted in the Latin word “*migrare*” that means, “*to change residence*” and scholars have traditionally defined immigration as the permanent movement of people across space (Petersen 1978). One of the early scholars of immigration Horace Hamilton (1965) defined it as the people movement that involves a change in their usual place of residence from one community to another.

Although the terms immigration and emigration both refer to the action of “moving into” and are often used interchangeably, they are distinctively different in terms of direction of the movement. For purposes of this study, I opt to specifically focus on immigration.

According to the United Nations (UN), an international migrant is a person who stays outside their usual country of residence for at least one year. According to that definition, the UN estimated that in 2005 there were about 200 million international migrants worldwide, including about ten million refugees. This is according to Koser (2008) is roughly the equivalent of the fifth most populous country on earth, Brazil.

This view is shared by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which states that immigration is a phenomenon that describes the movement of people to destination countries that are relatively wealthier than their own. The OECD states that about 3% of the world total population lives outside their birth counties (OECD 2009). As a matter of fact, “people have always sought new and better homes, and will continue to do so. Many countries will need to go on attracting immigrants in the years to come as they cope with populations ageing and seek to fill gaps in the labour forces” (ibid, p.2). Immigration is interlinked to the economic, demographic, politics, national identity, national security, culture, language and religious aspects of the receiving as well as sending countries (ibid).

In their influential book *The Age of Immigration* Castle and Millers (2003) urge that there are indeed very few people in both the industrialized and developing world who don't have a personal experience or story with the phenomenon of immigration.

Castles and Millers (2009) continue to argue that almost every country in the developed world has witnessed a marked increase in immigration in the past decade posing challenges even in Canada and The United States of America (USA) whose social fabrics and policies have for long been oriented towards receiving and settling new comers. The magnitude of people crossing their borders with or without valid documentation was unexpected.

As a matter of fact, European countries such as Ireland, Italy, Greece, Portugal, the Netherlands and Spain that were historically considered countries of emigration have quickly turned into immigrant receiving countries (Martiniello and Rath 2010). Hooghe et. al (2008) show that immigration flows to Europe experienced sharp increases in recent decades considering that in the 1960s for example; the yearly net migration into the countries that nowadays make up the EU-27 was less than 100,000 on average. This figure exceeded 1.6 million in 2006 and despite the fact that several of these European countries adopted more restrictive immigration policies during the 1970s and 1980s has not prevented an increasing number of persons from settling in Europe, either as economic or labour migrants, political asylum seekers, or for family reunification (Castle and Miller 2003).

It is however important to note as Koser (2007) shows that international immigration is as a result of significant global events:- revolutions, wars or the rise and fall of empires, that it is associated with significant global change that is, economic and political expansion among others. Also importantly, international immigration is associated with problems notably, conflict, war, persecution and abuse of human rights.

1.2 IMMIGRATION: A HISTORICAL OVER VIEW

According to Goran (1992), immigration is by no means a new phenomenon and "*the history of mankind is the history of migration*". The history of mankind and his existence over time could be linked to his ability to move from place to place. Take for instance early man who as a hunter and gatherer wandered from place to place in search of nourishment.

Another author Bohning (1978) wrote that when the size of a population overwhelmed the resources accessible to them, a section was forced to move on in search of new livelihoods causing social change and development. This was referred to as the "*Roving behaviour*" by Kulischer (1948) and that human beings would never have become the earth dominating species are without the ability to discover and explore, and the migration that followed such successful discoveries and "*Rovings*" (McNeill 1978).

In an analysis of the reasons for immigration in the last five centuries, Tilly (1978) points out the following as the main driving factors of long distance migration:

- The changing geographic distribution in employment opportunities
- Demographic imbalances, alterations of regional differentials in natural increase

- Actions and policies of national states such as making wars, immigration controls and expulsion of certain ethnic groups

Goran (1992) explains that as far back as the eighteenth century, immigration was encouraged to counter labour shortages and that in some European countries, the need for labour and soldiers was so high that steps were taken to hinder emigration.

The development and history of immigration across Europe was by no means homogenous. While some countries experienced large influx of immigrants in the second half of the last century, others quickly emerged as countries of emigration. In addition, Dustmann and Frattini (2012) have rightly explained that the every country has a unique story and experience of immigration as much as they differ in the type, origin and composition of their immigrant population.

According to Hammer (1990), a look at the number and level of restrictions to and on international migration is necessary to explain how the international migration trends have evolved over the years especially from and into Europe.

1.2.1 THE FIRST GREAT MIGRATION (1910- 1930)

The first movement of immigrants from Europe dates back to the period between 1836 and 1914 when over thirty million European immigrants left Europe for the United States of America, Canada, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand and Argentina (Fassmann and Munz 1994, Nicholas 2001).

During this same period, several hundred thousand Polish and Ukrainian workers migrated to the emerging centers of the coal, iron, and steel industries in France, Germany, and England. Several hundred thousand Eastern European Jews fled from the religious persecution, and economic misery in the Ukraine, Galicia, and the Baltics, establishing themselves as large ethno religious minorities in the booming metropolitan cities across Europe (Berlin, Vienna, Paris, Warsaw, and Prague to mention but a few) (Fassman and Munz 1994).

This wave of emigration was triggered by the search of freedom and new opportunities considering that the conditions in Europe at the time were characterised by the heavy taxation, religious persecution, agrarian depression and harvest failures. It is important to note that the assassination of Czar Alexander II in March of 1881 acted as a trigger for large Jewish exodus from Poland, Russia and other parts of Europe to the USA until the 1924 Immigration act was enforced to minimise the influx of immigrants amid growing public concerns about the economic depression and unemployment in the USA (Gildea 1989).

Despite these difficult conditions in Europe at the time, Hamburg (1976, p. 6) has argued that majority of the people who left Europe were more driven by the “desire inherent in men to better themselves in material respects” while Jerome (1926) concluded that the pull factors to the USA were the more dominant influence than the push factors for people to migrate.

1.2.2 POST WORLD WARS I & II

From the mid 1800 up until the start of World War I, immigration to Europe and the trans-oceanic countries such as North America and Australia was characterized by no restriction's, no travel controls except for Czarist Russia (Goran 1992). Passports were not required for people to move from one country to another and it was common for people to seek and undertake employment in any country before seeking a residence permit to do so (Holborn 1938, Marrus 1985).

The beginning of the World War I up till the end of World War II saw the systematic introduction of border controls and restrictions to international migration. Passport controls was introduced during World War I as an instrument of control against spy infiltration and it thereafter remained in use after the end of the war to protect the local population against foreign competition during the high unemployment that characterized the post war period (Goran 1992).

By the end of World War II and with an agenda of rebuild Europe, countries such as France, Belgium, and Germany opened their doors to foreign workers first from southern European countries such as Spain and Italy, and progressively to immigrants from the Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Middle East (Ben – David 2009).

The peace treaties signed after the 2nd world war laid a foundation for new geopolitical landscape in after war Europe. For example, the national borders of Germany and Austria were substantially reduced. In addition, the beginning of the cold war politically and economically separated Europe defining new borders between western, central and Eastern Europe (Dustmann and Frattini 2012).

Salt and Clout (1976) have written that by 1950, 7.8m refugees were living in West Germany and 3.5m in East Germany. These were mainly refugees were largely displaced from countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the USSR for political reasons.

1.2.3 POST COLONISATION IMMIGRATION REGIMES

The period after the world wars was characterized by a continuous process of de-colonization as the old Colonial powers withdrew from their former colonies and in the process, large influx of immigrants following their former colonial masters back home (Dustmann and Frattini 2012).

Many former colonial masters like France, the UK, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Portugal lost their colonies in the decades after the Second World War as countries such as India and Pakistan gaining independence from Great Britain in 1947, Algeria from France in 1962, Congo from Belgium in 1960 and the list can go on and on.

A close look at the immigrant populations across Europe confirms the higher likelihood of immigrants opting to settle in the countries of former colonial masters mainly due to language and cultural and administrative advantages. For instance the United Kingdom attracted immigrants from former colonies with the first Indians and Pakistanis arriving in Britain in the 1950s and the Bangladeshis in the

1970s. Likewise, countries like France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands also attracted immigrants from their former colonies (Ben- David 2009).

In addition, following the process of de-colonization, many Europeans who had previously settled in former colonies returned to Europe and with them, the citizens of former colonies started arriving in Europe, sometimes for political, but more often for economic reasons. One example is the United Kingdom which received immigrants from the Caribbean, Asia, and Africa escaping persecution back home.

Specifically to the case of Italy, the first Tunisian immigrants to arrive in Sicily in 1968 were following Italian entrepreneurs who had left the country during the period 1964–1969 (Cusumano 1976, Slama 1986). To date, Tunisians are currently one of the most populous immigrant populations in Italy to date.

It is therefore prudent to note that the process of de-colonization around the world greatly contributed to shaping the trends and scope of people movements globally and in Europe in particular.

1.2.4 GUEST WORKERS POLICIES

The economic boom experienced in Europe at the time acted as a pull factor for immigrants in search of employment.

By 1955, Germany had negotiated the first guest worker scheme with Italy and quickly followed by Greece and Spain (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964) Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968). By 1964, the guest workers in Germany numbered one million and to crown this achievement, the lucky one-millionth worker (Gasterbaiter) received a prize of a motorcycle (Hansen 2004).

At this point in time, it was thought that the immigration trend was temporary and that immigrants would return to their home countries and as Ben- David (2009) notes, it was not only the host population and policy makers that considered that immigration was a temporary phenomenon but also the immigrants themselves thought they would return home at some point in the future. In fact explains that this could possibly explain why most of the social infrastructure for immigrant such as schools and housing were largely under developed and never considered as a priority (Goran 1992).

1.2.5 THE ECONOMIC BOOM IN 1950'S EUROPE

During the economic boom in Europe in the mid-1950s - 1970s as well as huge immigration movements from the periphery of Europe into the centre, and from former colonial states. An example of this boom was evidenced in the German economy that quickly boomed after the 1948 currency reform. By the mid - 1950s, the demand for labour in Germany, just like in most of Europe was higher than supply hence the need to attract foreign workers (Hansen 2004).

The free movement of people, goods and services following the foundation of the European Economic Community in 1957 contributed to furthering the movement of people within and from beyond the European Union.

With the economic downturn in the early 1970s, the discussion on the effect of immigration in Europe started to gain momentum amid rising unemployment and public discontent of the hard economic times. Although many immigrants were suddenly unemployed, no evidence shows many returned to their home countries. As it became apparent that the immigrants were here to stay, policy makers and governments across Europe instituted an "immigration stop," introducing restrictive measures to deter immigration and to put a stop to recruiting foreign labour (Dustmann and Frattini 2012).

The period from 1973-74 was characterized by political action leading to tighter political controls and debates in almost all European countries. Although family re-unifications and political refugees were still permitted, these happened amidst tighter immigration controls that characterized that period.

1.2.6 THE FALL OF THE BERLIN WALL

Another huge influx of people movement experienced in European was triggered by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. According to Glitz (2012), the most significant was the movement of Ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to Germany where in 1990 alone, over 397,000 Ethnic Germans came to Germany from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. During the 1990s the inflow of Ethnic Germans from former Soviet Union remained high, with over 700,000 entering Germany between 1996 and 2001.

The collapse of Soviet rule in the early 1990s led to a wave of civil conflict and separations, with large displacements of civil populations. The Balkan wars led to large asylum and refugee migrations. This time however migrations were not only targeting Northern Europe, but also Southern European countries, which had, partly as a result of their incorporation into the European Union, experienced rapid economic development and convergence to Northern Europe during the 1980's (Dustmann and Frattini 2012).

1.2.7. THE EASTERN EUROPE ENLARGEMENTS

The next wave of movements in Europe was mainly internal, and triggered by the expansion of the European Union towards the former Eastern European countries. European legislation foresees that citizens of countries that join the European Union can freely move across those countries. However, pre-existing member states may impose, during a 7-year transition period; limitations to the employment of citizens of new-member countries (see Dustmann, et al. 2003 for details).

After the expiry of the labour market restrictions on April 30th 2011, Nationals of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia were work freely throughout the European Union (EU) although labour restrictions on nationals of Bulgaria and Romania remained (and deemed to expire on 31st December 2013).

After EU accession of 8 Central and Eastern European countries on May 1st, 2004 the UK, Sweden and Ireland allowed citizens of the new accession countries to work in their labour markets immediately, which led to sizeable movements from particularly Poland (the largest of the new accession countries) into these countries.

It is estimated that between 2004 and 2008, Poland experienced the net outflow of over 300,000 citizens, or about 1% of the total population (see Dustmann, Frattini, Rosso 2012). Also, enlargement led to movements into other European countries like Italy and Spain. Although new EU citizens were allowed to freely travel to these countries, taking up employment was illegal, and led many new accession citizens to engage in unofficial work arrangements that were considered illegal. These people movements were further stimulated by increasing conflicts and unrest in many parts of the world, improved travel systems and information technologies dramatically increased the pressure on Europe's Southern borders. Countries like Italy and Greece received the largest inflows of asylum and immigrants, many arriving by boat on Europe's largely uncontrollable sea borders and this led to the increase in the illegal immigrant population.

According to the recent estimates by Kovacheva and Vogel (2009), which are based on collection and harmonization of estimates from several national sources, the number of immigrants illegally residing in the EU 15 countries is estimated at between 1.8 and 3.3 million, or between 0.46% and 0.83% of the total population by 2008. According to these estimates, approximately 7% - 12% of the total EU 15 immigrant population was undocumented. In contrast, Hoefer et al. (2010) estimate that 10.8 million unauthorized immigrants, or about 28% of the total immigrant population, were living in the US as of January 2009.

This means that the number of undocumented immigrants is much higher in the USA than in EU although the actual numbers vary from country to country within the EU.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL CONTEXT AND ANALYSIS OF MIGRATION

As already discussed in previous chapter, migration is the temporary or permanent move of individuals or groups of people from one geographic location to another for various reasons ranging from better employment possibilities to persecution.

While migration is as old as humanity itself, theories about migration are fairly new (Hagen-Zanker 2008). A theory as defined by Graham (2000, p. 258) is any “*set of ideas, or conceptualization which goes beyond the particularities of individual cases and offers some more general framework, or account of the nature of certain circumstances, relationships or events. In addition, a theory must have explanatory force, which is to say that it must contribute to make these circumstances, relationships or events intelligible*”.

In relation to migration, Castle (2010, p. 1582) has argued that “*migration theory should not restrict itself to migration, but rather seek to link to analysis of migratory processes to boarder social theory and through this the analysis of society change in general*”.

It is indeed true that migration research studies have resonance for and with other population geography such as fertility, ageing, inter–generationality (King 2012) and as Castle (2007) explains, a theoretical and conceptual understanding of migration is important to place old and new migration phenomena within the past and current social, political and economic contexts.

More recently, Migration scholars such as De Haan (2010) have called for new theorization noting for example the impact the post 2007/08 economic and financial crisis has had on long term migration processes, effect of austerity politics on national and local labour in the developed nations (Castle 2009), and housing markets (Hamnett 2011) and how these have affected and transformed why and how social groups move within and between places, across regions, national borders and international migration patterns across the globe.

Over the years, scholars have advanced a number of theories to describe the phenomena of immigration and the following section attempts to briefly summarise and highlight the key theories and the principle characteristics.

2.1. NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMIC APPROACH

According to Lewis (1954) and Haris and Todaro (1970), this is probably the oldest known theory of international migration developed to explain the movements of labour in the times of economic development. The earliest scholarly contributions to migration can be tracked back to the nineteenth Century geographer Ravenstein (1885; 1889) who formulated the “*laws of migration*” in which he

noted that migration as an inseparable part of development and that the main causes of migration were economic (De Haan, 2008). To this effect, Hamberg (1976, p.5) has argued that *“Bad or oppressive laws, heavy taxation, an unattractive climate, uncongenial social surroundings, and even compulsion (slave trade, transportation), all have produced and are still producing currents of migration, but none of these currents can compare in volume with that which arises from the desire inherent in most men to “better” themselves in material respects”*.

According to this theory, internal and international migration is caused by geographical difference in the demand and supply of labour. When there is a fall in the supply of labour, it leads to higher wages in the economies previously considered “capital poor” while in the “capital rich economies” that receive the migrants, the oversupply of labour leads to fall in wages hence an equilibrium in the economy (Massey et al 1993). What this means in the long run is that the “capital poor economies” yield high rates of returns hence attracting investment capital including human capital (often highly skilled professionals) from the economies previously considered “capital rich”.

In fact, Castles and Miller (2003) note that the notion that people move from low to high income area, from densely to sparsely populated area is based on the assumptions of what has come to be known as the “push – pull economic theory that greatly influenced the discourse and policies of immigration the world over.

At the Macro level, the following assumptions form the basis of the neo-classical economic theory Massey et al (1993).

- The international migration of labour is caused primarily by wage differential between countries.
- In absence of wage differentials, labour migration would not occur.
- International labour flows are triggered by the Labour market factors.
- Other markets forces do not have important effects on international migration.
- Governments can control international migration by controlling wage differential in the receiving and sending economies.

While the above discussion has mainly centred on the macro- economic aspects of the neoclassical theory, the micro economic focus is equally important. “At the micro-level, neo-classical migration theory views migrants as individual, rational actors, who decide to move on the basis of a cost-benefit calculation. Assuming free choice and full access to information, they are expected to go where they can be the most productive, that is, are able to earn the highest wages. This capacity obviously depends on the specific skills a person possesses and the specific structure of the labour markets” (De Haan 2008, p. 5).

Borjas (1990) has argued that potential migrants estimate the costs and benefits of moving to alternative international destination and choose to migrate to the destination that presents the highest discounted net returns. The following are some of the underlying assumptions of this theory at the micro- level Massey et al (1993):

- International movements stems from international differentials in both earning and employment rates.
- The size of the differentials in expected returns determines the size of international migration between countries.
- That individual human capital characteristics (for example skills and experience, age, language skills)that increase rate of remunerations or the probability of employment in the destination country relative to the sending country will trigger international migration other factors remaining constant.
- Because of the above listed factors, different individuals in the same country can display very different propensities to migrate.
- If the conditions in the receiving country are preserved to be very attractive to potential migrants, migration costs may be negative.
- Governments can control migration by enacting policies that affect expected earnings in the sending countries (for example through undertaking long term development programmes) and in the receiving counties (for example through employer sanctions and caps or by increasing the material and psychological cost of migrating).

For example, the Heckscher- Ohlin model of “factor price equalization”, states that a growing convergence between wages at the sending and receiving end would result into a dis- incentive to migration (Harris & Todaro 1970; Lewis 1954; Ranis & Fei 1961; Schiff 1994; Todaro & Maruszko 1987).

The neo-classical migration theorists consider that rural-urban migration is key to the development process by which surplus labour in the rural sector supplies the workforce for the urban industrial economy (Lewis 1954). In fact the neo-classical theorist present development and modernization as a straightforward process consisting of successive- lineal stages as described in the Rostows stages of Development (Rostow 1960).

According to De Haan (2008) the “Harris- Todaro Model” (Harris and Todaro 1970) developed to explain the apparent contradictory phenomenon of continuing rural to urban migration in developing countries despite rising unemployment in cities has remained the basis of the neo- classical migration theory.

Harris and Todaro argued that, in order to understand this phenomenon, it is necessary to modify and extend the simple wage differential approach by looking “not only at prevailing income differentials as such but rather at the rural-urban “expected” income differential, i.e., the income differential adjusted for the probability of finding an urban job” (Todaro 1969:138).

It must however be noted that the Harris and Todaro Model was later modified to include other factors such as opportunity cost of migration, travel costs and the psychological costs of migration among others (Bauer and Zimmermann 1998).

Although the Harris-Todaro model was initially developed for internal migration (De Haan 2008), over the years, a number of scholars such as Borjas (1990) proposed modifications so that the theory can be applied to international migration as well. According to Borjas (1989; 1990), research has shown that international immigrants base their choice of destination on a number of factors including individual, cost-benefit analysis.

The Harris and Todaro model has further been interpreted in the human capital framework, which considers migration as an investment decision (De Haan 2008). Sjaastad (1962) and Becker (1962) human capital is an important factor in the process of economic development in the modernization of society. "Considering that individuals are different in terms of personal skills, knowledge, physical abilities, age, sex, and so on, there will also be differences in the extent to which people are expected to gain from migrating, that is, they can expect diverging returns on their migration investment" (De Haan 2008, p. 6).

Despite the importance and relevance of the neo classical theory, it is not without limitation in applicability where for example De Haan (ibid) points out that in economies where market factors such as capital and insurance are imperfect and not easily accessible to the most marginalized in society, the neo classical theory that focuses on expected income as the driving force for migration is hard to measure. "Migration does not take place in a social, cultural, political and institutional void. Neo- classical migration theory is not able to deal with constraining factors such as government restrictions on migration" (ibid, p. 7).

The assumption that immigrants have free choice and full access to information is in its self a myth as the reality is that most immigrants access and rely on information from secondary sources (other immigrants or family) and often the reliability and accuracy of this information can be questions in how it relates to reality in the receiving countries.

Another critic of the neo- classical theory of migration is Skeldon (1997) who has argued that structural conditions under which contemporary migration in and from developing countries takes place are different from the nineteenth and twentieth century reality of migration from the rural agricultural areas to the urban industrialized areas. The new economic theory of migration discussed below developed as a result of critics to the assumptions offered by the neo classical theorists as highlighted above.

2.2. THE NEW ECONOMIC THEORY

The new economics of Migration emerged as a critic to many of the assumptions and propositions proposed by the neo classical theory (Stark and Levhari, 1982, Stark 1984, and, Stark and Bloom, 1985). The main proposal of this theory is that migration decisions are undertaken not by individuals as proposed by the neo classical theory but by families or households acting together to maximize income, minimized risks and protect against constraints associated with market failures in (Stark and Levhari, 1982; Stark, 1984; Stark, 1991).

As such households are able to diversify their household resources such as labour while some members of the family could be deployed to work in the local economy, other members may be sent off to foreign economies that are not directly linked to the local economy in case of market failures so that household can rely on foreign remittances for survival (Massey et al, 1998).

In fact these same authors explain that while the risks arising from market failures are minimized through private insurance and government programs in developed economies, this is not the case in developing economies where these services are either absent, insufficient or inaccessible to poor households hence the need to spread out the risk to the household.

Massey et al (1998) explain the following risks and uncertainties that households in developing economies are confronted with:

1. Crop Insurance Markets: households invest money and time in sowing crops in a hope that the investment will pay off in the future. However, this is not always the case as crop family is faced by a number of constraints such as weather calamities, pests and disease incidences among others. Massey et al (1998) explain that even new farming innovations such as new seeds, fertilizers and technologies aimed at improving productivity may not always be successful. While the risks associated with these is absorbed by insurance companies and stringent government regulations in developed economies, these may not be available or inaccessible to poor households in developing economies hence an incentive for households to export their labour to as a self insurance against crop failure.

2. Future Markets: like in the scenario already described above, families invest in crop family hoping to sell at a future date for a profit. However this bet may not always be achieved due to price fluctuations and market imperfections common in developing economies. On the other hand, these risks are minimized in developed economies by future markets where farmers are able to negotiate price contract with buyers for products to be supplied at a future date. This mechanism means that investors assume the risk of loss should prices rise above the set minimum and reap the profits should prices rise above. The concept of future markets is generally lacking in developing economies hence an incentive for international immigration.

3. Employment insurance: many households in developing economies depend on wages earned by family members. If economic conditions deteriorate and unemployment rises, or if a member of the family is involved in an accident that leaves them unable to work for a period of time, the family livelihoods are threatened. In many developing economies, employment insurance schemes are not present, or insufficient or inaccessible for poor household. This is in direct contrast with the situation in developed economies where governments and institution mechanisms are in place to ensure the livelihoods of families are buffered from these shocks and calamities.

4. Capital markets: to increase household productivity, households may require capital investments to diversify, buy new farm implements, or new seed. Non-farm households may need capital to invest in the education and training of household members. Access to capital is facilitated by availability of a well-developed banking and insurance sector in developed economies. In many developing economies however, saving institutions are under developed and unreliable and hence many families shun them. It is also true that poor households lack collateral and so even if their banks and credit lending institutions exist, a number of factors hamper access especially for the poor households.

The critic of the new economics theory of migration is based on the set of assumptions on which it is based as discussed here below:

- Much as it is important for immigration research analysis to focus on the sending family or household unit as the decision making body as opposed to the individual, the literature doesn't not support this and indeed for many immigrants, their decision to move is based on information (from other immigrants, friends) about prospects for a better life and the urge to "better oneself" rather than on a collective and strategic family decision.
- ANOTHER critic is based on the assumption that "*Wage differences are not necessarily a pre-condition for migration. The main incentive for migration is to minimize risks and sustain the household livelihoods*". The reality shows that people are motivated to move for economic reasons as has been evidenced since the start of the 2007 financial crisis and often the move is to locations where employment opportunities are better and possibilities for a better quality of life.
- The assumption that "*International migration and involvement in local employment or production are not mutually exclusive but complementary*" is not true since the motivation for immigrations are wider than the employment aspects. This doesn't take into account the large percentage of people who are motivated to immigrate as a result security and stability concerns and in search of humanitarian assistance. In fact this is confirmed in the assumption of this theory that "*International migration does not stop when wage differentials are eliminated as other incentives for people to move remain in force*".
- Another key assumption of this theory is that "*Governments can influence international migration through policies that build sustainable, accessible and affordable capital markets, future market policies, unemployment insurance schemes and labour markets*". Despite this emphasis on the macros level reforms, the role of the micro level and personal aspirations cannot be more emphasised.

2.3. DUAL LABOUR MARKET THEORY

This theory emerged as a critic to the assumption and underlying principles of migration proposed by the neo classical and new economics theorists. While the two previously discussed theories focus on the micro economic level, the focus of this theory is at the macroeconomic level.

A main proponent of this theory is Piore (1979) who has strongly argued that international immigration is not as a result of the "push factors" out of the sending economies such as low wages or high unemployment but rather by the "pull factors" such as the persistence and extensive need for foreign/ migrant labour in the receiving countries.

According to Piore (1979) this built in and consistent demand for migrant labour is as a result of the following four fundamental characteristics of advanced industrial economies (Massey et al 1997):

- **Structural inflation.** Wages not only reflect conditions of demand and supply but also are expected to confer status and prestige to employees. As a result, wages don't often change as a result of changes in the supply of workers and a number of administrative and institutional

structures such as trade unions and administrative regulations are in place to ensure that salaries paid correspond to the hierarchies of prestige and status expectations in society.

Massey et al (ibid) explain that for instance employers could not offer higher wages to attract unskilled labour at the lower hierarchy as this could trigger demand for corresponding increments at the successive levels of the hierarchy. These authors have explain that “thus the cost to employers of raising wages to attract low level workers is typically higher than the cost of the wages to these workers alone. Wages must be increased proportionately throughout the job hierarchy in order to keep them in line with social expectations, a problem known as structural inflation” (ibid, p.441).

- **Motivational problems:** Piore (1979) explains that people not only work for wages per se but to accumulate and maintain social status. As such, acute motivational problems arise at the bottom hierarchy since these are usually low status jobs with few avenues for upward movement in the employment scale.

In fact, Massey et al (1997, p. 441) have argued that “this problem is inescapable and structural because the bottom cannot be eliminated from the labour market. Mechanization to eliminate the lowest and least desirable jobs will simply create a new bottom tier composed of jobs that used to be just above the bottom rung. Since there has to always be a bottom of any hierarchy, motivational problems are inescapable”.

As such, there is always a need for migrant labour whose motivation to work is as means to earn income for day-to-day sustenance with no implications for status or prestige in society. This seems to be the case for most migrants (especially at the beginning of their migrant careers) who begin out mostly as target workers to fulfil specific goals such as buy land, build a home or pay school fees for siblings back home.

Moreover the disjuncture in standards of living means that what is considered low wages abroad may actually enable the migrant to acquire and maintain higher status and prestige in his/her home community. “He does not view himself as part of the receiving community. Rather he sees himself as part of his home community, within which foreign labour and hard currency remittances carry considerable honour and prestige” (ibid, p. 442).

- **Economic dualism:** Piore (1979) explains that there is an inherent co relation between capital and labour. While capital is a fixed cost of production that can be made idle but not laid off when demand falls, labour on the other hand is a variable cost of production which can be laid off when the demand falls so that workers bear their own costs on unemployment. As such, capital-intensive methods are employed to meet basic demand while labour intensive methods are employed to address seasonal fluctuations in demand for labour.

While workers in the capital intensive primary sector better skilled, have stable contracts and benefits, belong to trade unions and as such cannot be easily laid off, the workers employed in the labour intensive secondary sector are temporary, unskilled or semi-skilled and could be laid off with no cost to the employer. These unfavourable conditions and low wages make these types of jobs unattractive to the native population who are drawn to the primary sector that

offers better work condition and prospects for upward mobility in the job hierarchy. This leads to the inherent need for migrant workers (Massey et al, 1989).

- **The demography of labour supply.** The above discussed factors, that is structural inflation, economic dualism and motivational problems combine to create a permanent demand for labour willing to work under harsh unstable conditions for little pay (ibid). In the past, these jobs were taken up by either women or teenagers whom were never considered primary bread earners at the family and derived their status and prestige from their social identity (Piore, 1979). This theory has argued that women tended to participate in the labour market up to the birth of first children and then to a lesser extent after the children have grown to earn a supplementary income for the family and for personal use. Women were willing to work for less pay in less status jobs as they considered these kinds of jobs as supplementary to their primary roles and identities grounded in family. On the other hand, teenagers are willing to take up these kinds of jobs as they view them as transitory with a hope of accessing the better paying status jobs at the end of their studies. To this effect, Massey et al, (1989, p. 443) note that *“teenagers have historically moved in and out of the labour force with great frequency in order to earn extra money, gain experience and to try out different occupational roles. They don’t view dead end jobs as problematic because they expect to get better jobs in the future after completing school, gaining experience and settling down. Moreover teenagers derive their social identities from their parents and families of orientation, not their jobs”*.

What is important to emphasises is that these trends have changed over time especially as more women ventured into the labour market as a means to income and social status. Also increased divorce rates resulted in the need for women to take on the role as primary income earners for some households.

Massey et al (ibid) has argued that although the dual labour theory is not in direct conflict with the above discussed micro economic theories; its implications for policy are quite different as suggested by the following:

1. International wage differentials are not a pre - conditions for international migration to occur since demand for migrant workers in industrial economies is structural and expressed through recruitment procedures and not wage increments.
2. International labour migration is largely demand based as opposed to being supply based.
3. Low-level wages in migrants receiving societies are controlled and regulated by institutions and government and as such cannot respond to changes in labour supply.
4. Immigrants fill a demand that is structural to modern postindustrial economies and creating a change would require a reorganizing at the macroeconomic level.

2.4. THE HISTORICAL- STRUCTURAL THEORY: WORLD SYSTEMS THEORY

According to Castle and Miller (2003) the world systems theorists with a strong intellectual rooting in the Marxist political economy provided a radically different interpretation of migration as opposed to neo- classical theorist. These theorist dominated research on migration during the 1970s and most of the 1980s (Massey et al, 1998).

These theorist argue that economic and political power are unequally distributed between the developed and developing countries, that people have unequal access to resources and that capitalist expansions reinforce these inequalities (De Haan 2008). It is in fact argued that “instead of modernizing and gradually progressing towards economic development, under developed countries are trapped by their disadvantaged position in the global geo political structure” (ibid, p.7).

According to Massey et al (1998), the historical structuralists never developed a theory per se but instead have pushed for the view that migration is a manifestation of capitalism and the growing unequal power between developed and developing countries.

In fact, Andre Gunder Frank (1969) is considered as one of the key proponents of this theory. He notably advised the notion of “development of underdevelopment” arguing that migration was a result of global capitalism and as such one of the key causes of underdevelopment. This is in contrast to the neo- classical view that migration leads to development (de Haan 2008).

This view is further supported by the ideas of Wallerstein (1974) and Sassen (1988, 1991) who have argued that countries are characterized either as the “core or the peripheral” depending on their degree of dependency. The most capitalist countries are classified as the “core” nations, followed by the “semi- peripheral”, and then the “peripheral”. Therefore, for countries in the peripheral to be included in the capitalist system, it would mean putting a migration drain on them as opposed to the factor price equalization presumed by the neo classical theorists (De Haan 2008).

In fact, “*instead of flowing in the opposite direction of capital as predicted by the neo- classical theory, the idea is that labour follows where capital goes*” (ibid, p. 7). That migration is not primamrily caused by people’s free choice in the face of structural constraints, but rather their being increasingly incorporated into the global capitalist system which results into the undermining of the community traditional livelihood systems and structures forcing people to migrate as cheap labour to the “core” nations that depend on availability of cheap labour to prosper.

Without a doubt, these theorists have been criticized first of all for a rigid approach, which considers people as “victims” per se and hence reactionary to macro- economic changes in society. As a matter of fact, Sen (1999) argued that thanks to global capitalism, countries that were traditionally considered labour exporters such as the Asian tigers have been able to develop never the less.

As explained by De Haas (2008), capitalism cannot be blamed for under development but that “the specific incorporation of a region or country into the global capitalist system seems to depend much more on the conditions under which this takes place.... how the incorporation is embedded into wider institutional structures as well as internal social political cohesion and economic strength of countries and regions.... Labour migration cannot automatically be interpreted as a desperate flight from misery, not only because it is seldom the poorest who migrate, but also because we can at least not logically rule out that the possibility that migration facilitates development through reverse flows of capital (remittances), knowledge, ideas, attitudes and people (return migration “ (ibid, p.8).

In summary the world systems theorists have argued that international migration is dependent on the ever expanding political and economic global markets hence the following hypotheses:

- The penetration of the global economy into the regions of the peripheral regions is the major catalyst for international migration. This is indeed true especially as globalisation has led to growing interconnectedness and interdependency around the world. This is evidenced by how widespread the financial crisis has been able to spread.
- The international flow of capital and goods stimulates transnational movement of labour as a result of increasing economic, social and cultural links between the core and periphery countries.
- There is a stronger likelihood for international migration between former colonial masters and their former colonies as a result of long established administrative, linguistic, and social cultural linkages and relationships established over time. This is supported by the literature and for many countries, the immigrant population profiles point to a historical relationship as will be discussed in the chapters to follow.
- Political and military interventions of capitalist governments in developing countries in an effort to protect their investment capital or offer support to foreign governments are likely to lead to international movements in the form of refugees especially when the interventions fail.
- International migration has more to do with the dynamics of market creation and global economic forces as opposed to just wage rates and employment differentials among countries.

CONCLUSION

The reasons why people migrate, their process of migration and how they relate to their families of origin after their migration experience has been widely researched and as evidenced in this chapter, a number of theories to explain this have evolved over the years. In this chapter, I introduced and discussed explained the different theoretical frameworks because I think it is important for the analysis of the root causes, effects and impacts of international migration as is the theme of this

Despite the differences in the assumptions, hypothesis and conclusions made by the different theorists, the reality is that that these are more complementary than contradictory. This understanding is therefore imperative for policy makers and implementers at the local, national and international level in face of the growing and changing trends of international migration.


CHAPTER 3

EUROPE AND IMMIGRATION

3.1. THE EU IN THE WORLD: AN OVERVIEW

On a global scene, the EU is undoubtedly an important actor considering it accounted for 25.8% share of the world's GDP in 2010. This is in comparison to the United States at 22.9%, China at 9.1% and 8.7% for Japan.


Figure 1: Share of the World GDP 2010



Source: Eurostat online data code (nama_gdpc) and the United Nations Statistics Division (National Accounts Main Aggregates Database)

One of the key effects of the financial and economic crisis is that it has led to global decline in productivity and consumption. It has in particular affected the overall performance of the EU Member State economies. The World Bank Report shows that in 2010 world GDP was valued at EUR 47, 570 billion, of which the G20 members accounted for 86.7%, which is 3% points less than in 2000 (as illustrated in figure 2 below).


Figure 2: Share of world GDP comparison between 2000 and 2010



(Source EUROSTAT 2011)

The effects of the global financial crisis are also evident in the analysis of EU 27 Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows and out flows. Figure 3 below shows how for instance the EU 27's FDI inflows and outflows dropped from a peak in 2007 to a low point in 2010. In the period 2008- 2010, the EU27 FDI flows were dominated by the United States which accounted for one third of the inward FDI and more than one quarter of its (EU) FDI outflows.

Figure 3: Average Flows of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) by Partners EU 27, 2008 -2010




(Source: Eurostat online data code (bop_fdi_main))

Canada also accounted for a significant share of EU 27 FDI inflows in the years following the 2007 economic down turn. As a whole, G20 countries (excluding Saudi Arabia) accounted for 54.2 % of FDI outflows from the EU 27 between 2008 and 2010 and 57.5 % of its inflows (Eurostat 2013).

3.2. THE EU POPULATION VS THE REST OF THE WORLD

According to the United Nations' (UN's) World Population Prospects 2010, the world's population reached 7.1 billion as of 1st July 2012. Asia accounted for the majority of the world's population (just over 60% in 2012) with 4.25 billion inhabitants, while Africa was the next most populous continent with 1.07 billion inhabitants, or 15.2% of the global total.

Figure 4: World Population 2010



Source: Eurostat online data code (demo_gind) and the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (World Population Prospects: the 2010 Revision)

In comparison, there were 740 million inhabitants in Europe (10.5% of the global total), of which almost 504 million in the EU-27 in 2012, accounting for just over 7% of the world's population (EU 2013). According to the latest special supplement on demographic trends (EU 2013), the EU population increased by 1.3 million people in 2012 continuing a pattern of uninterrupted population growth in the EU since 1960.

However, the report also notes that the rate of population growth is gradually declining and this can be evidenced in the fact that in the period 1992-2011, the EU-27 population increased on average by about 1.5 million persons per year compared to an annual average of around 3.3 million persons per year in the 1960s (EC 2013). What this means is that the population growth rate has more than halved what it was in 1960.

According to another recently released report, The EU in the World 2013 (EU 2012), the EU member states with the largest population in 2010 were: Germany (82 Million), France (65 M), the United Kingdom (62 M), Italy (60 M) and Spain (46 M). Future projections carried in the same report predicts that by 2060, the United Kingdom would become the most populous EU country (79 M), followed by France (74 M), Germany (66 M), Italy (65 M) and Spain (52 M).


These latest demographic studies show that while the European Union's population is increasing, its age structure is becoming older as post-war baby-boom generations reach retirement age. People are living longer and life expectancy continues to increase. It is however equally important to note that although fertility is slowly increasing, it remains well below a level that would keep the size of the population constant in the absence of inward or outward migration (ibid).

3.3. THE DEMOGRAPHIC CHALLENGES FACING EUROPE

The 2012 EU Ageing Report recently released by the European Commission shows that the age structure of the EU population is projected to change dramatically. The population pyramid for the EU-27 in 2011 is narrow at the bottom and is shaped more as a rhomboid due to the baby-boom cohorts of the 1960s (EU 2013).

As a result of the Low fertility levels across most of the EU 27, the decreasing share of young people in the total population has been dwindling resulting into the 'ageing at the bottom', as visible in the population pyramids between 1991 and 2011.

Figure 5: Population Pyramid EU 27, 1999-2011




The report points to an urgent need for Europe to start preparing now for a demographic shift towards an older population supported by a shrinking working age population.

This view is echoed in the Eurostat Population Projections (EUROPOP 2010), which show that the elderly people are projected to account for an increasing share of the population while the middle of the age pyramid becomes smaller as a result of below natural replacement fertility rates. Figure 6

below shows how the shape of the population pyramid will gradually change between 2012 and 2060 based on current population projections.

Figure 6: Population Pyramid EU 27, 2012 -2060



Population projections covering the period from 2011 to 2060 show that population ageing is likely to affect all EU Member States over this period. The above pyramid scenario indicates that the EU-27's population will be slightly higher in 2060 while the age structure of the population will be much older than it currently is. It also shows that nearly one third of Europeans will be 65 or over by 2060, and that the share of those aged 15-64 is projected to decline from 67% to 56%. This would mean a shift from 4 working-age people for every pensioner to just 2 (EU 2012).

The economic, social, cultural and organizational challenges and consequences this will impose to the EU markets, economy and fiscal sustainability are wide ranging and hence the need for policy makers at the EU and member states to address these issues.

3.4. THE EU AND IMMIGRATION

The EU has in the past decade experienced unprecedented levels of immigrants both from beyond and from within the EU. In the case of Latvia and Estonia, the proportion of citizens from non-EU countries is particularly large due to the high number of recognised non-citizens (mainly former Soviet Union citizens, who are permanently resident in these countries but have not acquired any other citizenship).


The population from Africa forms the next populous group, followed by Asia, the Americas and Oceania. Majority of African immigrants living in the EU originated mainly from north africa (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt). On the other hand majority of the asians in the EU came are from India and China. Citizens of Ecuador and the United States made up the largest share of non-nationals from the Americas living in the EU.

As a matter of fact, the impact of immigration on the population structure of the EU 27 countries over the years has been well documented and researched by a number of authors and organizations. The OECD 2012 Looking to 2060: Long Term Global Growth Prospects (OECD 2012, p.13) shows that net migration could and will continue to have a substantial impact on population growth and the working-age population if migration flows remain sufficiently large and sustained over time.

The report further states “Migrants contribute to population growth in two ways. First, they increase total population, and second, they generally have an upward impact on average fertility, as fertility of female migrants is generally higher than natives. If past trends continue, the positive contribution of net migration is projected to either mitigate the decline in population in some European countries or even offset the reduction in native population, notably in Austria, Italy, Spain and Switzerland. Moreover, because the foreign born population has been disproportionately composed of working-age adults, migration has in the past lowered the dependency ratio” (ibid, p.13).

The figure below serves to illustrate the effect of net migration on the EU 27 population over time.

Figure 7: Population Change by Component EU 27, 1990 - 2009



According to the latest data from Eurostat, approximately 1.7 million immigrants come into the EU from a country outside the EU-27 during the year 2011. The United Kingdom reported the largest number of immigrants (566,044) in 2011, followed by Germany (489,422), Spain (457,649) and Italy (385,793) (Eurostat 2013). These four Member States together accounted for 60.3 % of all immigrants to EU-27 Member States during 2011.

The largest share (52.4 % of all immigrants to the EU) are citizens from medium HDI countries and 34.6 % are from high HDI (but non-EU) countries. Low HDI countries (6.3 %), EFTA countries (3.6 %) and candidate countries (3.1 %) accounted for relatively low shares of total immigration to the EU-27 in 2011.

The figures 8A and 8B offer a summary overview of immigration to EU.

Figure 8A: Citizens of non EU countries resident in the EU 27 by continent of origin as of 1st Jan 2012





Figure 8B: Immigration in the EU



Sourced: <http://www.debatingeurope.eu/> accessed 26th August 2013)

3.5. IMMIGRATION STOCKS

According to the **EU Social Statistics 2011** (EU 2011), the EU-27 Member States received nearly two million migrants of other EU nationalities. The most mobile Europeans were the Romanians, the Polish and the Germans. The report notes that EU-27 Member States received 384,000 Romanian, 266,000 Polish and 91,000 Bulgarian citizens during the year 2008.

The remaining 1.8 million immigrants to EU-27 Member States were non-EU citizens (ibid) of these Moroccans (the only group to exceed 100000) were the largest group, followed by citizens of China, India, Albania and the Ukraine. Most Moroccans migrating in 2008 went to Spain (almost 94000) or to Italy (37000). In the same year, Spain also received the largest share of Chinese immigrants (28 % or 27000 in absolute terms). The United Kingdom was the main destination for citizens of India (EU 2011).

The report further shows that although majority of EU-27 Member States reported more immigration than emigration in 2008, the following countries Bulgaria, Germany, Poland, Romania and the three Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania experienced higher emigration than immigration. Spain, Germany and the United Kingdom were the EU countries with the highest immigration. They received more than half (53 %) of all immigrants in 2008 although they also experienced high levels of emigration in the same period (ibid).

On a whole, Compared with 2007 immigration to EU Member States is estimated to have decreased by 6% and emigration to have increased by 13% in 2008 (Flanders 2011). However as the researcher correctly states, the statics may be inaccurate considering the problems associated with measuring emigration; in particular, it is more difficult to measure people leaving a country than those arriving.


3.6. IMMIGRANTS BY GENDER, EU-27, EFTA AND CANDIDATE COUNTRIES (2008)

A gender analysis of the immigrants into the EU shows that around 48 % of immigrants were women (EU 2011). According to the same report, data from Cyprus, Italy, Spain, France and Ireland showed that women arrivals out numbered that of men. For example in Cyprus, this was mainly due to high arrivals of Filipino, Sri Lankan and Vietnamese women whereas in Italy and Spain women outnumbered men with Romanian citizenship in the case of Italy, and Moroccan citizenship in the case of Spain). In addition, among immigrants to Italy, women outnumbered men among citizens of Ukraine, Moldavia, Poland and Russia, while in Spain, the same applied for citizens of Pakistan and Senegal (ibid)

It is however important to note as Flanders (2011) explains that data on the reason for migration are rarely collected as part of the annual International Migration Statistics Data Collection which makes it almost possible to analyse whether men and women migrate for different reasons. However, analysis of the 2008 Labour Force Survey data from an ad hoc module on migration showed that for foreign-born men aged between 25 and 54, employment was the primary reason for migration, whereas half

of foreign-born women reported family-related reasons to migrate (ibid). Figure 9 below offers an illustration of the above-discussed reality.

Figure 9: Immigrants by gender, EU - 27, EFTA and candidate countries, 2008



No data for LI; immigration data for EL, RO and TR include non-nationals only and are therefore not included; immigration data for BG and HR highly underestimate non-nationals and are therefore not included.

Source: Eurostat (online data code: [migr_imm1ctz](#))


3.7. AGE STRUCTURE OF IMMIGRANTS BY BASIC CITIZENSHIP GROUPS, EU-27, 1ST JANUARY 2012

The EU publication, *Migrants in the EU* (Eurostat 2011) shows that immigrants to EU Member States were, on average, younger than the population of their country of destination. While the median age of the total population of all EU Member States was 40.6 on 31 December 2008, the median age of immigrants for the same period was 28.4 (EU 2013).

It should however be noted that latest released data by EUROSTAT as of 1st January 2012 shows an upward change in the median age with the median age of the national population in the EU-27 reported as 41.9 years, while that of the foreigners living in the EU was 34.7 years.

Among immigrants there were noticeable differences in the age distribution of nationals, EU nationals and non-EU nationals. Non-EU nationals were the youngest, with a median age of 27.5 years, followed by EU nationals on 29.3 years. Nationals were the oldest with a median age of 30.2 years (EU 2011).

Figure 10: Age Structure of the National and non- National population, EU-27, 1st January 2012




(Source: Eurostat (migr_pop2ctz))

3.8. FOREIGN AND FOREIGN BORN POPULATION IN THE EU

The latest statistics from EUROSTAT (Eurostat 2012) show that The EU-27 foreign population (people residing in a EU-27 Member State with citizenship of a non EU-27 Member State) as of 1st January 2012 was 20.7 million, representing 4,1 % of the EU-27 population. This is in addition to the 13.6 million persons living in an EU-27 Member State with citizenship of another EU-27 Member State as of the same date.

Figure 11: Share of foreigners in the resident population as of 1st January 2012



(Source Eurostat 2013)

The largest numbers of foreigners living in the EU as of 1st January 2012 were recorded in Germany (7.4 million persons), Spain (5.5 million), Italy (4.8 million), the United Kingdom (4.8 million) and France (3.8 million) (Eurostat 2012). Non-nationals in these five Member States collectively


represented 77.1 % of the total number of non-nationals living in the EU-27, while the same five Member States had a 62.9 % share of the EU's population.

An analysis of the distribution by continent of citizens of non-EU countries living in the EU, the largest proportion (38.5 %) were citizens of a European country outside the EU-27 while 7.9 million citizens from European countries outside of the EU-27 were residing in the EU; among these more than half were citizens of Turkey, Albania or Ukraine (Ibid).

The next biggest group was from Africa (24.5 %), followed by Asia (22.0 %), the Americas (14.2 %) and Oceania (0.8 %). More than half of the citizens of African countries that were living in the EU were from North Africa, often from Morocco or Algeria. Many Asian citizens living in the EU came from southern or eastern Asia, in particular from India or China. Citizens of Ecuador and the United States made up the largest share of non-nationals from the Americas living in the EU.

Another measure used to classify and describe foreign-born population in the EU – 27 is the level of human development index (HDI) of their country of origin. The HDI is used by the UNDP as a composite index incorporating statistical measures of life expectancy, literacy, educational attainment and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. This measure classifies countries into the high HDI, medium HDI and low HDI. Among the non-EU citizens living in the EU-27 in 2012, some 44.2 % were citizens of a high HDI country (with Turkey, Albania and Russia accounting for almost half), while a slightly higher share (48.3 %) came from medium HDI countries (one fifth from Morocco, followed by China and Ukraine). The remaining 7.6 % were from low HDI countries (30 % with Nigerian or Iraqi citizenship).

Figure 12: Non-EU citizens analysed by level of HDI of country of citizenship, 1st January 2012 (Eurostat 2013)



3.9. SECOND GENERATION IMMIGRANTS IN THE EU

Second-generation migrants refer to two different groups of immediate descendants of migrants. The first group, with a mixed background, is defined as persons who are native born and who have one foreign-born parent and one native-born parent. The second group, with a foreign background, is defined as persons who are native born with both parents foreign born.

In the EU 27, approximately 6 million native-born persons aged 25–54 have one parent born abroad and more than 4 million native-born persons have both parents born abroad. In general terms, the second-generation migrants (both with one parent and two parents born abroad) make up a substantial proportion of the population in Estonia, Latvia, Luxembourg and France, as well as Switzerland while very low proportions are observed in Hungary, Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal (Eurostat 2012).

3.10. UN DOCUMENTED / IRREGULAR/ ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION IN THE EU

The debate on the definition and terminology to describe the immigrants living in Europe without proper documentation has intensified in recent years. For many, the term illegal is vague and enhancing of stereotypes of immigrants as criminals or likely to commit crime as opposed to focusing on their status per se. more to that, the status of immigrants can change over time and therefore using the term illegal immigrants does not capture the dynamics of change over time in the status of immigrants. According to Düvell (2006) 'legal and illegal immigrants cannot be clearly distinguished' due to the increasing proliferation of legal statuses, the lines between legal and illegal are blurred.

Tapinos (1999) and Blomfield (2011) are some of the scholars who have provided the following characteristics used to define an illegal immigrant:

- Illegal entry (illegal border crossing)
- Entry using false documents
- Entry using legal documents but providing false information in the documents
- Overstaying visa or temporary residence permit
- Change of status due to non renewal of residence permit
- Being born into irregularity
- Absconding during the asylum evaluation process or failing to leave the state after a negative decision has been reached
- Failure of the state to enforce a return for legal or practical reasons (such as toleration or further consultation)

Even in the EU, the terminology used in debate and policy on illegal or undocumented immigrants is not uniform across all member states although a common framework exists. The reality is that each member state has a different immigration system and although common cooperation has been

established on border management through the establishment of Frontex and considerable progress being made in harmonising the approach and strategy (specifically on asylum), most other aspects fall in the domain of member state competences (Morehouse and Blomfield 2011). The table below extracted from the Clandestino project final report (2009) serves to highlight the different categorisations and definitions among member states and the different laws governing this category of immigrants.

Table 1. Legal Definitions of Irregular Migration in Select EU Countries

Country	Term / Definition	Law
United Kingdom	Illegal entry	1971 Immigration Act
Germany	Unlawful entry. Foreigners no longer possessing a necessary residence title and a right of residence are required to leave the federal territory.	Aufenthaltsgesetz (Residence Law)
Netherlands	The presence of foreign nationals who are not in possession of a valid residence permit and are therefore obliged to leave the country are defined as "unlawful stay illegals."	2000 Aliens Act. Linking Act. (Benefit Entitlement and Residency Status Act). Illegalennota (Ministry of Justice, Policy document on Illegal Aliens, 2004).
Spain	There is no term in national legislation for irregular immigration or irregular situation. Clandestine migration means that the foreigner is not a legal resident of Spain.	Ley organic 8/2000. Reglamento de la ley organica 4/2000, de 11 de Enero, sobre derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en Espana y su integracion social (Rules of Implementation of the Law on Foreigners). Penal code
Italy	Foreigners in an irregular position.	Bossi-Fini Law No. 189/2002
Poland	Nelegalni (nonlegal), illegal crossing of the border, residing in the territory without the required visa or permit.	Act on Aliens

Source: Adapted from *Clandestino Project Final Report*, 2009.

According to the 2008 EU return directive, illegal stay is defined as the "presence on the territory of a member state a third country national who does not fulfil, or no longer fulfils the conditions of entry as set out in article 5 of the Schengen borders code or other conditions of entry, stay or residence in the member state (Comm 2008).

One particular challenge with this category of immigrants is the lack of up to date data and actual statics since as described they are "undocumented". However a number of estimated figures are available and can be used in this analysis. The Cladestino research project "*Undocumented Immigrants: Counting the Uncountable*" from 2007 - 2009 funded by the EC DG Research established that in 2008, an estimation of between 1.9 million to 3.8 million unauthorised immigrants lived in the EU. The report also showed that the population of irregular immigrants had declined considerably especially after the 2004 enlargements and that the decline was expected to continue following the onset on the financial crisis in 2007 which led to decline in job opportunities in most of the EU.

The latest data from FRONTEX confirm that, based on the detections of the number of people trying to illegal enter into the EU declined by more than half in 2012. This according to FRONTEX is an indicator of relative easing in tensions in the Arab neighbouring countries of North Africa on one hand and the fact that the EU worked hard to enforce tighter border controls especially on the previously porous border between Greece and Turkey as depicted in the map below.

Figure 13: Number of Illegal Border crossings detected and change from 2011 by route



However, as Ilkka Laitinen, director of Frontex is quoted in Stevis (2013), the conflict in Syria has increased the number of Syrians entering Europe and this may cause an increase in the number of illegal immigrants in total considering the difficulties encountered by Syrian immigrants arriving in Greece over the last few months.

This view is further emphasised in the FRONTEX annual Risk analysis report (2013) stating that although majority of the detected illegal entrants into the EU were Afghans in 2012, the numbers for Syrians increased in 2012 and 13 and is likely to continue as more Syrians escape the political war and unrest that continues to threaten the whole region.

Painting the actual picture of the numbers and situation of the immigrants illegally residing in the EU is a great challenge not only to the EU but to the member states, regional and provincial governments. The estimates based on detected arrivals doesn't cover the number of immigrants that enter into Europe with valid visas but decide to over stay, and who take opportunity to move freely in the Schengen area. This category does not take account of those immigrants previously legally resident but whose status changed due to rising unemployment that has hit mostly the construction and manufacturing sectors in which majority of immigrants are employed.

Although the financial crisis and the resulting unemployment have led into a number of immigrants change residences within the EU. The actual figures and number remain unconfirmed and so are questions about the actual numbers of immigrants previously illegally resident in one member state who have been able to move across Europe. This therefore renders it almost impossible to understand how the economic crisis has impacted on illegal immigration beyond the scope of detected arrivals

CONCLUSIONS

The publication **Migrants in the EU** (Eurostat 2011) highlights the following facts on the demographic and social economic conditions characterizing and affecting migrants in the EU- 27. These are of paramount significance to policy makers and implementing structures at the EU, member state, regional and local levels if effective integration of Migrants in the EU is to become a reality:

- The labour market participation of first-generation migrants compares unfavourably to that of the native-born and nationals. The difference between the two groups results mainly from a considerably lower labour market participation of migrant women, particularly those with at least one child.
- Consistently higher levels of unemployment hamper the integration of migrants into the labour market. Higher levels of unemployment are seen for both male and female migrants and for migrants of all levels of education, including those with the highest qualifications.
- The potential misuse of skills and qualifications of highly qualified migrants not finding jobs is amplified by the large number of highly qualified migrants working in jobs well below their educational qualification.
- Migrants also have a lower level of income and particularly those from outside the EU have a significantly increased risk of poverty or social exclusion, even if they are in employment. This risk is greater in households with children.
- Lower income levels also go hand in hand with less favourable housing conditions, in particular with regard to overcrowding.
- In the second generation (native born persons with one or both parents born abroad), some of these disadvantages have been reduced or even, in the case of second-generation migrants with a mixed background (one parent born abroad), sometimes reversed. The situation of second generation migrants with a foreign background (both parents born abroad), while being more positive than that of first-generation migrants, still shows disadvantages compared to the situation of persons with a native background.
- Young second-generation migrants with a foreign background are generally at greater risk of exiting the education and training system without having obtained an upper secondary qualification. The level of educational attainment of second-generation migrants, however, differs considerably between Member States.

CHAPTER 4

EU LAWS AND POLICIES ON IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION

4.1. EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK ON IMMIGRATION

According to Collyer (2011), the EU interest and focus on the relationship between migration and development dates back to the 1960s and 1970s with the commissioning of a number of policy related research projects. These projects main focus was the countries of origin of guest workers. These early studies showed that financial transfers from migrants funded consumption rather than investment. They did not purposely document on the potential of immigration for development since it has been widely expected that migration to Europe would cease in the 1970s with the ending of labour migration (ibid).

Other authors Cerna have written that the EU efforts to harmonise immigration can be traced back to the early 1970s with the 1974 action programme in favour of migrant workers and their families considered the first step towards a common position on migration (Cerna 2013, Huysmans 2000). It is these efforts that paved the way for further attempts during the 1980s The Single European Act, the Dublin - Schengen Agreements, and the Maastricht Treaty of the early 1990s. It should however be noted that Immigration policy at this time was limited to asylum and transit visas, as part of the third pillar of Justice and Home Affairs (Cerna 2013).

The above described scenario has been coined as the “*more development for less migration*” approach by Pastore (2003) since most governments in Europe in the 1980s and 1990s focused on more stringent migration controls and efforts to end migration by addressing the so called “root causes”

It is not until the European Council instituted the High-level Working Group on Asylum and Migration (HLWG) towards the end of 1998 that real intergovernmental policy discussion on immigration and development in EU started to take shape (Collyer 2011).

The Amsterdam Treaty signed on 2 October 1997 and entered into force on 1 May 1999 made substantial changes to the Maastricht Treaty (which had been signed in 1992) by expanding the area of immigration in the first pillar (e.g. external border controls, immigration, and asylum). It is indeed important to note that the treaty of Amsterdam enabled the commission to initiate legislation in areas of the justice and home affairs, more specifically Migration and asylum.

The recommendations of the HLWG on the EU relation with six key countries of origin presented and discussed at the Tampere European council in 1999 focused on strengthening the EU's justice and home affairs (JHA) policies and introduced a five-year mandate to harmonise immigration policies. This

as Schain (2009) points out was in recognition of the undisputed demographic challenges facing the EU and her sectorial labour market needs.

The five years that followed the ambitious Tampere programme saw the passing of the first round of harmonized legislation and the preparation for the 2004 enlargements that focused attention on Eastern Europe (Collyer 2004).

As such, the first communication from the commission on Migration and development was published in 2002 (COM 2002, 703 Final) and discussed the '*Migration Hump*', possible policy orientations, remittances and highly skilled migration among others. It is this communication that marked the shift between the earlier focuses on development as a tool for migration control to more development focused approaches (Collyer 2011).

In December 2005, the Commission presented a proposal for the Green Card according to the 'Policy Plan on Legal Migration' on the adoption of four legislative proposals (for high-skilled immigrants, intra-company transferees, seasonal workers, and trainees) from 2007 to 2009 (Commission 2005). The European Council endorsed this selective approach in December 2006, inviting the Commission to present proposals as part of the comprehensive EU Migration Policy (Commission 2007).

The years following 2006 onwards saw the EU undertake a wide range of activities and projects processes in partnership with various regional actors such as the Euro Mediterranean partner countries, the African Union, the ACP and a further grouping of African states following on from the Migration and Development Conference in Rabat in 2006 (Collyer 2008).

As most recently as the 2009, an overview of the entire EU Home Affairs programme was presented in the Stockholm Programme (CEU 2009) highlighting the EU's commitment to 'solidarity' in international migration, in the context of the global approach (Collyer 2011). The EU called for 'proposals' on 1. Enhancing remittances; 2. Supporting diaspora groups and 3. Facilitating circular migration, all of which indicated a significant shift from the previous focus on Communications in relation to migration and development towards binding legislation, presumably in the shape of Directives.

The Commissions 3rd and latest Communication on Migration and Development (Com 2013, 292 final) focused on "*a more 'ambitious and forward-looking' approach to migration and development at EU level, as formulated in the Council conclusions of 29 May 2012 on the GAMM*" (Commission 2012, p. 3) in recognition of the need for a broader and wider appreciation of the link between development and Migration in view of the post 2015 development framework.

One of the authors that has widely written on this theme is Cerna (2013) who explains that before the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in December 2009, immigration policy at the EU level was under unanimity rule where in this case, all Member States had to agree on the Blue Card Directive. This directive was approved by the EU Council on 25 May 2009 (Council 2009) and entered into force on 19 June 2009. Benefiting from a single application procedure, Blue Card holders can reside and work in

an EU country for a maximum of four years and move to another Member State after eighteen months (but need to apply for a new permit).

Although the above discussion indicate a gradual evolution of the EU institutional discourse and policy implementation on issues of Migration over the last few years, it must be noted that the global economic crisis effects of rise in unemployment, underemployment and society vulnerability is likely to change this. It is indeed true that in EU countries where elections have brought to right wing or extreme right wing political parties to power, the discussion and immigration debates has tended to shift to enhancement of border controls as opposed to the immigration for development agenda of the last few years. Attached to this thesis as appendix I are the following EU Directives on immigration (the directives have been accessed from http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries on 10th August 2013).

- I. Directive 2003/86/EC on The Right to Family Reunification
- II. Directive 2003/109/EC on a Long-Term Resident Status for non-member nationals;
- III. Directive 2004/114/EC on the admission of students;
- IV. Directive 2005/71/EC for the facilitation of the admission of researchers into the EU;
- V. Directive 2009/50/EC Concerning The Admission of Highly Skilled Migrants.
- VI. 4.1.6 Stockholm Programme and Action Plan (COM 2010) 171 final)

4.2. THE EUROPE 2020 STRATEGY

In the beginning of 2010, the European Commission (EC) proposed Europe 2020 – a new strategy for jobs and growth in the EU in the upcoming decade and a follow-up to the Lisbon Agenda (2000-2010) that aimed to boost Europe's competitiveness through a set of strategic policy initiatives in various areas of economic, social and environmental policies.

Europe 2020 identifies several strategic priorities, namely, developing a knowledge and innovation-based economy, promoting sustainable growth and inclusive societies characterized by high employment, social and territorial cohesion, and setting related headline targets. In particular, the new strategy includes reinforced references to migration in the context of raising employment levels and combating poverty by removing barriers to labour market participation.

The strategy puts forward seven flagship initiatives, including an “Agenda for New Skills and New Jobs” that strengthens the importance of this joint policy initiative by the EC and the EU Member States launched at the end of 2008. The “New Skills for New Jobs” initiative supports efforts to forecast future needs for new skills in the EU labour markets and secure these skills through education and training.

This Europe 2020 flagship initiative tightly links meeting the future demand for skills and migration by stating that the EC will work “to facilitate and promote intra-EU labour mobility and better match labour supply with demand with appropriate financial support from the structural funds, notably the

European Social Fund (ESF), and to promote a forward-looking and comprehensive labour migration policy which will respond in a flexible way to the priorities and needs of labour markets”.

In addition, the EC has issued a proposal for the Council decision on the Europe 2020 integrated guidelines that would guide national policies in achieving the objectives of the strategy. Guideline 7 calls for “increasing labour market participation and reducing structural unemployment”, including through promotion of labour market integration of legal migrants.

The EU headline target is “to bring by 2020 to 75 per cent the employment rate for women and men aged 20–64.” Furthermore, Guideline 8 refers to “developing a skilled workforce responding to labour market needs, promoting job quality and lifelong learning”, specifically stating that “quality initial education and attractive vocational training must be complemented ... by targeted migration and integration policies.

4.3 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The EU has developed a number of directives as part of the body of legislative work of the EU on Immigration. Despite this, Thym (2013) explains that confusion about the legal status of third country nationals persists in the EU. That while deepening EU integration has been at the core of the EU through abolition of borders legally under the fundamental freedoms and physically through the abolition of external borders in the Schengen areas. While for EU citizens, EU law assumes that their social integration should be left to the discretion of individual choices and they have a right to more freely and settle in the country they so choose.

However as Cholewiski (2002) quoted in Thym (2013) states, standard EU legislation often diverges from the single market paradigm in dealing with third country nationals (with the exception of long term third country residents) if compared to the rights of EU citizens. Luedtke (2009) on his part explains the discrepancy that exists between the approach of the Eurocrats in Brussels who appear sympathetic to the freedoms and rights of the third country nationals while the member state governments and state authorities across Europe are keen to link immigration to criminality, rising unemployment and insecurity as a strategy to rise public fear and resentment for immigrants, especially illegal immigration as a vice that must be curbed through tighter laws and rules for immigrants. This can be explained by the nature and amount of political pressure felt by the elected governments which in turn influences how the EU legislation on immigration is adopted and thereafter implemented in the different member states (Luedtke 2009).

Despite the amount of legislation so far attained at the EU level, it remains apparent that cooperation and coordination at the member state level remains a challenge and this is evidenced by the events following the arrival of thousands of immigrants escaping the unrest of the Arab spring in 2011 and thereafter. The unfortunate accident of October 2013 at the Italian shore of Lampedusa cause public outcry for strengthened support from the EU and member states across Europe.

Advocacy by the civil society, NGOs and lobby groups continue to lobby for the protection and promotion of the rights of all immigrants especially refugees and asylum seekers. These efforts received a further boost from the visit of Pope Francis to Lampedusa to pay homage to immigrants who lost their lives in quest for safety and better life in Europe. In addition, Caritas Europa used the occasion of the World Day of refugees (20th June 2013) to advocate for the right to family life as one of the pillars of human rights for Refugees and calling for better implementation of EU rules citing failure by some EU Member States of repeatedly failing to apply them accordingly (EuroActiv press release 2013).

For many immigrants, family reunification is perhaps the most important channel of immigration into the EU considering that that other channels of legal migration (labour migration and asylum seeking) have remained relatively closed and limiting. As such family reunification occupies a primary place in the EU's efforts to create a common immigration and asylum policy.

However and as Luedtke (2009) argues, the directive on family reunification stood in between the national legislation of those member states such as Belgium and France with their generous and more liberal provisions to grant family reunion rights, while on the other hand, member states such as Italy and German whose domestic legislation was more restrictive of these rights. One example according to the Berlin Institute of Comparative social research (BICSR 2003) states that while the national legislation of Belgium and the Netherlands provided family reunion rights for both heterosexual and homosexual couples, the EU directive is silent on this.

On the contrary, other member states such as Spain used the directive as an opportunity to better their own legislation which lacked the integration test for minors hence using the directive to tighten their own weak points if it can be looked at as that. In the France, the Sarkozy Government, attempted to use the directive to introduce DNA testing between family members to curb illegal entry and fraud (ibid).

Generally speaking, it can be said that the directives long term residence of third country citizens in the EU and the directive on family reunifications are the ones that have been more successfully implemented if compared with other directives aimed at EU legislation on integration of Immigrants (ibid)

Indeed a number of scholars have argued that one area in which the EU legislation on immigration has not been successful are the directives on legal labour migration be it in regards to low skilled labour, or even the highly skilled personnel (The Blue card directive) (Cerna 2007, Luedtke 2009).

Unlike the already mentioned directives, the economic migration directives have received very little support from almost all members since the initial proposals of the "green card" were introduced in 2001. In fact, a number of member states such as France and Belgium were more open and supportive of humanitarian immigration as opposed to economic immigration since this was more in line with their domestic laws and policies.

Even the more recent introduction and modification and hence the “blue card” proposals, member states have not been forthcoming especially during the current times of the economic crisis and rising unemployment in almost all member states. Even those member states such as Germany, France and Belgium with their liberal immigration policies have not enthusiastically supported the economic migration directives and this is confirmed by an opinion poll which found that 36 per cent of French respondents, 40 per cent of respondents, and 43 per cent of German respondents agreed with the statement that “immigrants have jobs that we should have” (Reif and Melich, 1988).

In conclusion therefore, it is clear that the legislative work of the EU in the field of immigrant integration is a work in progress. While progress has been made on a number of fronts, it is also true that much more work needs to be done at all levels if real integration of immigrants is to be achieved across the EU.

According to Caporaso and Tarrow (2007), European institutions have been more willing than their elected counterparts at the national level to ignore populist xenophobia and work with business, trade unions and NGO lobbies because of the pro-free movement bias in the European project.

Since the coming into force of the Lisbon treaty, the Commission has the sole right of initiative to propose all new laws and this coupled with the “open method of coordination,” gives hope that using its powers of agenda-setting and information provision, legislation in general and specifically in the field of immigration will be more streamlined and coordinated in the future (Caviedes, 2004).

More still, since voting in the European council will be by majority, a few reluctant countries will not be able to hold up key legislative proposals in the future as happened with the economic immigration directive. Also the co - decision making powers of the European Parliament will ensure effective participation and ownership of EU legislation both at the EU and back home in the member states, where they represent the citizens who elected them into office.

CHAPTER 5

THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: IMPACT ON MIGRATION IN THE EU

5.1. THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE EU

The global financial crisis that hit the global economy in 2008 has led to the most severe recession since the Second World War (IMO 2009). The 2008 global financial crisis is widely understood to have been triggered by the collapse of the financial and housing sectors in the US (Wright and Black 2011). Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) have observed that the causes of the 2007 crisis have a lot in common to previous financial crises, as it was preceded by a period of financial liberalization and recycling of surplus petro dollars into loans to borrowers who lacked the capacity to repay the loans.

The European Economic Recovery Programme (EERP) was designed as a set of comprehensive anti crisis measures to boost economic activity and limit the rise in unemployment across Europe and bail out packages to support those member states worst hit by the financial crisis. EU helped to coordinate these different measures and introduced further measures of its own (EC 2008).

The EU's Stability and Growth Pact for instance sets limits on the amount of public borrowing and debt that Member States are allowed to take on. As way back as 2010, the European Economic Spring 2010 Forecast noted that recovery seemed promising for the next few years, the rate of recovery remains slow and the EU may be facing "a rather jobless recovery and (potentially persistent) high unemployment" (EC 2010).

Although the current analysis of the effects of the financial crisis has tended to focus on micro economic impact on global trade, credit, private capital flows, remittances and aid (McCulloch and Sumner 2009), a number of organisations and authors have concentrated efforts on highlighting the micro level impact on people livelihoods across the world. For example an 2008 Oxfam international report showed that the increased hike in food prices in 2008 immensely affected low-income household livelihoods around the world. It is therefore important to note that both the macro and micro level impacts must be equally explored as they both cross cut material and psychosocial domains of human wellbeing (Wright and Black 2011).

Despite the fact that the material and psychosocial domains operate separately, their impact on migration shows a dynamic inter linkage between these two domains at the global and at the personal level (ibid). This view is shared by Castle (2009) emphasises that migrants cannot be mistakenly seen to serve as a sort of safety valve for developed economies by providing labour in times of expansion and then leaving in times of recession. Castle (2009) wrote that immigrants cannot just be looked at as economic actors only motivated by income maximisation, but rather as social beings who arrive into a new community, set up roots and form relationships just like any one else.

In addition, Castle (2009) has argued that the effects of the financial crisis on immigrants need to be distinguished between the short and the long term as these have implications for policy programs and implementation. The short term impacts as listed include:

- Increased numbers of migrant workers returning to their homelands as a reaction to unemployment or lower earnings as has been observed in the case of Polish workers in Britain and Ireland).
- Reduced levels of migration from origin countries to destination countries.
- Attempts by governments to provide incentives to unemployed migrant workers to leave for example in Spain and in Italy although this has achieved minimal results.
- Reduced remittances (money transfers) from migrants to their home communities, leading to possible hardship in communities dependent on these transfers.
- Increased hostility to migrants among majority populations in the host countries leading to increased xenophobia, conflict and resentment as a result of increased society vulnerability.

On the other hand, the long term effects of 2008 global financial crisis on international migration are more complex and difficult to foresee (ibid). Like Castle (2009), another scholar Koser (2009) has argued that a look at the long term impacts that the 2008 financial crisis will have on immigration calls for reflection on the impact of previous global financial crises and their general impact.

As a result of the great depression (1929-33), there was a huge repatriation of Latin Americans from the USA while in most of industrialised Europe, highly restrictive immigration policies were instituted. The 1973 oil crisis led to severe restrictions of labour migration and an increase in asylum applications and irregular migration into Europe. The financial crisis in Russia (1998) led to large numbers emigrating from Russia as did the Latin American crisis (1998-2002) which led to enmass emigration especially from Argentina.

As such, it should be expected that the current financial crisis will have as dramatic an impact on immigration not only because of the severity and global nature of the crisis but more importantly immigration is more integrated in the global economy than ever before (Koser 2009).

In fact Martin (2009) has written that the 2008- 2009 recession, the worst in the last half century is more likely to affect international Immigration and Migrant livelihoods differently from past recessions. This crisis has been very severely felt in countries with high debt excesses and those mostly dependent on trade especially in Europe, the USA and in Asia. The author notes that “*new deployments of migrants are likely to slow, but what is not yet clear is how many migrants who lose jobs will remain in abroad*” (ibid, p. 1).


5.2. IMMIGRATION AND EMIGRATION FLOWS IN EU 27

A Eurostat report on immigration and emigration into and from the EU 27 in 2008 shows that on comparison with the previous year 2007, immigration to EU Member States is estimated to have decreased by 6% while emigration increased by 13% in 2008. However, the scale and patterns of immigration and emigration differ from one Member State to another (Flanders 2011).

This is a considerable decline since statistics from 2004 to 2008 showed that the population of EU Member States increased on average by 1.7 million per year. These increases are solely attributed to the fact that inflows outweighed outflows as depicted in the figure below (ibid).

In another publication, *Migrants in Europe* (EU 2011) it is explained that the flows of Migrants into and within the EU 27 has greatly varied in scale and pattern in the past decade after having peaked in 2007 as illustrated in the image below.

Figure 14: Immigration and Emigration EU 27, 2004 - 2008 (million persons)




While regular inflows seem to have declined with the onset of the financial crisis, the picture on the state of affairs as regards irregular migration is less clear since there is no conclusive evidence of an increase or a decrease in this case. By definition, irregular flows and stocks are difficult to measure because of their irregular, i.e. undocumented, nature (Koehler et al. 2010).

It is however very likely that the population of irregular migrants will increase as many of those who lose jobs, may lose their legal permission to stay in the EU member state since many cases, an employment contract is a pre-condition for permit renewal. While many temporary workers may have left their country of destination, some may have decided to try to “wait out” the crisis, especially if employment prospects and social protection are worse in their country of origin than in their country of destination (ibid). There is also not sufficient information yet to show to what extent of how shrinking employment opportunities during the crisis might have pushed many migrants into irregular employment.

A reliable sources of information on irregular migration is the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex) in whose report it stated that the number of persons staying illegally in the EU increased by 15 per cent in 2008 with France and Spain representing 40 per cent of all detections (Frontex 2008). As illustrated by the figure below, the arrivals by sea peaked in 2011 as a result of the Arab spring that

saw close to 60,000 women, men and children arrive at the shores of Europe through Italy. Considering that this was at the height of the financial crisis and rising unemployment, it is still not clear to what extent these arrivals have been able to integrate into Europe, find employment and dignity.

Figure 15: Irregular arrivals by sea, selected countries



Source: UNHCR, All in the same boat: the challenges of mixed migration, UNHCR website.

It has also been documented that the falling net migration during the financial crisis has led to changes in gender compositions of inflows into the EU reversing past trends where male immigration was higher than female immigration (OECD 2009). One of the reasons advanced for this is the declining job opportunities in the traditionally male dominated sectors that experienced the highest contractions such as constructions and manufacturing (Papademetius and Terraza 2009). On the other hand, women are traditional employed in the service and health care sectors that have remained relatively stable despite heavy budget cuts and deteriorating work conditions as a result of the financial crisis and economic contraction in other sectors.

Linked to the issue of rising unemployment among both native and migrant populations is the question of return of migrants. This issue is at the forefront in both countries of destination implementing voluntary return schemes and countries of origin concerned with the return and reintegration of their nationals to situations of unemployment back home.

In the context of this crisis and contrary to popular belief and expectations, the fact that many immigrants have remained unemployed as a result to the financial crisis, this has not resulted into mass return of immigrants to their countries of origin. As already discussed above, countries such as Ireland and Italy have witnessed rising emigration during the economic crisis but the figures show that majority for those leaving are either citizens of those countries or citizens of Europe who are moving on to search for better opportunities elsewhere.

In additional, much of this emigration registered since 2006 concerns nationals of new EU Member States and may only involve temporary return or onward migration for example, statistics for Polish return migration for 2008 indicate that re - migration was particularly likely among Polish returnees


from Germany (with 33% of emigrants having re - migrated several times), the UK (16%), and Italy (12%) (Koehler et al. 2010-Poland case study).

This reality of affairs has resulted in a number of countries for example Spain and the Czech Republic to institute voluntary return or “pay-to-go” schemes based on various incentives to encourage immigrants left unemployed to return to their countries of origin (Koehler et al. 2010).

The details of this scheme adopted by Spain is extensively discussed in an OECD report (2009) showing that Spain adopted a new regulation at the end of 2008 to support the voluntary return of unemployed non-EU migrants where beneficiaries are paid their accumulated unemployment benefits in two lump sums, one in advance and one upon their return, on the condition that they do not come back to Spain for at least three years. The report however showed that fewer than 4,000 out of 80,000 eligible migrants had signed up for the programme by mid-March 2009 (ibid).

According to Koehler et al (2009),the Czech Republic initiative launched on 9 February 2009 to pay EUR 500 and the airfare for unemployed migrant workers to return home is another example how governments across europe have responded to avert unemployment during the financial crisis. The Czech government allocated 2,000 places for the first phase of the project and about 1,900 immigrants returned home under the first phase of the programme. However, fewer than 300 out of 2,000 eligible migrants signed up in the second phase that was launched between 27 July 2009 and 15 December 2009 (Koehler et.al 2010 - Czech Republic case study).

Figure 16: Numbers of migrants forcibly returned from selected EU countries



* Note: Different data sources have been used; hence, the data is not comparable across the selected countries.

Source: IOM country surveys.

As evidenced from the image above, the overall number of assisted voluntary returns (AVR) increased only marginally from 18,486 in 2008 to 19,635 in 2009 and according to the author’s, the countries which registered the highest unemployment rates for foreign workers, such as Spain, Portugal, and Ireland, registered only marginal increases or even a decrease in the number of AVR. According to the

same authors, In Spain and Ireland, the AVR caseload decreased by 40% and 10% respectively, in 2009 compared to 2008, while Portugal only saw a small 10 per cent increase in AVR cases in the same period (ibid).

I would like to conclude with the following observation as illustrated by Koehler et al (2010) that the declining net migration rate may be part of the natural migration cycle, where at some point in time, migrants will decide to return home for a number of reasons regardless of the economic circumstances. In this case, the economic crisis might have accelerated, but not necessarily triggered, the return process.

5.3. REMITTANCES


Remittances are the most tangible link between migration and development. Remittances are generally defined as economic transfers that follow unidirectional paths from an immigrant worker to his or her sending country and households (Maimbo and Ratha 2005).

At more than \$325 billion per year, remittances sent by migrants to developing countries are larger than official development assistance as well as private debt and portfolio equity flows (World Bank 2012). Remittances are important for the families of migrants (providing disposable funds to pay for food, housing, education, health expenses), for developing country governments (as a valuable inflow of funds into their country) and for banks in receiving countries (by providing foreign currency and access to new potential customers).

The World Bank Report 2012, Global remittance flows to developing countries were estimated by the World Bank to be close to USD 351 billion in 2011 and according to close to EUR 31.2 billion from the European Union in 2010. According to Eurostat, these payments are critical source of livelihood for the receiving families and many governments across the world who rely on them as a source of foreign exchange and as an overall contributor to gross domestic product (GDP)

The same report shows that in many parts of the world, particularly in developing countries, the volume of remittances has increased at a tremendous rate over the last decades and proved to be resilient during crises in many parts of the world and this is illustrated by the figure below (ibid). In fact, when compared to other international financial flows such as foreign direct investment, overseas aid, and private loans, Remittance flows to developing countries totalled about \$75 billion in 1989, \$125 billion by the mid-2000s, and more than \$350 billion by 2011 despite about a 5 percent decline in 2009 (Mohapatra and Ratha 2011) as shown in Figure 17.

Figure 17: Resilience of Remittances Compared to Other Financial Flows to Development Countries (1991 - 2011)




According to the World Bank and Eurostat Germany, Spain and Italy are the countries with largest estimated outflow of remittances in the EU 27. For Germany, the majority of remittances correspond to compensation of employees, while in the cases of Spain and Italy the majority of the estimated flows are actually workers' remittances. In the year 2009, the outflow of workers' remittances was highest in 2009 in Spain (7.1 bn euro or 22% of total EU27 remittances), Italy (6.8 bn or 21%), Germany (3.0 bn or 9%), France (2.8 bn or 9%) and the Netherlands (1.5 bn or 5%) (Eurostat 2012).

The impact of the financial crisis is evident as one starts to analyse the available data on the workers remittances from the EU 27 member states. The Eurostat reports show that workers remittances had registered a constant increase over recent years but this rise was interrupted by the economic crisis of 2008. In 2009, the majority of Member States recorded decreases in the outflow of workers' remittances with the highest falls observed in Spain (from 7.9 bn euro to 7.1 bn) and France (from 3.4 bn to 2.8 bn). On the other hand the largest increase was registered in Italy (from 6.4 bn to 6.8 bn) (Ibid).

Total EU27 outflows amounted to 30.3 billion euro in 2009, compared with 32.6 bn in 2008 (-7%). These figures include both intra-EU27 and extra-EU27 flows. The decrease in workers' remittances in 2009 compared with 2008 was almost the same for extra-EU27 flows (-7%) and for intra-EU27 flows (-6%). The share of extra-EU27 remittances in the total stood at 73% in 2009, the same level as in 2008 as shown in the image below.

Figure 18: Workers' remittances total outflows from EU 27 member states, in billion euros



(Sourced from Eurostat website).

It is however important to note that the informal remittances usually sent back home through friends and families are unrecorded, undeclared and hence don't appear in the official records. This means that the actual figures are likely to be higher than is currently known. In fact at the global level, Freund and Spatafora (2005) estimate that informal remittances account for about 35 to 75 percent of official remittances to developing countries. They find that informal remittances to Eastern Europe are relatively high when compared to other regions such as East Asia and the Pacific or Africa.

Recently released figures by the Chambers of Commerce of Milano (Camera di Commercio di Milano, (2013) shows that Immigrants who work in the Lombardia Region of Italy send € 1.5 billion a year to their homeland. Although this figure decreased by 7.9% between 2011 and 2012, it accounts for 21.2% of the national total. The main recipients are China, which alone won one third of the total figure, the Philippines, Romania and Peru. On average, Lombard immigrants send home €1,524 per head with a peak of € 2,975 in the Province of Milan. To be noted that in the latter it is concentrated 66.6% of regional remittances and 14.1% of the national total

5.4. EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT

Before the start of the economic crisis in 2008, the average EU-wide employment rate of about 68 per cent of the workforce was close to attainment of the Lisbon target of 70% (EC, 2009). The rise in unemployment was immediately noticeable at the onset of the financial crisis and the hardest hit categories of the population are the youth and the immigrant population as has been widely researched and documented. However, the impact of the economic crisis on the labour market situation of migrants has varied and continues to vary from country to country (OECD 2013).

According to the OECD (2010), the unemployment rate for France was 10.0% in December 2009, unchanged from the previous month and 1.5 percentage points higher than the previous year. In the case of Germany, the rate was also unchanged from the previous month at 7.5% but 0.4 percentage point higher than in December 2008 while in Italy, the unemployment rate rose to 8.5%, 0.2

percentage points higher than in the previous month and 1.5 percentage points higher than a year earlier.

A critical analysis of the statistics shows that the rise in immigrant unemployment has risen at a higher rate than the rise in unemployment among nationals. While unemployment rates for nationals rose by 1.8 percentage points in 2008, the rates for nationals of other EU countries rose by 2.8 percentage points; and for non-EU migrants, unemployment rates rose by 5 percentage points during 2008 (EC, 2009). By the second quarter of 2009, the gap between nationals and non-EU migrants had widened to 11 percentage points (Koehler et. al. 2010).

In fact the OECD international immigration outlook 2013 confirms these alarming statics and shows that the unemployment among foreign born population in OECD countries increased by 5% compared to that of native populations whose unemployment grew by 3% in the same period and that at least one of two unemployed immigrants had been searching for a job for close to a year in 2012. The strongest effects of unemployment have been felt by immigrants from Latin America and North Africa with the rate as high as 27 % among North African immigrants in 2012 according to an OECD report (OECD 2013).

Another scholar Cerna (2013) who has widely researched immigrants' participation in the EU labour market has written that the current global financial and economic crisis has caused unprecedented rise in unemployment, underemployment and informal work, which impact has been specially felt by migrant workers who are often the first to suffer from job cuts in the face of shrinking employment opportunities and deteriorating working conditions in the receiving economies.

A number of factors have been advanced to explain the relatively high unemployment rate among immigrants as compared to the national population in some of the EU member states. Prominent among these reasons is the fact of relatively high immigrant concentration in economic sectors that are highly sensitive to the business cycle such as construction and manufacturing which have been worst hit by the global financial crisis. It should however be noted that the relative concentration of migrants in sectors varies from country to country (OECD 2009).

According to the OECD report (Ibid), while in some countries, migrants are overrepresented in sectors of cyclical demand, in others, the distribution of migrant employment in sectors of cyclical demand is more comparable to that of the native born hence why unemployment is likely to be higher in the former than in the later. For instance the construction sector which has been hardest hit by the recent economic and financial crisis accounts for an especially large share of national employment in the Baltic States, Ireland, and Spain, and attracts a large number of migrant workers. It has been estimated that in Spain and Greece, migrants constitute up to 50 per cent of employees in construction, wholesale and hospitality – sectors that have been particularly affected by the economic crisis (ibid).

Other factors that may have contributed to higher unemployment among immigrants could be their different socio-demographic background and the lack of fluency in the host country language (Eurostat 2011, Dustmann and Frattini 2012). In addition, the non-transferability of skills that migrants have

acquired in their home country, discriminatory practices excluding migrants from certain job categories (such as public sector and political positions), and what has been termed as the immigrant 'temporary mind-set' by Anderson and Ruhs (2010). This mind-set makes immigrants more likely to accept low-skilled or low-paid jobs unappealing to indigenous workers because of the comparative advantage relative to the conditions prevailing in the migrant country of origin.

In light of the alarmingly high unemployment among immigrants, it is important to pose questions on what livelihood strategies they are adopting to be able to meet their day to day basic needs and those of their families in the country where they live as well as those back home in the country of origin. It also highlights questions for policy formulation and integration strategies being implemented at regional, national and EU level.

5.5. PUBLIC OPINION AND XENOPHOBIA

It can be stated that the onset of the global financial crisis of 2008, public discourse on immigration has received increasing media space and time in most parts of Europe. The crisis has resulted in rise in unemployment reversing the gains of previous decades recorded across Europe. This has provoked fears of a rise in xenophobia and discrimination against immigrants and persons belonging to minority communities as governments across Europe implement anti -crisis policies (FRA 2010).

According to the 2013 international migration outlook, a recent opinion poll showed that 50 % citizens in Europe and Canada believe that immigrants are a burden to the economy, contribute less in taxes than they benefit from social services and health services (OECD 2013).

On the other hand however, a recent IMO thematic study on Migration in Europe state that there is not sufficient evidence to show that opinion poll data in selected European countries show a consistent increase in public hostility towards migration as a result of the 2008 financial crisis. This study states that for instance in the UK and Spain where migration was already a highly politicized issue in the pre-crisis period, concerns over the economic recession have reinforced rather than increased public worries about migration. In the case of Ireland where public opinion had been relatively positive towards migrants in the pre-crisis period, public attitudes towards migration seem to have hardened during the crisis (Koehler et.al. 2010).

What the available literature shows is that the financial crisis has reinforced, rather than caused increase public resentment of migration. Indeed, in some countries where migration was already an issue of high salience during the pre-crisis period, the economic crisis of 2010 has helped to propel Immigration discussions into the mainstream public discourse as an issue of migration of concern.

CHAPTER 6

ITALY AND IMMIGRATION IN TIMES OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS

6.1 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The phenomenon of immigration is embedded in the history and story of Italy. The beginning of Immigration towards Italy has been documented by a number of researchers to have originated with the oil crisis of 1973. Zincone (2006) explains that Italy, a relative late-comer among immigration countries only started to witness immigrant inflows after the 1973-74 oil shock when Britain, Germany, and, in particular France closed their borders. As a result, immigrant flows were partially diverted towards Southern European which until that time had played the role of “transit route”. Sciortino (2000) wrote that the beginning of immigration to Italy coincided with the adoption of restrictive immigration policies in the other European countries that traditionally imported labour.

The large scale closure of the legal entry points in much of Europe resulted in in large numbers of foreign workers such as maids and gardeners often entering the country as tourists and then opting to overstay their visas in order to meet the high labour demand (Andall 2000, Parrenas 2001). This is advanced as one of the main reason advanced for the growth of immigrant population in the 1970s and 1980s. To understand better the history and types of migratory influx into Italy, a number of scholars have proposed the a focus on the following criteria; ambitions of the immigrants themselves (Reyneri 1996), the variations in the type of work they seek (Ambrosini 2001; Pugliese 2002), and the length of stay (King and Rybaczuck 1993)

According to Bade (2000), Post-war decolonization greatly contributed to increased immigration to almost all European countries. While on the one hand, former colonial masters, administrative and military personnel returned home, it also opened possibilities on the other for citizens of former colonies who had reason to abandon their liberated countries moved in the same direction as the ex-colonizers. Indeed the statics show that from 1940 to 1960, between 550,000 and 850,000 Italians returned to Italy from the former colonies and the rest of Africa, some of them returning with their service personnel.

In this view Cusumano (1976) and Slama (1986) have cited that the first Tunisian immigrants to arrive in Sicily in 1968 were following Italian entrepreneurs who had left the country during the period 1964–1969 (nationalization process) and as a result, Tunisians are one of the most populous immigrant population in Italy to date.

As a result Sicily a historical region of emigration was transformed into an immigration port as other immigration routes opened following the return of Italians from Eritrea, a former colony (1890- 1941) and the following Eritreans who had served under the colonial government and maintained links with these families back in Italy (Galeazzo 1994). According to Colombo and Sciortino (2004), large

numbers of immigrants followed to Italy, the high number of Italians who had worked in the oil producing countries during the 1960s-1970s.

The rise in demand for seasonal and temporary workers in different sectors of the Italian economy as way back as the 1960s contributed to cementing Italy as a country of destination for many. Cusumano (1976) and Ambrosini (1999, 2000) show that the arrival of immigrant workers from Tunisia to work seasonally in the fishing and agriculture production in Sicily were soon followed by cross-border commuters from Yugoslavia and other east Europeans into other big cities in Italy. While the first Tunisians arrived at the end of the 1960s recruited as seasonal farm workers by local landowners in search of cheaper labour, by the mid-1970s, it had spread into other sectors such as fishing. Over time, similar waves of seasonal work linked sub-Saharan Africa and Campania through the tomato harvest, and, after 1989, eastern European countries with Trentino through the apple harvest.

The industrial boom of the 1970s attracted additional immigrants to Italy. The 1977 recruitments of middle eastern workers in factories in Reggio Emilia was quickly followed by hiring of immigrants from Senegal and Ghana as unskilled labourers in quarries, small and mid-size steel mills, textile and food factories in the 'deep north', provinces of Bergamo, Brescia and the Veneto. (Anteri 1981, Bonora 1983).

Another significant mode of immigration has been through Students. Colombo and Sciortino (2004, p.57) explain the arrival of students into Italy has been a main channel of immigration especially as students arrived from former colonies and countries where Italy had major influence during the 1970s. many students choose Italy for their university studies because of the low cost associated to university studies, the fact that there were no numerical restrictions for enrolment. Also The Italian Government offered scholarships as a tool of diplomacy and international cooperation and it has indeed been recorded that In 1970, of the 143,000 Italian residency permits issued, 27,000 were granted for study purposes.

Another historical vehicle of immigration into Italy was through granting of refuge and asylum to individuals who had been forced out of their countries of origin or residence for one reason or the other. According to UNHCR report (20012), Italy was home to 8,571 asylum seekers, refugees and other individuals under its supervision by the end of 2001.

Although to a much less extent and scale, the arrival of foreign entrepreneurs' and business savvy individuals with an aim of identifying and setting up business structures in Italy. One category of foreigners present in the post-unification period was that of refugees most of whom arrived between 1861 and the beginning of World War I taking advantage of the liberal immigration policies in Italy just like in many other countries of Europe. The presence of these foreigners was felt in many Italian urban centres and a good example is that of the influx of Immigrants from the former Soviet Union between 1919 and 1933 who settled primarily in Milan, where they established businesses, Italo-Russian social clubs and Orthodox churches, which are still exist today (ibid).

Another category of foreigners into Italy were affluent individuals, professionals, landowners, industrialists and members of the ecclesiastical orders arriving from the European countries that

shared a border with Italy. Prominent among these were nationals from Austria-Hungary, Germany, France, Yugoslavia and Switzerland. Also on the list were foreigners from non-European countries such as Americans, Russians, Argentines, Brazilians and Turks and among these the Chinese, whose arrival goes back to the 1920s (Colombo and Sciortino (2004).

In fact Pan (1999) and Cologna (2000) note that as far back as this time, the Chinese first established themselves in Milan and then moved to Bologna or Tuscany where they entered the silk and fertilizer industry business.

For example, (Ambrosini 2001) notes that analysis in Milan one of the most economically active cities of the country showed that Chinese, Egyptians and Tunisians demonstrated particularly high levels of entrepreneurship as far back as the early 2000.

Lastly, it is important to acknowledge the significance and arrival of young people from middle-class families and with an average education. Most choose Italy after the closure traditional destinations such as France. These young people arrived with the aim of ‘exploring the west’, gaining experience and accessing goods unavailable in their home countries, and quickly took advantage of opportunities (Colombo and Sciortino 2004). Their exploratory, risky and opportunistic nature resulted into their engagement in the so-called trabendo or contraband importation of consumer goods to their countries of origin, which were then distributed through informal markets (Colombo 1998).

In conclusion, the above discussion aims to offer a historical context of the development and formation of immigration trends and development of the migrant population in Italy. The above information is important to be able to put into context the current statics and policy discussions regarding immigrants in Italy to date.

6.2. IMMIGRATION IN ITALY: CURRENT STATISTICS

According to the latest ISTAT report, Italy was home to 4,387,721 foreign national residents at the beginning of 2013 representing an increase of 334,122 (+8.2%) from the previous year 2012 (Albani 2013). This figure shows that immigrants account for 7.4% of the Italy’s population, including 79,894 children born in Italy to foreign nationals (15% of total births).

Figure 19: Population in Italy with Foreign Citizenship



Source: <http://www.tuttitalia.it/statistiche/>

The figure above shows that despite the onset of the financial crisis, the number of immigrants has continued to steadily increase since 2007. In fact, Pastore (2010) has argued that the foreign population legally resident in Italy has almost tripled in the last decade and the same steady increase is recorded even after the onset of the financial crisis in 2008.


One of the reasons to explain this continuing immigration growth can be linked to the persistent, although controversial and uneven, need for foreign labour hence the option by for policymakers to keep legal channels of entry relatively open until well into 2009 (ibid).

In fact, Bratti and Conti (2012) explain that majority of firms in Italy seem to prefer immigrants for low skilled jobs and a key indicator of this phenomenon that has come to be called “job ethnicization” is that even if foreigners make up about 9% of the total workforce, they are more than 80% of agricultural workers, 40% of workers in low skilled personal services and 18% of workers in the construction sector.

6.2.1. IMMIGRANTS AS PART OF THE POPULATION

According to ISTAT reports, Immigrants represent higher than 7% of the total population (ISTAT 2010). It is however important to note that the immigrant population is unevenly distributed across the regions in Italy with the north as home to majority as will be discussed further below.

Figure 20: Immigrants as part of the Total Population in Italy




(Source ISTAT 2010)

6.2.3. MAIN COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN

According to a report released by Caritas, the largest numbers of Immigrants resident in Italy are predominantly from east Europe and increasingly from Asia as opposed to popular belief that majority of the immigrants are from North Africa (Caritas 2013). This is illustrated in the image below.

Figure 21: Main Countries of Origin



Source ISTAT 2010


6.2.4. REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF IMMIGRANTS IN ITALY

The distribution of foreign-born population is largely uneven with 86% of immigrants residing in the northern and central parts of the country (the most economically developed areas) and only 14% resident in the southern part of the country (Albani 2013). The map below shows the regional distribution of the migrant population between the north and the south of Italy.

A number of explanations for this uneven distribution have been given by some authors. On their part, Bratti and Conti (2013) write that not surprisingly, foreigners tend to settle in the richer regions and big cities that offer better opportunity of employment. As such, 86.9% of immigrants in Italy are concentrated in Northern and Central Italy, 23.2% of them living in Lombardia, 11.8% in Lazio and 19.2% just in the provinces of Milan and Rome.

The following map of Italy serves to explain the uneven distribution of immigrant population in the different provinces of Italy. The provinces are coloured according to the share of foreign-born population in the total population, with 'darker' provinces hosting a higher share of immigrants. The figure below reveals some spatial clustering of immigrants showing that provinces and regions with higher immigrant population tend to be close to each other (Ibid).

Figure 22: Regional Distribution of Immigrants across Italy



(censimento translates to census, and stime demografiche translates to demographic estimate. % of resident with foreign citizenship over the total resident population per region)

6.2.5. ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS IN ITALY

According to Lunaria (2013), the number of illegal immigrants recorded on Italian territory between 2005 and 2011 totals about 540,389. This number has been declining considering that in 2005 alone, the number of illegal immigrants were 119,923, yet the figure was 47,152 in 2011 showing a total decline of more than half.

6.3. ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF IMMIGRATION POLICIES IN ITALY

In the early 1980s, Italy turned into a country of immigration with somewhat limited experience in handling the size, scope and nature of the immigrant flows from the outside. According to Veikou and Triandafyllidou (undated) the Italian immigration experience was mainly restricted to Italians mostly moving from the rural south to the industrialized northern parts of Italy. The unexpectedly high influx of immigrants of from Africa and Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe were attracted by the country's economic growth and the near absence of immigration controls (Cornelius 1994).

Colombo and Sciortino (2004) have explained that the adjective 'New' used to describe the phenomenon of immigration in Italy has a number of significance. First of all, it could be in reference to the beginning of the influx of Immigrants in the mid-1970s. It could also refer to the difference between old and new immigrations, where the old classical immigrants (including Italians) moved to

countries and destinations of high foreign labour demand while immigrants of today are viewed primarily as poor destitutes motivated by push factors such as war, famine and dictatorships in their countries of origin rather than by pull factors in the host countries (Macioti and Pugliese 1991). As such, Italian migration evolved as a fall back choice after the closure of the traditional immigrant destination countries (Zincone 1994, Pugliese 2002).

Furthermore, Immigration became of importance after the 1981 census indicated for the first time that the number of people present in the country exceeded the number of residents, suggesting an influx of undocumented immigrants (Macioti & Pugliese, 1991:6). At this point in time, the issues of immigration were characterized as a social emergency rising questions about their social cultural integration in host communities, access to social services and informal labour and political asylum among others (Veikou and Triandafyllidou, Undated).

According to Martiniello (1992, p. 210), Italian migration policy evolution is largely inspired by the European politics and the orientation proposed by the European Community in terms of migration policy as far back as 1985. To this effect, Campani (2007) has written that the evolution of legislation on immigration in Italy was introduced slowly from the mid-eighties onwards responding more to “**urgency factors**” than to a coherent migratory policy aimed at embracing the issue of immigrant flows control and the one of their integration in the country.

Another scholar Ambrosini (2001) has written that integration of immigrants in Italian society has taken place mainly through the labour market that needed labour force for manual and unqualified jobs abandoned by the nationals in informal sectors such as small enterprises, construction, tourism, Mediterranean agriculture and services to private persons. Ambrosini coined the term “**subordinated integration**” to refer to this phenomenon (ibid).

In fact Veikou and Triandafyllidou (undated) explain that in comparison to other European countries, Italy had a particularly large underground economy and a rigid segmentation of the labour market hence contributing to large numbers of immigrants insertion in low-paying, temporary, irregular jobs throughout the country especially in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors. These difficulties caused by lack of proper data availability posed problems for policy makers to intervene as majority of immigrants remained undocumented.

According to Rasconi (2010), it would not be totally wrong to define the period 1976- 1986 as the decade of migration without a legal framework in Italy. The first attempt to at a comprehensive migration policy was the Act 943 /1986 which was the first large-scale regularization proposal attempting to address the legal status and rights of immigrants. However, since Italy was still predominantly an emigration country, the uncertain status of immigrants was not seen as a challenge to state controls, but rather as an attack on foreign rights. As such, the act was never implemented and the first (real) operative legislation dates back to 1990 (ibid).

6.3.1. LEGGE MARTELLI, ACT. 39 OF 1990

The first Italian law Legge Martelli 39/ 1990 named after its promoter had the following key aspects:

- Narrowing of the flow of immigration by establishing quotas linked to the labour market needs.
- Set in place permit of stay lasting two years and is linked to work, study, medical care and family reunification.
- Immigrants who over stay their visas are considered “illegal” immigrants and must be expelled.
- Expelled immigrants must leave in 15 days or face police deportation

According to Rasconi (2010), Italy was at the time of involved in the Schengen process and this law was an attempt to comply with membership requirements and assure other European members that it was able to prevent the entry of unwanted immigrants into the Schengen area. However, as resulted, this law was based on un reasonable assumptions and complicated procedures which did not solve the problems it was intended to address but instead resulted in stimulating irregular immigration and informal hiring (ibid).

6.3.2. THE TURCO-NAPOLITANO LAW, ACT. 40/1998

As a result, a number of new reforms took place in the late 1990s and gave the basis for the Turco-Napolitano law, Act. 40/1998 promoted by the centre-left coalition government. This law aimed at curbing clandestine entries introduced new repressive measures for illegal immigrants and repatriations procedures more effective. According to the documents presented in the chambers of deputies on 19th February 1997, the main goals of this law are:

- “counteracting illegal migration and the criminal exploitation of the migratory flows;
- implementing of precise policies concerning legal entries, which must be programmed and regulated;
- setting up realistic integration paths entries for new immigrants and foreigner residents in Italy”.

According to Campani (2007) and Rasconi (2010), the basis for immigrant integration is rooted in this law. Specifically, this law guaranteed access to education and to the National Health System to all immigrants, included irregular immigrants, legal immigrants could enjoy the same social rights as Italians, it acknowledged the right to family reunifications and introduced the institution of a permanent residence permit (carta di soggiorno).

According to the Decree of the President establishing the law, immigrant integration is defined as:

“a process of non-discrimination and of recognition of differences, that means a process of hybridization and an experimental tool of new forms of relationships and behaviours in the continuous attempt to maintain universal principles and specificities, in the constant and everyday attempt of keeping together universal principles and specificities, of preventing situations of emargination and ghettoisation that threaten the equilibrium and social cohesion, and a firms the universal principles as the value of human life, the dignity of the person, the recognition of women’s freedom, the protection of childhood, on which there are no possible exceptions, even in name of the difference.” (CNEL 2001)

According to Campani (2007), the following three years 1998-2001 under the centre-left governments of Romano Prodi, Massimo D'Alema and Giuliano Amato, a group of scholars were appointed to a national commission in an attempt to develop an "Italian integration model" to ensure effective policies of Integration of immigrants as foreseen by the Law. This commission which was headed by Giovanna Zincone (a political science professor who has widely written on Immigration and integration in Italy) produced two reports of the commission (Zincone 2000 and 2001) presented an important understanding of the Italian immigration context.

The Commission reports (Zincone 2000) show attempts and motivation to develop an Italian model of integration based on Italy's unique realities and the experiences and lessons learnt in the experiences of other countries already implementing similar policies. The Commission proposes an Italian "model" which they called "**reasonable integration**" based on two fundamental interconnected principles:

- The recognition of the person's integrity
- A low conflict-potential integration based on a positive interaction with the Italian population.

However as Campani (2007) points out, the change in the political majority (in 2001 the general elections bring into power the centre-right coalition of Silvio Berlusconi) resulted into a change in the government's approach to migration and even if the Law 40 is not completely suppressed but amended, the integration project intended to implement the Law is abandoned in favour of a restrictive approach to managing immigration.

6.3.3. THE FINI-BOSSI LAW (189/2002)

After the 2001 election campaign based on the dangers of immigration and immigrants as a source of insecurity, the centre right coalition involving introduced reforms to the already existing law on immigration which came into force on the 26th August 2002.

A new law called the Bossi-Fini Law introduced repressive measures and drastic budget cuts for integration projects. To be specific, the National Fund for Migration Policies created by the Unified Act on Migration (art. 45 Unified Act) is suppressed and new policies to counteract illegal migration flows, the indiscriminate compulsory escorting of expelled migrants to the borders call for huge financial investment in policing and border controls (Campani 2007).

On his part, Rasconi (2010) writes that the new centre – right was inspired by restrictive positions not only intended to fight clandestine entry and irregular residence but also to limit legal entries and making it more difficult even for legal immigrants to obtain a residence permit and contract of employment. This law relied on registered employment as the main mean of integration and required that potential immigrants would only be allowed to enter the country if they already possessed a contract of employment, and could only stay as long as the contract lasted. In addition, the law required that the prospective employer had to guarantee the availability of lodging and pay the

immigrant's trip back home at the end of the employment relationship (ibid). In addition, "The Bossi - Fini law (189/2002) reformed the residence permit system creating incentives and conditioning the concession of residence permits upon fulfilment of integration conditions (mainly language acquisition) set in an agreement of integration" (Barbulescu 2010, p. 9).

In summary, the most significant aspects of the law are as follows:

- Each year, before 30 November, the Prime Minister will lay down the number of non-EU workers who can be admitted into Italy in the following year;
- There are no limitations to entry into Italy for highly skilled workers (university lecturers and professors, professional nurses etc.);
- Other non-EU immigrants will be allowed entry into Italy only if they have a 'residence contract' (contratto di soggiorno) - i.e. a contract of dependent employment signed by an employer (a firm or a family) and the immigrant worker. The contract must provide for accommodation and the payment of travel expenses for the workers to return to their country of origin. Italian embassies and consulates will issue entry visas only on these conditions. When the contract expires, the immigrant worker must return to the country of origin;
- A specific immigration office is to be set up in each province of Italy to oversee the entire recruitment procedure for immigrant workers on both open-ended and fixed-term contracts. Employers are able to recruit specific immigrant workers 'by name' or from lists of immigrant workers held by Italian embassies and consulates abroad;
- The new offices will also deal with applications for non-EU citizens to enter Italy for purposes of family reunification. Only non-EU immigrants with a regular residence permit will be entitled to present this kind of application with regard to their family members. Only 'first degree' relatives will be admitted - spouses, children and parents over 65 years of age with no other form of support;
- Residence permits issued for reasons of employment will last for a maximum of two years, even if the worker concerned has an open-ended contract of employment. In these cases, the immigrant workers must request a further temporary residence permit on the expiry of the old one;
- When their residence permit is issued, immigrant workers must provide their fingerprints;
- After six years of regular residence in Italy, non-EU citizens with the necessary economic requisites to sustain themselves and their families will be able to receive a form of permanent permit instead of a temporary residence permit;
- Irregular immigrants will be deported and accompanied to Italy's borders. Deportation will be immediate and will not be suspended even if the immigrant appeals to the courts;
- Suspected illegal immigrants stopped by the police will be taken to specific centres controlled by the police. The authorities will try to discover their identity during the following 60 days. If they are found to be illegal immigrants, they will be ordered to leave the country within five days (a period they must spend in the centre). If they fail to do so, the illegal immigrants will be arrested for between six months and a year or deported and accompanied to the borders. If illegal immigrants return to Italy, they will be arrested and tried by the courts;

- Non-EU minors living in Italy will obtain a residence permit once they reach adult age (18 years) provided that they already have lived in Italy for at least three years and have attended a social and civil integration programme provided by a public or private organisation. This organisation must also guarantee that they have accommodation and attend school or go to work. The number of residence permits issued on these conditions will be subtracted from the pre-defined number of total annual permits; and
- For irregular immigrants already in Italy, the law provides for an amnesty which will allow the regularisation of the position of those who have worked and lived in Italy for at least three months.

The adoption of the Bossi- Fini law was followed by condemnation and criticism at the local and international level. To highlight just a few at the local level, the President of the Federation of Industrialists of the Veneto Region (Federazione industriali veneti) Luigi Rossi Luciani was quick to speak out emphasizing the dilemma of local companies already faced with labour shortages are now being faced with additional dilemmas since as their employees face deportation. Similar sentiments were voiced by trade unions (Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro- Cgil) and Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori- Cisl especially those in the north of Italy most dependent on immigrant labour.

Despite the wide criticism and debate that surround the Bossi- Fini law, it should be noted that the largest regularization ever granted in Europe occurred under it with 634,728 people being regularized during the right-wing government (Rasconi 2010).

On a whole, it is not clearly documented that the Bossi- Fini law has been effective in reducing the arrival and continued presence of illegal immigrants on Italian territory. Komadi (2011) has in fact urged that this law did not repeal the anti - discrimination clauses introduced by the Turco. Napolitano law and as such, there is evident and growing tensions between third country residents and the local community.

6.3.4. THE SECOND ROUND OF CENTRE – RIGHT REFORMS (2008 – 2010)

During its short-lived legislature (2006-2008), the centre - left coalition did not succeed in putting any substantial innovation in migration matters into practice. The return into power of the centre – right coalition lead by Silvio Berlusconi implied the strengthening of the repressive components in immigration policy (ibid).

On May 2008, the Italian Interior Minister Roberto Maroni launched the so-called “**Security Package**” (**Pacchetto Sicurezza**) which included legislation on migration in the wider area of public security measures. The following two are the main laws contained in the “**Security Package**”:

- Law n. 125 of 2008, conversion of the former legislative bill “Urgent Norms on Security Matters”.
- Law n. 94 of 2009, “Regulations on Security Matters”.

This Law-decree 92/2008, which was subsequently converted into law 125/2008, changed the Italian Penal Code making it possible to deport a foreigner or remove an EU-citizen if found guilty of a crime carrying a sentence of more than two years imprisonment. The new decree also envisaged the possibility of imprisoning Italians or foreigners who had rented a flat to irregular citizens (Finotelli and Sciortino 2008).

According to this law, illegal immigration was illegal and any one helping or supporting an illegal immigrant was committing a crime prosecutable under Italian law. As such doctors, teacher or any public official are obligated to report any form of irregularity they encounter in their work. Understandably, this provoked strikes and public debate across the country and internationally.

Critics who included the Catholic Church and Human right organisations accused the new legislation of promoting discrimination and violating the rights of vulnerable persons protected by the international conventions on Human rights. Critics saw this law as criminalizing immigration and a shift from the integration approach introduced by the Turco . Napolitano law (Komadi 2011). A key critic of this law was Archbishop Agostino Marchetto who served as secretary in the Pontifical Council for Pastoral Care of Migrants and Itinerant People predicting it will cause more problems without solving the causes of illegal immigration (Allen 2010).

On their part, Amnesty international condemned the move as a violation of the rights of immigrants by criminalizing illegal immigration, and in particular condemned the proposed measures to deny basic services such as health and education to illegal immigrant men, women and children (Amnesty international 2009). Critics argued for instance that requirement that principals and school officials report undocumented children attending school to the authorities was in violation of UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) and international human rights law. More so, critics of the law urged that the Italian constitution article 10 mandates the Italian legal system to act in accordance with the recognized international law while article 34 states that “education will be open to all”.

Another aspects of this law that has been widely criticized is the “sea landings-decree” that granted the Italian Navy the right to take control of ships in open sea suspected to carry clandestine immigrants. The occupants of the ship under question should be subjected to extended temporary detention of up to 60 days and deportation there after back to the country where they originated.

Despite these proposal and critics, the law was finally passed including the contested provisions and as Komadi (2011) explains, these proposals are not all together illegal under national and international law. For example, The Italian Constitution grants the state exclusive legislative power over immigration while The Treaty on the European Union, Article 42 dictates that states shall be in charge of national security, which the government says is the main basis of this law.

On a whole, the Italian policies and laws on Immigration remain a work in process. Public focus and debate has intensified since the onset of the Arab spring which saw continuous arrival of women, men and children escaping war, suffering and poverty seeking refuge and security from Italy and Europe as a whole. To a great extent, the focus has been on the rescue operations, settling in facilities available and then integration which has continued to expose implementation shortcomings and challenges for

the residents, political and institutional structures in the islands of first arrival Lampedusa, Sicily and other, but more so on the effectiveness of the laws and policies by Italy and Europe as a whole. Actually the ex - minister of internal affairs Roberto Maroni issued a ministerial circular in April 2011 banning journalist access to the centres of detention or first arrival. This was however revoked by Minister Anna Maria Cancellieri as of 23 April 2012.

At the time of writing of this, the spotlight was again on Lampedusa after the tragedy when a boat carrying 500 women, men and women capsized and many of those on board drowned. This re-ignited the debate on the Italian policy on immigration with renewed calls for a review of the Law Bossi-Fini. The spot light has also been on the efficiency and effectiveness of rescue operation, the laws governing these operations, the role of the Government of Italy and the European Union and the availability and access of services of hospitality and social care for arriving Immigrants.

The European Union has promised 30 million euros in emergency cash for Italy and proposed expanding search and rescue patrols across the vast southern Mediterranean but as Joanna Parkin, a researcher at the Centre for European Policy Studies, a think tank in Brussels has said "Tragedies like this one in Lampedusa occur every year in the Mediterranean and each time we see similar reactions from the political level of the EU - calls to strengthen solidarity and common action," but in reality very little is done to address the problem as it's been particularly hard for the EU 28 governments to agree on immigration especially with the rising influence of extremist parties across Europe.

On the role of the EU's external border agency (Frontex) set up in 2004 that currently coordinates patrols of the European Mediterranean coast, The European Home Affairs Commissioner Cecilia Malmstrom proposed expanding its role to deploy a search-and-rescue operation spanning the Mediterranean from Cyprus to Spain. Frontex operations have not only been influenced by limited operational mandate, it is also under resourced and currently only have a total of four ships, two helicopters and two planes to carry out their mandate. In addition, its budget was cut from 118m euros (£100M; \$160M) in 2011 to 85M euros in 2013 (BBC news 2013).


Despite the above limitations, the Frontex spokesman Michal Parzyszek recently interviewed said 16,000 people have been rescued so far in the year 2013 (Croft and Pawlak, 2013) and EU governments will be asked to contribute cash to finance the operation and provide boats and aircraft. However as Elizabeth Collett, director of the think tank Migration Policy Institute Europe, said Malmstrom's proposal was a short-term solution hence the need for the EU to find more actual and concrete strategies to enhance cooperation amongst the member states and their Mediterranean partners that play the role as either sending or transit countries to curb the immigrant smugglers cartels.

6.4. IMPACT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS ON IMMIGRANTS IN ITALY

6.4.1. IMMIGRATION FLOWS

According to Pastore and Vellosio (2011) the steady growth in stocks of immigrant flow to Italy at least until the end of 2008, suggests that immigration to Italy was not immediately affected in the initial phase of the economic crisis. The yearly ISMU report for 2011 shows that the yearly growth in number of foreign citizens in Italy was around 390,000 per year in the period 2003-2009 only to drop to 335,000 in 2010. What this shows is that even though the number of new immigrants coming into Italy declined, it did not stop all together as evidenced in the figure below.

Figure 23: Stock and shares of Foreign Population in Italy



Source: Istat, population registers.

(Sourced from Pastore and Vellosio 2011)

The declining capacity of the Italian economy to absorb new immigrants and the declining employability of the immigrant labour already in Italian territory resulted in a number of immigrants relocating either to another region, country or back home to their country of origin. However, return migration seems to be an undeniable reality, but not a mass choice (OECD 2009, IOM 2009) if the number of those leaving are considered as a percentage of the total immigrant population in Italy.

In the analysis of Pastore and Villasio (2011), a clear increase in outflows is evidenced of the financial crisis as a coping strategy for immigrant families as is evidenced in I table below

Table 1. Outflow estimates – Italy (2010)

	2007	2008	2009	2010
Absolute values	21,472	37,905	62,961	80,059
Share over foreign resident population	-0.7%	-1.1%	-1.6%	-1.9%

Source: Istat, population registers.

Notes: Outflows estimated as the difference between foreign resident population at the beginning and end of the year, net of inflows.

According to the Istat population balance sheet (Istat bilancio demografico 2009), the number of people of foreign nationality who withdrew from the Italian municipal demographical registers declaring they were going abroad increased by (+19,4 %) in 2009. The follow up Istat report (Istat Bilancio Demographical 2010) shows that after clean up of municipal registers in 2010, the number of foreign residents deleted from the municipal registers due to “**un traceability**” increased from 32,000 to 56,797 (Brusa and Pappoti 2011) although it should always be noted that the reliability of this source of data has been questioned.

One example has been among the Moroccan immigrants who as a coping mechanism in response to the difficulties of the financial crisis have adopted what Pastore and Villasio (2011) have referred to as “**delayed family re- groupment**” and family “**re – groupment**” where some members of the family – in the case of Moroccan families wives and children) return to Morocco while the bread winner remains in Italy if they have a job to maintain them. The social economic impact and policy implications of this strategy and how wide spread it is among other immigrant communities requires further qualitative and quantitative research.

A recently released report **Rapporto Annuale sull'Economia dell'Immigrazione** by Fondazione Leone Moressa (2013) shows that about 32,000 foreigners left Italy in 2011 resulting in a total loss of income amounting to 86 million Euros in taxes to the state coffers. The report emphasizes that despite the crisis, foreigners workers who approximately are 2.3 million immigrant workers (10.1% of total employment) are still an asset to the country considering they account for 5.4% of the total declared income (43.6 billion Euro) and pay income tax of € 6.5 billion (4.3% of the total of the net) as illustrated in table 2 below:

Table 2. IRPEF lost as a result of immigrants leaving Italy 2012

Irpef in meno nelle casse dello stato a seguito dell'allontanamento degli stranieri dall'Italia, anno 2012

Paese di ritorno	Numero di stranieri che lasciano l'Italia	Irpef media pagata (in €)	Ammontare complessivo dell'Irpef (in €)
Romania	7.693	1.730	13.308.890
Marocco	1.761	1.570	2.764.770
Cina	1.672	2.250	3.762.000
Albania	1.525	1.870	2.851.750
Polonia	1.433	2.110	3.023.630
Germania	1.249	4.320	5.395.680
Ucraina	1.212	1.380	1.672.560
India	1.058	1.840	1.946.720
Moldova	806	1.470	1.184.820
Francia	786	5.420	4.260.120
Bangladesh	680	1.290	877.200
Brasile	620	4.480	2.777.600
Pakistan	577	1.500	865.500
Gran Bretagna	576	6.480	3.732.480
Tunisia	571	2.430	1.387.530
Altre nazionalità	10.185		37.086.750
Totale	32.404		86.898.000

Elaborazioni Fondazione Leone Moressa su dati Istat e Ministero delle Finanze

(Source – FLM report 2013) (IRPEF refers to personal income tax, numero di stranieri che lasciano Italia- number of immigrants leaving Italy, Irpef media pagata – average irpef paid, ammontare complessivo dell irpef- total irpef)
(economic loss to the Italian Government per every foreign citizen income earner leaving the economy)

But as the financial crisis continued to evolve and impact many more sectors of the Italian economy, more immigrants have found themselves unemployed and even those still employed are faced by uncertain contract terms and working conditions. They are also increasingly faced with competition from the native populations who are now taking on jobs that were predominantly considered the domain of immigrant workers.

Another aspect to consider are the statistics and trends in the number of foreigners buying homes to establish themselves in Italy. According to Ponzo (2009), many foreign workers purchased a home as soon as they settled into stable jobs in the early 2000s, this was considered an investment for the future. Also at that time, many foreign /workers felt it was sustainable and made economic sense to settle in Italy. However, the impact of the financial crisis has been enormous on the housing and mortgage sector resulting in less and less numbers of foreign workers considering the option and even having the ability to own home as is captured in the table here below:

Table 3. House purchased by Immigrants in Italy

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Total house purchases	804126	833350	845051	806225	683783	609145	611878
House purchases by foreign immigrants	110000	116000	131000	135000	103000	78000	53000
Share of house purchases by foreign immigrants on total	13.7%	13.9%	15.5%	16.7%	15.1%	12.8%	8.7%

Source: Scenari immobiliari. Note: Figures for 2010 are estimates.

(Sourced from Pastore and Villasio 2011)

As a result, many immigrants are able to make the hard decision of leaving Italy as soon as they find themselves in a position of unemployment and unable to pay house rent and meet their needs for subsistence. On the other hand, this could mean that for many immigrant families, Italy is a country they work to earn money to finance investment elsewhere.

This was confirmed by the study "*Qualità del Lavoro e Impatto Della Crisi tra i Lavoratori Immigrati*" by Associazione Trentin-Isf-Ires and Cgil Nazionale (October 2013). In this study, 1000 respondents were interviewed and 46% said they were contemplating of leaving Italy in the face of growing unemployment and uncertain future prospects.

The price of the economic crisis as has been concluded by Düvell (2009, p.5) "is felt harder by migrant workers and the recipients of their remittances, and by ethnic minorities; the economic crisis will not generate a migration crisis but rather turn out to be an individual crisis for migrants and their families at home".

6.4.2. IMMIGRANTS AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN ITALY

Although the current economic crisis had a negative impact on the general occupational level in the Italian job market (Cnel 2011), the statistics show an alarming impact for the immigrant workers in particular. As can be observed in the figure below, the employment of immigrant labour in Italy has always been affected by structural and seasonal changes.

The **Rapporto Annuale sull'Economia dell'Immigrazione 2013** very recently released by the Fondazione Leone Moressa (FLM 2013) shows that from 2008 to 2012, there was an increase in the unemployment rate of foreigners by 5.6 percentage points from 8,1% to 14.1% and an increasing wage gaps between Italians and foreigners of up to € 336 for the same job under similar conditions and that Immigrant workers represent 10% of the total labour force.

Table 4: Employment and Unemployment in 2012

Occupazione e disoccupazione nel 2012

	Stranieri	Italiani
Occupazione	Occupati	2.334.048
	Tasso di occupazione	60,6
	Var 2008/2012 del tasso di occupazione	-6,5
	Var 2008/2012 del numero di occupati	-562.247
Disoccupazione	Disoccupati	382.672
	Tasso di disoccupazione	14,1
	Var 2008/2012 del tasso di disoccupazione	5,6
	Var 2008/2012 del numero di disoccupati	220.981

Elaborazioni Fondazione Leone Moressa su dati Istat Rcfl


According to a recent research study the "**Qualità del lavoro e impatto della crisi tra i lavoratori immigrati**" by Associazione Trentin-Isf-Ires and Cgil Nazionale (October 2013), more than one million two hundred thousand immigrant workers have been drastically affected by this financial crisis. Of these about 500,000 have lost their jobs while about 700,000 are forced to undertake part time work. The report shows that as a result of this situation, 46% of the immigrants interviewed said they were thinking of leaving Italy.

This study which covered over 1,000 immigrants in 10 regions across Italy classified the situation of immigrants as "**extremely difficult**" and to quote CGIL Secretary Vera Lamonicas words on the day of the report launch, "*Immigrant workers are paying disproportionately for the effects of the crisis: more of them are unemployed, underpaid and exploited, and more are paid under the table.*"

According to another report, the 3rd Rapporto Annuali Immigrati Nel Mercato Del Lavoro in Italia (Ministro di Lavoro 2013) showed that the numbers of foreign workers with a job in 2012 were 2,334,000 immigrants while those in search of a job were 385,000. When compared to 2011 the

number increased by 19.2% among those who come from EU countries and 25.4% for those who come from outside the EU.

Figure 24: Unemployed foreigners in Italy, 2005-2012 (first quarter). Data in 000.



(Source: Labour Force Survey, Istat)


Men _____
 Women _____
 Total _____

Figure 23 above shows that in just a few months in 2011, the number of unemployed immigrants increased by 100,000 persons and this can be attributed to the collapse of the construction and manufacturing sectors where large numbers of the employees are of immigrant descent.

In relation to this, a gender analysis of the data shows that the rate of unemployment among immigrant male workers has almost doubled since the onset of the financial crisis. While the rate of unemployment among women immigrant was 13.4% in 2006 and increased by 4 points by 2012, the rate of unemployment among immigrant men has more than doubled from the 5.4% in 2006 to 13.6% in 2012 as shown in the image below.

One of the reasons used to explain this phenomenon, has been the increase in demand for immigrant female workers in the service and care sectors (for example home care providers and cleaning services) that were not initially affected by the financial crisis while the sectors such as construction that were predominantly male have been hardest hit by the crisis. The figure below depicts this distinct impact of the financial crisis on men and women immigrant workers.


Figure 25: Evolution for males and females unemployment from 2006 to 2012 (first quarter).



(Source: Istat website)

The feminization of the Italian immigrant population as Pastore and Villasio (2011) have called it started to emerge in 2007 at the same time as the initiation of the financial crisis. According to the authors, this may be attributed to a large wave of family re-unifications and the increasing employment opportunities in the care and service industry. But it could also mean that as the financial crisis deepened, the collapse of the construction and manufacturing sectors resulted in less male immigrants coming into the Italy in the face of uncertain employment possibilities.

Figure 26: Immigrant arrivals into Italy (2003- 2009)



Source: Istat, population registers.

Despite the above scenario evidenced by the figures above, the situation of immigrant unemployment is not the worst if compared with other EU countries such as Spain, Portugal and Greece. According to the OECD (OECD 2009) and Finotelli (2009) is because Italy has a considerably lower concentration of immigrants in low skilled occupation and this is evidenced by the facts in the table below.

Table 5. Immigrants in low skilled employment in selected EU countries (2008)

Immigrants aged 15–64	All occupations (%)	Low-skilled occupations (%)
France	11.2	21.2
Germany	12.8	27.5
Italy	9.0	23.2
Spain	15.9	33.6
United Kingdom	11.1	14.4

Source: OECD, 2009: 88.

On a regional level, the picture of immigrant unemployment is not as promising especially if the labour observatory reports for Veneto and Piemonte in 2010 are anything to go by. Both Regional Observatory on the Labour Market (2009) show that the crisis has hit migrant workers of African nationality comparatively harder in terms of recruitment. For example comparing the data for June 2008 and June 2009, it is evident that African migrants had a -40 per cent variation in recruitment compared to Asian migrants at 20 per cent (ORML, 2009). This is explained by the fact that African immigrants in Piedmont are over represented in the manufacturing sector which has suffered worst during this financial crisis.

In Veneto, the regional labour agency (Veneto Lavoro 2010) reported a similar picture showing declining in volume of recruitment for all foreign nationalities except the Chinese which is probably a statement of the resilience of Chinese businesses in Italy in these times of the Crisis (Ferruchio 2010). Generally, it has emerged that African nationalities are among the most negatively affected to date.

6.4.3. REMITTANCE FLOWS FROM ITALY

Ruiz and Vargas (2009) wrote that one of the most recognizable features of the global economic crisis is the decline in remittance flows to all regions of the world. In addition, the XV Report on Migrations (2009) published by the Ismu Foundation highlighted that the effects of the recession were clearly detectable from the beginning of the crisis if the remittances sent by the immigrants to their countries of Origin are critically analysed.

In fact a study by the Italian Banking Association (ABI) and the Centre for International Policy Studies (CeSPI 2009) on immigrants' financial needs showed that remittances are an important component of migrants' economic behaviour at all stages of their migration and integration experience. They respond to different strategies and needs, and stay more or less constant, even at a distance of 10 years from the immigrant's arrival in Italy. The main recipient countries of remittance flows from Italy largely correspond to the countries of origin of the most numerous migrant communities in Italy.

A recent study by the Chambers of Commerce of Milano (Camera di Commercio 2013) shows that immigrants resident in Italy remitted 6.8 billion Euro in 2012. The figure is a reflection of the impact of the financial crisis on immigrant workers given that in 2011 the total figure remitted was 7.3 billion euro which reflects a decline of about 500 million euro in just a space of a year (2011 - 2012).

When data on remittances released by the Bank of Italy (la Banca d'Italia) and the statics is analysed, it is evidenced that from 2000 to 2011, the volume of remittances to foreign countries steadily grew

each year except in 2010 when for the first a decline of (-2.6%) was recorded. The growth in volume of remittances picked up and grew between 2010 and 2011 at a growth rate of 12.5% which is higher than the growth recorded between 2007 and 2008 (+5.6%) and between 2008 and 2009 (+5.8%) (Fondazione Leone Moressa).

Until 2008, the volume of remittances from Italy had registered constant growth which was even higher than the growth this growth in Italy's resident immigrant population. The number of foreign citizens resident in Italy increased at an average rate of 17.4% from 2003 to 2007. Over that same period, remittances sent from Italy grew at an average rate of 26.8%. The Fondazione Leone Moressa recently released report shows the country's recipient of the remittances and the table below represents this information.

Table 6. Top 10 Remittance Recipient Countries 2012.

	Remittance (in 1000's of €)	Distribution %	% Difference 2011 - 2012
China	2,674,453	39%	5%
Romania	810,950	12%	-9%
Philippines	366,807	5%	-39%
Morocco	242,510	4%	-19%
Bangladesh	228,178	3%	-21%
Senegal	216,264	3%	-12%
India	198,060	3%	-4%
Peru	187,651	3%	-3%
Ukraine	152,705	2%	-8%
Ecuador	137,385	2%	-12%
Total	6,833,116	100%	-8%

Source. Leone Moressa Development Foundation on Bank of Italy data

As evidenced in the table below, those regions with large shares of immigrant population evidence high remittances levels than the southern regions where the population of immigrants is not as widespread. The statistics show that Rome leads the ranking of cities with a third of remittances coming from Rome (28% of the overall weight). This is followed by Milan accounting for (14% corresponding with under two billion euro, Naples and Prato. In the case of Toscana, the large concentration of the Chinese population is reflecting in the level of remittances sent back home.

Table 7. Top 10 Remittance Provinces 2012:

Province	Remittance in 2012 (€)	Weight against the rest of Italy
Rome	1,938,168	28.40%
Milan	965,969	14.10%
Naples	295,600	4.30%
Prato	208,458	3.10%
Florence	197,194	2.90%
Catania	178,292	2.60%
Torino	164,577	2.40%
Brescia	134,645	2%
Genova	110,334	1.60%
Bologna	108,989	1.60%
Total Provinces of Italy	6,833,116	100%

Source. Leone Moressa Development Foundation on Bank of Italy data

At the regional level, Lombardi is in first place with 1.4 billion in remittances. This is a reflection of the over 82,000 foreign companies operating on the territory (Camera di Commercio 2013). The report shows that almost all the money sent from Milano and the other provinces (especially Brescia and Bergamo) is destined for China (450 million euro), while the Egyptians who represent the largest community in the Lombardia send out about 4.7 million euro. The remittances to china can also be co - related to the large inflows of investors arriving from china to set up business in Italy.

A number of themes emerge in relation to the level of immigrant remittances in Italy and prominent among these is the china Factor. Undoubtedly, the growing influence of the Chinese as a group of immigrants and secondly as entrepreneur. While press reports show that on average 134 businesses close shop per day since the onset of the financial crisis, the resilience of the Chinese enterprises and businesses must be noted.

A number of scholars have urged that there exists a close link between remittances and return intentions to the home country. The average propensity to remit increases steeply during the first few years after arrival after many have covered their initial costs of relocation and settlement in their new country of residence.

It is clear that foreigners residing in Italy are not a homogenous group regarding their remittance behaviours, which vary significantly with individual and household characteristics. It has been documented that immigrants with high household incomes and stable job contracts are more likely to remit hence confirming that financial capacity is a precondition for remittances (Busetta and Strangers 2011). The effect of the financial crisis on household incomes in general and more specifically on Immigrant households has been profound and is reflected in the declining capacity of immigrants to meet their housing, heating and maintenance costs let alone contribute to maintaining the welfare of their families back home.

In addition, differences by foreign-national groups persist with some such as Peruvians and Filipinos showing a higher propensity to remit, while others such as Ukrainians and Macedonians are more likely to remit larger amounts Busetta et al (2012)

6.4.4. PUBLIC OPINIONS AND XENOPHOBIA AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS

The impact of the financial crisis in Italy is evidenced by the profound impact it has had on the economic, financial, social and cultural fabrics of society. The public debate and policy discourse in the years since the crisis has highlighted the increasing rates of unemployment among the youth, the inability for families to cover their monthly, the need for social support policies and the fact of increasing poverty in Italy. And as Ferruccio (2010, p. 128) rightly states, it is not uncommon that these issues have resulted in increased hate speech and “*negative shifts in insiders’ attitudes towards outsiders*”.


The problem for Italy is further reinforced by the fact that majority of the population depend on the radio and television media as their main source of information and news. According to Jonjić and Mavrodi (2012), television is the main source of news for 80% of the Italian population. The reporting and coverage of issues of immigration is predominantly negative, alarmist and discriminatory. In fact a study by the Sapienza University of Rome in 2008 found out that out of the 5,684 television news items on immigrant issues, only 26 did not relate to crime and security issues (HRW 2011, p. 11).

According to a Human Rights Watch report published in 2011, racism and xenophobia that are on the increase in Italy have contributed to increased hate speech and that the political discourse that links immigrants, Roma and Sinti to crime has helped to create and perpetuate an environment of intolerance (ibid).

Unfortunately, the lack of a periodic survey of European citizens’ attitudes towards immigrants post the financial crisis prevents proper analysis of the issue, a number of smaller opinion pools and studies provide some indication to what the situation is like. One such survey is the 2005-07 the World Values Survey which found 11.1% of Italians saying they did not want neighbours of a different race, against 4.9% in Britain. Even among Spaniards, who have had a similar experience of rapid, recent and largely unauthorised immigration, the proportion was 6.9% (Economist 2013).

Another is the thematic opinion survey recently carried out in six EU Member States (France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK) and two North American countries (USA and Canada) by the German Marshall Fund of the United States et al., (2009). This Transatlantic Trends: Immigration 2009 shows that overall attitudes towards immigration in the target countries including Italy remained relatively stable between 2008 and 2009, although a slight trend toward more respondents describing immigration as “**more of a problem than an opportunity**” as reported in the Figure 27 below.

Figure 27: Percentage of interviewees who said that immigration is “more of a problem than an opportunity”



Source: German Marshall Fund of the United States et al., 2009.

This survey showed that the Italian public opinion ranked in the middle concerning its perception of immigration as a problem rather than an opportunity, slightly behind of France, Germany and The Netherlands but better than the UK, Spain and the USA.

Another study by the Pew Research Centre (2009) cited in the IOM report (2010) found that the Italian public opinion is much less open to multiculturalism than the German, French, Spanish, British and Americans.

The role and initiatives by the civil society notably the trade unions, National Association Beyond Borders (Associazione Nazionale Oltre le Frontiere- ANOLF), Association of juridical studies on Immigration (Associazione per gli Studi Giuridici sull'Immigrazione- ASGI) and Caritas in counteracting these trends has been commendable. One notable campaign “*Don’t be Afraid*” (*Non Avere Paura*) launched in 2009 collected over 80,000 signatures for a petition against racism and intolerance that was presented to President Giorgio Napolitano.

In another campaign, “*I am also Italy*” (*L’Italia sono anch’io*) launched by over 19 civil society organisations in 2011 collected signatures for 2 legislative proposals: one a reform to the citizenship law to enable second-generation immigrants obtain Italian citizenship (109,268 signatures collected). The second calls for reform of the electoral law to grant immigrants voting rights at administrative elections after five years of legal residence and this collected 106,329 signatures (Polchi 2012).

The role of the government and the political parties in shaping the increasingly negative views about immigration cannot be over emphasized. Jonjić and Mavrodi (2012) point out that although the effect of the financial crisis on shaping the public opinion was already evident by the 2009 as unemployment and financial hardship spread across all sectors and aspects of daily life, the role of the Berlusconi government (2008- 2011) promoted anti-immigration rhetoric and shifted the government policy approach in regards to immigration in the direction of less integration and more investment for internal and public security as evidenced by the government spokespersons public speech and the laws passed during this period.

This view is supported by the IMO reports which notes that in the last couple of years, Italy seems to have been moving towards the adaptation of a new Gastarbeiter rather than an integrationist model (IOM 2010: 133) aimed at meeting her labour demands especially in the domestic workers and health

care sectors and seasonal labour needs on the one hand while increasing border control and control against clandestine immigrants.

Although the coming into force the Letta Government in April 2013 brought with it new energy and focus onto the topic of the integration of immigrants. While the appointment of Cecile Kyenge as Minister for Integration in Italy's newly formed government has kicked off a much-needed discussion on race and immigration in a country that still struggles to come to terms with its rapid transformation (Faris 2013).

The public debate and hate speech that followed her appointment received global wide condemnation and exposing the real challenges of immigrant integration in Italy especially at the time when a section of the population felt the government should focus on job creation and rebuilding the economy. Mario Borghezio, a member of the European Parliament for Italy's anti-immigration Northern League in an April 30 radio interview is quoted to have publically said

"Kyenge wants to impose her tribal traditions from the Congo," said "She seems like a great housekeeper," he added. "But not a government minister." (ibid)

Public statements from individuals especially those holding public office have only served to fuel the on-going debate. In the last couple of months, the arrival through the Mediterranean boatloads of asylum seekers and refugees escaping war, poverty and suffering has contributed to ensuring that immigration and the issues of asylum seekers are discussed in the public domain.

Following the tragic loss of life, questions about the role of FRONTEX, The validity of the Bossi. Fini law, the role of the Italian Coast guards, the role of Italy and the EU28 in supporting the local administrative structures and the resettlements of refugees and asylum seekers across Europe and much more have dominated the print and electronic media space in the last half of 2013.

Although a number of research studies and reports on the theme of the impact of the financial crisis on immigration exist, there is a general lack of current scientific data and analysis on how public opinion has been shaped by the dramatic events post the 2007- 2008 financial crisis. Although a number of electronic and print recordings provide a window into the general sentiments, these are still not sufficient and cannot be attributed or generalized to indicate the Italian public opinion on immigration. This is one area that requires further research.

CHAPTER 7

THE INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS: A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

7.1 AN INTRODUCTION

In recent years, immigration and immigrant integration have emerged as key issues on EU, national and local governments and institutions agendas. The arrival of immigrants into Europe brought with it wide ranging individual country or a city changes to the size and composition of the native population and presented not only new challenges and demands for appropriate service delivery but also opportunities as the newcomers adapt to the indigenous population (and their institutions), and vice versa.

To this effect, Bijl and Verweij (2012, p. 11) have recently wrote *“If the full benefits from migration are to be realised, Europe needs to find a way to cope better with its diverse and multicultural societies through more effective integration of migrants. Integration is thus not only important as a means of safeguarding social cohesion, but also has economic significance; if migrants are not integrated into the host society, and especially the labour market, Europe is in danger of losing economic power”*.

To speak generally, some countries have moved faster than others in developing immigrant integration policies. On the other hand for those countries considered the “**new**” immigration countries it is a work in progress. While for some, immigrant integration is a means, it appears that for others it is an end in itself and this will be further discussed latter on in this thesis.

7.2. INTEGRATION: A DEFINITION

Integration is often used as a term, but rarely defined as a concept (Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003). According to Heckmann (1992), the social science study of immigrant integration phenomenon has resulted in the emergence of a number of terms to describe it and prominent among these include: absorption, adaptation, race relations cycle, assimilation, acculturation, inclusion, incorporation and, of course, ‘integration’.

According Entzinger and Biezeveld (2003) at a macro, integration can be equated to the characteristic of the society where the more a society is integrated, the more the groups and individuals in that society closely relate to one another.

A social scientist Lockwood (1964) offers a deeper insight by distinguishing between systems and social integration. According to this author, System integration is the result of the anonymous functioning of institutions, organisations and mechanisms – the state, the legal system, markets,

corporate actors or finance while on the other hand Social integration refers to the inclusion of individuals in a system, the creation of relationships among individuals and their attitudes towards the society resulting into the conscious and motivated interaction and cooperation of individuals and groups.

Another team of researchers Bosswick and Heckmann (2006) have argued that Integration in a sociological context, refers to stable, cooperative relations within a clearly defined social system. They add that Integration can also be viewed as a process of strengthening relationships within a social system, and of introducing new actors and groups into the system and its institutions. “The integration of immigrants is primarily a process: if this process succeeds, the society is said to be integrated” (p.2).

This view is further complemented by Seer (2000) that proposes four basic forms of social integration that is acculturation, placement, interaction and identification. These have specific relevance to immigrant integration and are further elaborated as follows:

- Acculturation which can also be termed as socialisation refers to the process through which people acquire the knowledge, cultural standards and competencies needed to interact successfully with others in a society.
- Placement means an individual gaining a position in society – in the educational or economic systems, in the professions, or as a citizen. Placement also implies the acquisition of rights associated with particular positions and the opportunity to establish social relations and to win cultural, social and economic capital. Acculturation is a precondition for placement.
- Interaction is the formation of relationships and networks, by individuals who share a mutual orientation. These include friendships, romantic relationships or marriages, or more general membership of social groups.
- Identification refers to an individual’s identification with a social system: the person sees him or herself as part of a collective body. Identification has both cognitive and emotional aspects

According to Bosswick and Heckmann (2006)), efforts to analyse the integration of individuals into existing systems and institutions must look at their participation in those institutions that are central to their integration? (Bosswick and Heckmann (2006). This means that social integration is actually a process of learning and socialization that takes place under certain conditions. These authors explain that individuals and groups of immigrants may not always not be welcomed with open arms in the institutions and systems that impact their lives. Therefore, for these barriers encounter barriers to be overcome, the host society must engage in a mutual process of integration.

The debate on immigrants and integration and the role of the receiving society in offering institutional and political opportunities for social inclusion across Western Europe has in the past decade made its way to the discussion boards by politicians policy makers, academics and civil society actors. However Cappiali (2013) criticizes this approach as fundamentally flawed in two instances: First, by focusing on “good policies” or “good practices of integration,” it depicts immigrants as objects of specific policies rather than subjects of their own integration; second, it reinforces the idea that immigrants’ options are determined by other actors rather than by themselves. For meaningful integration to be achieved, immigrants

themselves must play a central role in deciding and participating in how integration policies and programmes are designed, implemented and monitored for results.

There is no one generally accepted definition of the meaning of integration. In fact Robison (1998) cited in Ager and Strang (2008) describe it as “**chaotic**” on reference to the different and often conflicting definitions in the literature. Despite these, a common feature that is agreed upon by many scholars is that integration should be analysed at the micro- individual level (individual and groups of people inclusion in a society) and the macro level which focuses on the state of societal cohesion as a whole (Entzinger and Biezeveld (2003) and Gil Leal et al. (2011) in Hutcheson and Jeffers (2012).

In addition, it is important that integration is not confused with assimilation which according Gordon (1964) and to Alba and Nee (1997) refers to the convergence of identity, culture, political and social economic features between natives and immigrant taking place across multiple dimensions. According to Baubock (2006) in Hutcheson and Jeffers (2012), integration is a two way process rather than a process of immigrants shedding their old identity, culture to take up new identity or cultures.

7.3. AS AN INITIATIVE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Europe has over the years emerged as a favourite destination for immigrants from all over the world. Europe’s economic prosperity, relatively high level of political stability and democratic principles are appealing to many migrants be them asylum seekers, students or people in search of employment or to start a new life outside of their former residence countries (Bijl and Verweij 2012). As a result, the composition of Europe’s population at all levels (City, town, municipality, region, country and at EU level) has and will continue to rapidly change. In fact, demographic projections foresee an increase in the immigrant population in the EU in the very near future (Lorent 2005, OECD 2009, Ministero del lavoro e delle Politiche sociali 2011).

Immigration as a policy domain often stirs strong emotional debates and controversy as economic, political, humanitarian, cultural and other considerations and philosophies often clash with particular force (Jonjic and Movrod (2012). Although the largest impact of immigration is felt at the local level where problems, opportunities, solutions and approaches are more likely to differ even with in the same country not to mention among member states at the EU level.

The division of competences in handling the integration of immigration is shared between the local, national and at EU level often making it a complex, dynamic and multi levelled policy with no straightforward divisions in the competences (ibid). the 2011 “Arab Spring” is just one of the many events that exposed the difficulty and complexities concerning the integration of immigrants in Europe where the increase in new arrivals put to test the willingness and commitment of some member states to stand up to the task and support Italy, Spain and Malta at whose shores the immigrants arrived. In fact a couple of member states temporarily reinstalled controls at their national borders under exceptional conditions or even called for a revision of the Schengen agreements (EMN 2012).

The journey to develop and harmonise a common immigrant integration policies at the EU level has been a long and protracted one. The first initiatives date way back to the 1999 Tempere programme which emphasized the need to design common integration policy across the EU in order to offer “*third country nationals “rights and obligations comparable to those of European Union citizens* (Martinello, undated). This was followed by the publishing and adoption of key EU communications such as Charter of Fundamental Rights, which was proclaimed in 2001, a Communication on family reunification (COM (2002) 225), a Communication on long-term established third-country nationals (COM (2001) 127), and a Communication on admission and stay conditions of third-country nationals’ workers (COM (2001) 386) and the European Council directive on Member States’ minimum standards in receiving asylum seekers (2003/9/CE), and a legal framework to fight against discrimination applicable to all residents, regardless of their nationality (directives 2000/43/CE and 2000/78/CE) (Ibid).

According to the Communication to the Council, the Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and to the Regions Committee on immigration, integration and employment (COM (2003) 336) presented in June 2003, integration is defined as:

“a two-way process based on reciprocity of rights and obligations of third-countries nationals and host societies that foresee the immigrant full participation”. Integration is conceived as a “balance of rights and obligations”. The holistic approach targets all dimensions of integration (economic, social and political rights, cultural and religious diversity, citizenship and participation).

The Common Basic Principles (CBP presented as box 1.1) agreed in 2004 under the Dutch presidency aimed at designing a common framework for a European approach to immigrant integration providing a framework to serve as a reference for the implementation and evaluation of current and future integration policies across all member states (Martinello, Undated).

Box 1.1 EU Common Basic Principles for immigrant integration policy
(Council of the European Union, 14615/04, 2004)

- Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States.
- Integration implies respect for the basic values of the European Union.
- Employment is a key part of the integration process and is central to the participation of immigrants, to the contributions immigrants make to the host society, and to making such contributions visible.
- Basic knowledge of the host society’s language, history and institutions is indispensable to integration; enabling immigrants to acquire this basic knowledge is essential to successful integration.
- Efforts in education are critical to preparing immigrants, and particularly their descendants, to be more successful and more active participants in society.
- Access for immigrants to institutions, as well as to public and private goods and services, on a basis equal to national citizens and in a non-discriminatory way is a critical foundation for better integration.
- Frequent interaction between immigrants and Member State citizens is a fundamental mechanism for integration. Shared forums, inter-cultural dialogue, education about immigrants and immigrant cultures, and stimulating living conditions in urban environments enhance the interactions between immigrants and Member State citizens.
- The practice of diverse cultures and religions is guaranteed under the Charter of Fundamental Rights and must be safeguarded, unless practices conflict with other inviolable European rights or with national law.
- The participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in the formulation of integration policies and measures, especially at the local level, supports their integration.
- Mainstreaming integration policies and measures in all relevant policy portfolios and levels of government and public services is an important consideration in public-policy formation and implementation.
- Developing clear goals, indicators and evaluation mechanisms are necessary to adjust policy, evaluate progress on integration and to make the exchange of information more effective.

This formed a second step after the June 2003 Communication on immigration, integration and employment and was followed by the publication of the “Integration Handbook” which described and suggested practical implementation policies for the integration of migrants (November 2004) and by the Green Paper on an EU approach to managing economic migration (COM (2004, 811 final). In 2005, the Commission made an attempt to move beyond the common basic principles by introducing the common agenda for integration.

Further attempts to mainstream legislation and coordination followed the 2009 Stockholm Programme which called for the development of limited core indicators in specific policy areas for the EU to effectively monitor progress of immigrant integration and as a strategy to increase experience sharing and learning among member states. Consequently, the conclusions of the expert meeting organised by the Swedish Presidency in Malmö on 14 to 16 December 2009 presented the results of a process to identify European core indicators which later have come to be known as the Zaragoza declaration adopted by the EU Ministers in Charge of Immigration and approved by the Justice and Home Affairs Council of 3rd - 4th June 2010. The table below presents the key indicators of the Zaragoza declaration.

Table 8. Indicators of the Zaragoza Declaration

Indicators of migrant integration	
policy area	indicators
employment	core indicators: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – employment rate – unemployment rate – activity rate
education	core indicators: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – highest educational attainment (share of population with tertiary, secondary and primary or less than primary education) – share of low-achieving 15 year-olds in reading, mathematics and science – share of 30-34 year-olds with tertiary educational attainment – share of early leavers from education and training
social inclusion	core indicators: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – median net income – the median net income of the immigrant population as a proportion of the median net income of the total population – at risk of poverty rate – share of population with net disposable income of less than 60 per cent of national median – share of population perceiving their health status as good or poor – ratio of property owners to non-property owners among immigrants and the total population
active citizenship	core indicators: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – the share of immigrants that have acquired citizenship – the share of immigrants holding permanent or long-term residence permits – the share of immigrants among elected representatives

Source: Zaragoza Declaration (2010)

This same council meeting called for the commission to undertake a study to evaluate the integration policies being implemented by member states, examining the validity of the proposed indicators, evaluating the sources of data, the specific country dynamics, immigrant population and local realities.

Eurostat published the results of the pilot study in 2011 (EU/Eurostat, Indicators of Immigrant Integration. A pilot study, 2011) showing country summaries for the measured indicators (unemployment, education, social inclusion and civic participation) was thereafter published. The pilot study was based on the EU Labour Force surveys (EU- LFS), the EU statistics on incomes and living conditions (EU- SILC) and the OECDs Programme for International Students Assessment (PISA).

In the Communication (Com 2011) 455) of July 2011, the European Commission proposed the a renewed agenda for the integration of non EU immigrants with special focus on increasing social, cultural, economic and political participation of immigrants especially at the local level. This was in recognition of the fact that the 2004 common principles on immigrant integration and the common agenda on integration of 2005 had not resulted into effective integration. This is in light of the current statics which show that unemployment level among immigrants was higher than that of the native population, coupled with high levels of social exclusion, poverty and vulnerability especially since the financial economic crisis that hit Europe since 2007.

In conclusion, I would like to highlight that ‘integration’ and the subsequent pluriformity of integration policies have resulted in the major dilemmas for most member states. Even within a member states, the realities and approaches at the local level are diverse as dictated by the social economic resources and political governance structures and convictions to promote integration. I will hereby focus my analysis on the case of measuring integration in Italy and thereafter narrow down to the case study of Parma for which is the focus of this thesis.

7.4. MEASURING IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION IN ITALY

The integration of immigrants in Italian society dates as was back as the early 1980s when a number of scholars started to study how immigrants were settling into the different regions across Italy (Birindelli 1991). These studies were aimed at documenting the employment and social economic wellbeing of the immigrants (Natale and Strozza 1997). The interest in this subject gained further interest in recent years as the foreign born population in Italy grew to current levels of approximately 10% of the population (Gabielli et al. 2009).

As already mentioned elsewhere in this thesis, the differences in the definition and understanding of integration contributed to ambiguity in the definition and conceptualization of policies, actions and reporting on immigrant integration and as Bonifazi et al (2012) state, it is not easy to find a single and unified definition of “integration” even though there is general consensus on the dynamic and multi-dimensional nature of the concept. In fact Integration can take on very different forms and characteristics over space and time ranging from the complete assimilation to multiculturalism (Colemann 1994). This process is further complicated by the fact that measuring integration means evaluating two social processes since one cannot look at the migrants alone, but also has to take the members of the host society into consideration (Borjas, 1999, Bauer and Zimmermann, 1997).

A number of studies and indexes have been developed over the years in an attempt to document the level of integration of immigrants in Italy. However as Bartolomeo and Bartolomeo (2007) explain, the

regional contexts and differences even with in Italy point to the complexity of this process. Never the less and notwithstanding the definition or concept of integration applied, Martolomeo and Bartolomeo (2007) show that the following four dimensions are generally agreed upon in the analysis of integration of migrants into their respective host societies:

- 1) The degree of polarization,
- 2) Cultural diversification,
- 3) Social stability,
- 4) Integration in the labour market.

One of the earlier studies on Immigrant integration in Italy was conducted by CNEL in 2004 providing a performance ranking of the different regions of Italy. The CNEL study (CNEL 2004) collected and analysed data based on the following indicators developed to capture different aspects of immigrant's livelihoods in Italy. The indicators identified and used for the study are:

- 1) Incidence (INC) measures the quota of foreign residents on the total number of residents in each region.
- 2) Incremental indicator (INR) measures the percent variation of foreign residents between 1992 and 2002.
- 3) Permanence (PER) is the proportion of net migrant flows (residence permits released in the year and still valid at the end of the year) on the gross flows (residence permits released in the year).
- 4) Flow indicator (FLU) is the incidence of the new net flow of migrants on the total amount of resident foreigners.
- 5) Pluralism indicator (PLU) is the number of foreign nationalities represented by foreign resident in each region.
- 6) National heterogeneity (ET1) measures the incidence of the largest foreign national group on the total amount of foreign residents.
- 7) National heterogeneity (ET2) measure the incidence of the ten foreign groups more present on the total number of migrants.
- 8) Continental heterogeneity (ETC) is the degree of diversification of the continental representatives, which is computed among the 10 foreign groups more numerous within the migrants, It is built by an index number that considers the migrants' continental areas, the number of migrants' ethnic groups of the continent more represented (for more details, see CNEL, 2004).
- 9) Religious difference (REL) measures the heterogeneity of the regional confessions among migrants. It is the number of people accepting the more diffused religious confession on the number of migrants.
- 10) Family reunion (RIC) is the incidence of foreign resident for family reasons on the total amount of them.
- 11) Long (LUN) measures the long stays, i.e. the incidence of migrants who are present from at least 10 years on the total number of migrants in 2000.
- 12) Citizenship (CIT) is the yearly number of foreign resident who acquire the Italian citizenship for every 1.000 foreign residents.

13) Stability residence (STA) indicates the incidence of stable residents on the total; stable residents are people resident for job, adoption, re-joining, study, religion, elective residence, waiting for citizenship.

14) Deviance (DEV) is the incidence of resident foreigners complained to the police authorities on the total number of resident foreigners (2001).

15) Potential employment (OCP) is the incidence of the foreign labour force on total of foreign residents.

16) Effective employment (OCE) is the percentage of the foreign unemployed on the foreign labour force.

17) Labour market sustainability (LAV) corresponds to the migrants' incidence of the net yearly flow of migrants hiring on the total number of net hiring;

18) Entrepreneurship (IMP) is the proportion of foreign entrepreneurs on the total number of foreign citizens.

19) Work injury (INF) is the percentage of indemnities paid to foreign citizens on the total indemnities in 2001

Following the compilation and analysis of data for each of the indicators mentioned above, the CNEL report produced the following table of ranking:

Table 9. Regional Ranking of the CNEL indicators

Regions	Polarization	Culture index	Social Stability	Job integration	CNEL index
Abruzzo	47	45	58	53	203
Basilicata	39	24	44	43	150
Calabria	60	40	31	62	193
Campania	36	69	49	55	209
Emilia Romagna	71	53	66	56	246
Friuli Venezia Giulia	71	63	53	42	229
Lazio	51	84	41	44	220
Liguria	43	72	51	48	214
Lombardia	59	80	56	68	263
Marche	74	45	60	57	236
Molise	43	28	52	39	162
Piemonte	65	48	61	69	243
Puglia	36	35	29	42	142
Sardegna	30	55	66	58	209
Sicilia	27	49	57	51	184
Toscana	73	68	38	65	244
Trentino Alto Adige	53	47	53	63	216
Umbria	59	47	51	32	189
Valle d'Aosta	33	19	87	46	185
Veneto	80	76	47	57	260
mean	52,5	52,35	52,5	52,5	209,9


Source: CNEL (2004).

The CNEL (2004) index revealed different levels of immigrant integration with regions such as Lombardia, Veneto, Emilia Romagna, Toscana, Piemonte, Marche and Friuli Venezia Giulia ranked as above average, followed by Lazio, Trentino Alto Adige, Liguria, Campania, Sardegna, Abruzzo and Calabria as close to average while Umbria, Valle d'Aosta, Sicilia, Molise, Basilicata and Puglia were graded as below average (Ibid). The index emphasizes regional heterogeneities and an easier integration in the North and central than in the south of the country.

In a critic of the methodology and approach of the CNEL (2004) index, Bartolomeo and Bartolomeo (2007) highlight a limitation in the failure of the CNEL index to consider the geographic distances among regions. They also criticize the index for using a similar weight of between 1 to 20 for all the indicators yet some indicators carry more weight in terms of significance and influence. The authors employ the Principal Components Analysis first described by Karl Pearson (1901) to aggregate the CNEL indicators into a linear index, which is a rather objective measure of integration and their finding are some what diverse as presented from those by the CNEL report as shown in the maps below.

Figure 28: Map results comparison between the CNEL Index and PCA Index

Figure 1 – A comparison between the CNEL index and our index.



(Source : Bartolomeo and Bartolomeo 2007)

According to the PCA index (Ibid), the most integrated region was found to be les Marche instead of Lombardia as shown by the (CNEL index). Lombardia takes third place in PCA index. Secondly, because the distance between the North and the South of Italy was magnified, the performance of the central Italy greatly improved and that there is not a substantial difference between the North and Centre of Italy. Infact many central regions performs better than those of the North while In contrast, the difference between North and South Italy appears higher than previously documented in the CNEL report.

7.5 The IX CNEL REPORT 2013

In July 2013, CNEL released the latest report on the integration of immigrants in Italy covering the year 2011 (except in cases of lack of update data, the data of the next available data is used). Once again, the report highlights the difficulty in directly measuring the complex phenomena of immigrant integration hence the application of sets of indicators categorised under the following broad categories:

1) Indicators to measure **territorial attractiveness** (which measure the ability and strategies for different regions and provinces to attract and maintain the immigrant population. The indicators included in this subcategory are:

- % of immigrant population
- Density of immigrant population
- Internal reception mechanisms and strategies (new immigrants transferring from other communes and regions to come and reside in new region, commune, province)
- % of young immigrants
- Birth rate
- Annual increment in immigrant population.

2) **Indicators for social inclusion** (measuring the level of immigrants' access to goods and basic welfare services (homes and schools), the degree of embeddedness in the society fabric for instance through adequate knowledge of Italian language and the achievement of ensure that certain legal status and / or lay down a solid and mature inclusion in the host society (such as the continuity of the state of regularity for foreigners who intend to settle permanently in Italy, the acquisition of citizenship by naturalization, the recomposition of its on-site family).

3) **Indicators for inclusion in the job market:** (this group of indicators serves to measure the degree and quality of participation of immigrants in the local labor market by quantitative analysing the percentage of all employed population, rate of entrepreneurship, the type of involvement, duration of contracts and involvement in public administrative jobs among others). The indicators for this category include:

- Indicator for labor market participation:
- Indicator for the labour market absorption capacity:
- Indicator for level of responsibilities at work:
- Rate of employment retainment
- Indicator for continuity of residence permits for work
- Indicators for self employment

In noting the challenges and limitation of the above selected indicators, this CNEL report emphasised that the above indicators cannot be taken as conclusive but rather as indicative of the situation at hand considering the current reality and challenges related to availability of data.

This ninth CNEL report shows that, the integration of immigrants in Italy has dramatically changed in the space of two years (the period 2009 – 2011). Data shows that immigrant integration has experienced widespread challenges with " widespread deterioration " reported in almost all regions of Italy as a result of the financial crisis. The worst effects have been suffered in the North and North eastern regions as small and medium sized enterprises closed shop.

The results after the analysis of the data collected for each indicator are aggregated and presented in tables and narratives as I summarise here below.

7.5.1. REGIONAL CLASSIFICATION ON TERRITORIAL ATTRACTIVENESS

The table below shows that Lombardia is the region with the highest level of attractiveness for immigrants with 91.9 on a scale of 1- 100 followed by Emilia Romagna with 80.2 points. The points for Lombardia improved in respect to 2009 when the points were 86.2, still in first position.

Table 10: regional performance list in Teritorial attractiveness (2010)

ITALIA. Indice di attrattività territoriale. Graduatoria delle regioni: punteggi su scala 1-100 (2010)

N° ord.	Regione	Indicatore 1	Indicatore 2	Indicatore 3	Indicatore 4	Indicatore 5	Indicatore 6	Indice sintetico	Fascia intensità
		Incidenza	Densità	Ricettività migratoria interna	Stabilità	Natalità	Incremento annuo		
1	Lombardia	93,9	100,0	61,9	100,0	95,7	100,0	91,9	Massima
2	Emilia R.	100,0	70,7	53,9	84,0	88,3	84,5	80,2	Alta
3	Veneto	88,2	86,5	47,7	97,8	88,1	53,7	77,0	
4	Lazio	80,0	100,0	64,5	35,5	26,7	100,0	67,8	
5	Piemonte	74,3	47,9	63,9	79,6	71,1	48,4	64,2	
6	Liguria	61,2	72,3	100,0	59,2	43,8	24,4	60,1	
7	Toscana	82,7	48,3	56,8	60,7	54,9	56,7	60,0	Media
8	Trentino A. A.	71,7	18,0	81,1	82,7	66,6	11,3	55,2	
9	Marche	78,7	45,9	39,6	79,8	67,8	16,4	54,7	
10	Valle d'Aosta	50,7	4,9	76,2	73,6	100,0	1,0	51,1	
11	Umbria	96,9	35,0	49,2	65,8	40,6	14,7	50,4	
12	Friuli V. G.	69,6	40,3	57,0	67,1	58,0	9,8	50,3	Bassa
13	Abruzzo	42,4	20,8	51,3	45,1	37,5	11,7	34,8	
14	Sicilia	7,0	14,3	48,6	53,4	33,8	32,5	31,6	
15	Puglia	1,9	12,4	41,8	40,0	19,8	25,4	23,5	Minima
16	Calabria	16,9	12,4	28,9	27,2	4,0	19,4	18,1	
17	Molise	6,8	2,8	32,7	39,1	24,7	1,7	18,0	
18	Basilicata	3,7	1,0	57,5	18,5	17,1	3,8	16,9	
19	Sardegna	1,0	1,3	57,6	6,5	18,0	10,1	15,8	
20	Campania	7,1	35,9	1,0	1,0	1,0	38,4	14,1	

Fonte: CNEL - Centro Studi e Ricerche IDOS

Emilia Romagna is the region with the highest immigrant population density of 11,3% of its total population against the national average of 7,5% and is among the top three most attractive regions for immigrants in 2011. It is important to note that even within any single region, the performance of different provinces differs as I will highlight in the table below focusing on those provinces with in the Emilia Romagna region.

All the provinces of the Emilia Romagna that is Piacenza, Parma, Reggio Emilia, Modena, Ferrara, Bologna, Ravenna, Rimini, Forlì – Cesena are all situated in the top 50 provinces with the highest levels of attractiveness. It is important to note that the indicator for the employment inclusion in 2011 exceeds the value of 70 only in 3 provinces (Imperia (72.0) , Reggio Emilia (71.5) and Prato (71.3) when compared to the last analysis in 2009 when a total of seven provinces (in order of ranking: Reggio Emilia , Prato , Trieste, Florence , Piacenza , Milan and Bologna) all scored above the 70/100. This is another testimony of the negative effect of the financial crisis and the growing difficulty to find employment even in the once booming manufacturing and construction sectors in the North of Italy.

Table I I. Indicator score list for territorial attractiveness per province (2010)

ITALIA. Indice di attrattività territoriale. Graduatoria delle province: punteggi su scala 1-100 (2010)									
N° ord.	Provincia	Indicatore 1	Indicatore 2	Indicatore 3	Indicatore 4	Indicatore 5	Indicatore 6	Indice sintetico	Fascia intensità
		Incidenza	Densità	Ricettività migratoria interna	Stabilità	Natalità	Incremento annuo		
1	Brescia	100,0	38,7	46,1	100,0	97,0	100,0	80,3	Massima
2	Prato	99,7	100,0	64,3	94,3	96,6	22,7	79,6	Alta
3	Bergamo	79,0	48,0	42,2	97,2	100,0	92,8	76,5	
4	Milano	80,2	100,0	48,5	59,5	54,6	100,0	73,8	
5	Modena	93,1	36,0	39,9	79,0	77,9	64,2	65,0	
6	Reggio Emilia	95,4	32,7	39,1	85,2	84,0	43,1	63,2	
7	Roma	75,4	89,2	47,5	32,2	30,6	100,0	62,5	
8	Mantova	93,7	24,8	45,2	91,8	84,5	28,8	61,5	
9	Treviso	83,4	44,8	33,4	93,1	76,1	32,6	60,6	Media
10	Varese	55,7	64,5	45,2	74,9	66,0	49,0	59,2	
11	Lodi	79,4	34,9	49,2	95,6	79,5	14,9	58,9	
12	Padova	69,4	46,3	46,5	68,2	69,8	52,4	58,8	
13	Cremona	78,5	24,5	44,0	99,8	84,5	21,3	58,8	
14	Verona	83,4	36,9	39,5	71,8	72,5	46,7	58,5	
15	Genova	50,2	38,7	100,0	54,3	45,1	60,9	58,2	
16	Torino	62,9	33,0	45,9	57,7	54,8	88,1	57,1	
17	Bologna	73,9	30,2	42,3	56,3	59,0	76,5	56,4	
18	Vicenza	79,7	38,4	34,8	86,3	69,7	23,8	55,4	
19	Firenze	80,6	34,5	39,1	51,0	49,0	74,4	54,8	
20	Lecco	55,7	36,7	43,7	81,9	92,1	16,8	54,5	
21	Como	54,3	39,8	48,9	75,1	74,3	34,3	54,5	
22	Parma	90,8	17,5	41,3	62,6	66,2	46,7	54,2	
23	Pavia	68,2	19,6	53,3	73,5	67,8	40,6	53,8	
24	Piacenza	98,1	16,4	45,6	76,6	61,2	24,3	53,7	
25	Novara	66,1	28,4	52,5	70,8	73,8	28,7	53,4	
26	Rimini	71,4	66,9	48,2	46,1	60,7	24,4	53,0	
27	Trieste	55,2	96,8	87,9	29,6	24,4	9,9	50,6	
28	Cuneo	66,7	9,1	49,3	76,5	68,3	32,1	50,3	
29	Venezia	60,9	33,3	42,8	57,0	51,8	53,6	49,9	
30	Asti	77,8	17,5	44,6	75,4	69,9	14,3	49,9	
31	Forlì	75,1	19,1	44,8	65,7	69,0	25,2	49,8	
32	Ravenna	79,9	25,6	46,2	53,0	62,4	27,7	49,1	
33	Alessandria	68,2	13,2	53,6	69,1	56,6	28,1	48,1	
34	Pordenone	82,5	17,4	34,7	68,8	66,6	13,5	47,2	
35	Trento	64,3	8,8	52,5	72,7	60,9	24,2	47,2	
36	Ancona	64,2	24,8	40,2	62,4	60,7	26,1	46,4	
37	Perugia	83,3	13,5	36,1	58,6	40,1	45,5	46,2	
38	Macerata	78,9	14,2	33,2	72,5	61,5	16,1	46,1	
39	Rovigo	50,4	11,5	45,2	79,4	75,6	14,3	46,1	
40	Ferrara	51,4	11,5	39,7	63,1	73,8	26,0	44,2	
41	Bolzano	56,5	6,4	63,9	58,1	49,5	23,9	43,0	
42	Arezzo	77,2	12,9	42,2	60,4	43,3	20,4	42,7	
43	Latina	45,2	18,4	63,1	48,3	46,7	33,8	42,6	
44	Pisa	61,7	16,6	51,6	45,2	46,4	31,4	42,2	
45	Gorizia	51,8	25,4	59,7	52,5	59,6	3,2	42,0	
46	Vercelli	50,5	7,3	54,3	73,7	55,8	6,1	41,3	

7.5.2. REGIONAL POTENTIAL FOR INTEGRATION: EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL INCLUSION OF IMMIGRANTS

Table 12 Indicator score list per region for employment and social inclusion (2010)

ITALIA. Indice del potenziale di integrazione. Graduatoria delle regioni: punteggi su scala 1-100 (2011)

N° ord.	Regione	Indice 1 inserimento occupazionale	Indice 2 inserimento sociale	Indice sintetico	Fascia intensità
1	Piemonte	64,5	61,0	62,8	Alta
2	Emilia R.	73,8	49,7	61,7	
3	Liguria	70,6	51,2	60,9	
4	Friuli V. G.	61,9	59,7	60,8	
5	Abruzzo	57,3	63,1	60,2	
6	Marche	58,7	61,6	60,1	
7	Sardegna	64,3	55,1	59,7	Media
8	Toscana	69,4	48,7	59,1	
9	Trentino A. A.	39,3	77,3	58,3	
10	Valle d'Aosta	44,7	70,4	57,6	
11	Lombardia	69,4	40,2	54,8	
12	Umbria	46,5	60,2	53,3	
13	Veneto	58,7	46,1	52,4	
14	Lazio	60,4	36,7	48,6	
15	Campania	54,4	35,7	45,1	
16	Molise	38,5	51,4	45,0	
17	Sicilia	39,8	45,9	42,8	
18	Basilicata	37,7	45,8	41,8	
19	Puglia	28,1	51,5	39,8	Bassa
20	Calabria	34,3	39,4	36,8	

Fonte: CNEL - Centro Studi e Ricerche IDOS

According to the report, The region with the highest potential for the integration of immigrants is Piemonte which has taken first position from Friuli Venezia Giulia, the 2009 winning province and who in this case fall to fourth position. The data also shows that Emilia Romagna (EM) has the highest employment inclusion rate for integration of immigrants although falls way short of the medium in social inclusion. Despite this, EM holds the second place with 61.7 points for the regions ability to integrate immigrants into her region through the labour market. Like in the case of Piemonte, when compared to the 2009 report, EM points fell by 1.4 points in a space of two years.

Despite the impressive performance of Piemonte, Emilia Romagna, Liguria, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Abruzzo and le Marche all reported as having a high level of immigrant integration, it is important to note that the points of all the above fall in the 60/100. Therefore, no region was found to have excellent integration (80-100) points. It should however be noted that even within the regions, there are marked differences between the performances of individual provinces with some provinces shown in the table below scoring points higher than the average marks awarded to the region. In the table below, some of the provinces of the EM are highlighted to illustrate the different scores.

Table 13. Indicator score list for social and employment inclusion per province (2010)

ITALIA. Indice del potenziale di integrazione. Graduatoria delle province: punteggi su scala 1-100 (2011)					
N° ord.	Provincia	Indice 1	Indice 2	Indice sintetico	Fascia intensità
		inserimento occupazionale	inserimento sociale		
1	Macerata	65,3	67,4	66,4	Alta
2	Mantova	67,9	64,6	66,2	
3	Imperia	72,0	59,7	65,9	
4	Pistoia	65,0	64,3	64,7	
5	Asti	59,9	69,2	64,6	
6	Biella	57,6	71,3	64,4	
7	Teramo	64,4	64,2	64,3	
8	Massa Carrara	68,2	59,7	64,0	
9	Savona	63,3	64,1	63,7	
10	Lucca	56,8	70,1	63,4	
11	Novara	62,0	64,9	63,4	
12	Udine	61,9	64,9	63,4	
13	Pesaro Urbino	59,3	67,2	63,3	
14	Vercelli	62,2	64,3	63,2	
15	Terni	56,9	69,2	63,1	
16	Ravenna	65,0	61,0	63,0	
17	Alessandria	58,1	67,8	63,0	
18	Lecco	57,6	67,7	62,6	
19	Prato	71,3	53,9	62,6	
20	Piacenza	63,7	60,6	62,2	
21	Cuneo	54,1	69,0	61,6	
22	Lodi	67,3	55,7	61,5	
23	Trento	47,6	75,4	61,5	
24	Varese	63,0	59,3	61,2	
25	Reggio Emilia	71,5	50,7	61,1	
26	Arezzo	63,8	58,4	61,1	
27	Pordenone	64,2	57,7	61,0	
28	Treviso	62,8	58,9	60,9	
29	Cremona	58,0	63,5	60,8	
30	Trieste	58,6	62,6	60,6	
31	Pavia	63,3	57,8	60,6	
32	Forlì	62,2	58,6	60,4	
33	Viterbo	53,9	67,0	60,4	
34	Vicenza	55,3	65,0	60,2	
35	Rimini	61,1	58,9	60,0	Media
36	Nuoro	56,4	63,1	59,7	
37	Aosta	49,8	69,1	59,5	
38	Torino	64,5	54,3	59,4	
39	Belluno	51,5	66,8	59,2	
40	Bolzano	50,4	67,9	59,2	
41	Chieti	56,7	61,6	59,2	
42	Rieti	51,6	66,7	59,1	
43	Parma	65,4	52,4	58,9	
44	Verbania	53,9	63,2	58,6	
45	Isernia	54,6	62,5	58,5	
46	Brescia	60,8	56,1	58,4	
47	L'Aquila	50,9	65,6	58,2	

Source : CNEL - Centro Studi e Ricerche IDOS

A key revelation of this report is that social and employment inclusion of immigrants seems to succeed or manifest more easily in the “**smaller**” regions and cities as opposed to the more “business model” centers of power such as Rome and Milan where the hectic, frantic and competitive realities of day to day life are noted to contribute to social exclusion and isolation of the most vulnerable in society.

The data shows that Milan and Rome, two of the largest metropolitan cities of Italy and home to large numbers of immigrant population exhibited a decline in their integration indexes from 56,4 and 55,5 in 2009 to 49,2 and 49,9 respectively at the beginning of 2012). This view is confirmed by the fact that most of the other metropolitan cities of Italy such as Naples, Turin, Genoa, Palermo, Florence, Bologna, Bari, Catania, Venice, Cagliari all score low points in social inclusion of immigrants and hence

tend towards the end of the classification list as shown in the attached annex of the classification of all provinces in Italy (Annex).

An interesting point to note is that, while a number of the metropolitan cities scored low in social inclusion of immigrants in society, they scored relatively better in job and employment inclusion by the fact of availability of more employment opportunities in the bigger cities. This points to the dilemma of how to measure integration of immigrants and how to strike the balance between social inclusion and economic inclusion especially in the face of the economic crisis.

CHAPTER 8

PARMA AND IMMIGRANTS: AN OVERVIEW

8.1. IMMIGRANTS AS PART OF THE POPULATION

Parma is a multi-ethnic province, hosting approximately 137 foreign citizenships arriving from all parts of the world. Recent statistics show that East Europe in recent has surpassed North Africa as the region from where majority of the immigrants in Parma arrive from.

According to the 12th provincial report on Immigrants in Parma (2012), the number of foreigners resident in the province of Parma as of January 1 2013 were 60,550, equal to 13.5% of the total population in the province of Parma. As shown in the table below, this represents an increase of 2,317 compared to the same period in 2012. The figure below shows the gradual increase in immigrant arrivals recorded over the last 15 years.

Figure 29: Foreign Citizen resident in Parma 1st January 2013




(source: <http://www.statistica.parma.it>) (The note says: as of 1st January 2013, immigrants in Parma were 60,000, 13.5% of the total population. There were 2,317 more than the previous year although this increase was much less than the previous year).

The report shows that the severe economic crisis that has resulted in high unemployment for many foreign workers has resulted in this scenario. Parma as a province has not been spared from the global recession and as a result the difficult economic conditions and financial prospects have resulted in fewer new arrivals and even fewer requests for family re- unions hence a gradual slowdown in foreign population growth.

Overall, an immigrant population making up 13.5% of the total population as of 1 .1.2013 positions Parma as one of the highest levels of immigrant residents in Emilia Romagna and Italy. The report shows that the foreign population increased last year in 29 out of the 47 municipalities of the province.

The municipalities of Caledon, Langhirano, Colorno and Fornovo host the largest proportion of immigrants and in some cases as high as 17.7% of the population in that municipal.

Figure 30: % Immigrant Population per health districts in Parma




(source: <http://www.statistica.parma.it>)

An emerging phenomenon emphasized by the report on the immigrant situation in Parma is the rapidly changing gender composition of the immigrant population. Women make account for 51.7% of the total population as of 2013. This has followed a steady increase in the last few years considering that in 1999, women accounted for only 42.5% of total foreign population. In fact the percentage of female immigrants increases significantly in the municipalities in the mountain belt for example in Tornolo, the percentage is as high as 77.4% of the immigrants are female. The numbers are equally high Monchio delle Corti (67.7%), Albareto (66.7%) and Bore (65.9%).

The changing trend of the gender composition is not unique to Parma but to Italy and Europe as a whole. One of the reasons advanced for this is that women are predominantly employed in the service and care industry which also have been affected by the financial crisis, the impact has not been as devastating as that on sectors such as manufacturing, industry and construction that were predominantly male dominated but collapsed in the last five years.

Another reason that is advanced by the report is that the changing composition of the immigrant population may be an indicator and confirmation of the It hypothesize that with the aging of the native population, this has stimulated demand for female immigrants as opposed to their male counterparts.

Figure 31: Gender composition of the Immigrant Population




(source : <http://www.statistica.parma.it/allegato.asp?ID=877411>)

8.2. COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN

The available data confirms that the largest number of immigrants in Parma arrive from the Eastern Europe countries of Moldavia, Romania and Albania. These three nationalities comprise a total of 35% of all the immigrants resident in the province.

Figure 32: Countries of Origin with highest numbers of Immigrants in Parma




(source : <http://www.statistica.parma.it/allegato.asp?ID=877411>)

8.3. AGE CLASSIFICATION

What the picture below presents is the fact that majority of the immigrant population in Parma can mainly be classified to fall in the productive age bracket between 20 and 44. This means that finding employment is vital to their livelihoods. Likewise the age group of the young immigrant also referred to as the “second generation” is high especially in the age bracket 0-4 yrs. As shown in the CNEL

index for social inclusion and integration, this is an indicator to demonstrate the choice of a considerable number of immigrants to set up social and civic roots in the province of Parma. On the other hand, it is also an indicator to the type of social support services and structures to meet the needs of the immigrant population with these specific characteristics.

Figure 33: Age Classification of Immigrants in Parma




8.4. IMMIGRANT UNEMPLOYMENT IN PARMA

According to a 2011 Caritas Migrant report (2012), the immigrants in Parma with regular employment number more than 20,000. Among the total number of caregivers, 75% are foreigners while in the construction sector, 18 out of 100 employees are foreigners. Additionally, 12% of nurses and 10% of those working in agriculture are foreigners. Out of 100 foreigners with a job, 90 were casual workers, 7.3 % employees, 1.2% self employed and 1% in management roles.

Building on the data and statistics of earlier reports, the Caritas Migrant report (2013) covering the year 2012 focuses on the increasing unemployment that has affected immigrants and Italians alike as a result of the financial crisis.

The rate of unemployment has continued to increase in Europe, Italy and more specifically in Parma as an alarming reflection of the effect of the global financial crisis on economy in Emilia Romagna and specifically Parma built over years through the success of the manufacturing, processing and construction sectors. In just a space of one year from 2011- 2012, the unemployment rate among immigrants in Parma almost doubled from 7.2% to 13.3%. As already discussed, it is important to note that the worst affected are the male working age immigrants employed in the construction sector.

Figure 34: A Comparison of the Unemployment rates between Immigrants and Italians in Italy and Parma



(source : (source : <http://www.statistica.parma.it>)

The report also highlights a declining availability in the services, home care and hospitality services mainly dominated by women immigrants. In 2012 alone, a decline in the number of employment contracts for domestic workers and caregivers registered a decrease of 7.4% compared to the previous year of available data. This decline is further confirmation of the effect of the crisis especially on the employment sectors that had seemed to survive the wrath of the crisis.

In an effort to reduce the un employment rate, the Province of Parma undertook a number of formation courses. For the year 2012- 2012, a total of 322 training courses were initiated involving 2158 participants of whom approximately 20% are foreign nationals.


8.5. IMMIGRANTS AND HOUSING IN PARMA

Access to a safe and habitable home is considered one of the most important conditions for integrating immigrants. This is especially most important today where the economic conditions continue to make it impossible for many families to access and maintain a place to call home. This is particularly true in the case of the immigrant population who for a number of reasons are not able to afford a mortgage to buy a house and pay rent with the soaring uncertainty economic situation. Also the lack of social, capital and political capital increases the vulnerability for many immigrant households in face of the risks and uncertainties' of life today.

In Parma, a number of initiatives including the social housing schemes have been implemented and the statistics as shown in the figure below continue to confirm the inability of the province to meet the housing needs of the population.

At the end of 2012, 5,650 public housing apartments (edilizia residenziale pubblica (ERP) were occupied by 4,815 Italian households (85.22%) and 835 families from other countries corresponding to 14.78% as shown in figure 34 below. The number of foreign households to access public apartments in 2012 increased by 41 families.

Figure 35: A Comparison Italian and Immigrant Familys' access to Public Housing



(source : <http://www.statistica.parma.it>)

The report in detail shows that majority of those in the occupancy of the social housing apartments, 3,578 are citizens from non-EU countries while those from EU countries number only 142. More specifically, the following countries are dominant; Morocco (905 people), Tunisia (588 people), Albania (458 people), Ghana (221 people) and Nigeria (214 people). What is interesting to note is that these figures do not correspond to the figures of the largest number of immigrants in Parma (Moldavia, Romania and Albania in that order) for the simple reason that majority of these nationalities are fond of house sharing with co - nationals already in residence rather than seek personal residence. Another factor showed by the report is that, for most of them, they see themselves as immigrants for work with a tendency to occasionally return home as opposed to permanent residents setting up roots in Italy.

8.6. PARMA AND REMITTANCES IN 2012

The effect of financial crisis on remittances from Europe and Italy has been devastating considering that many households in many countries around the world depend on these funds for their day-to-day survival. The picture from Emilia Romagna and Parma specifically is not any different.

According to Bank of Italy data quoted in Violi (2013) majority of the immigrants living in Parma sent less money home with the exception of the Indian, Chinese and Filipinos community. In 2012, remittances sent from Parma with the official channels totaled € 41 million, compared to 48 million in 2011 representing a net decline of 14%.

When compared to the national statics of remittances from Italy in 2012, the decline in of 14% in remittances from Parma is double the national decline of 7.6% in the same period considering that official remittances amounted to 7 billion and € 394 million in 2011 compared to 6.833 billion in 2012: 7.59%.

The according to the Bank of Italy 2012 data, the country to receive the most amount of remittances sent from Parma was in 2012 was Romania with 4.3 million (reflecting a decline of 15.55% compared to 2011) followed by Senegal, with little more than 4 million (a decline of 5.34% if compared to 2011). According to Violi (2013), Moldavia as a recipient of remittances from Parma suffered the worst decline in 2012 falling from first position in 2011 with 6,45 million euros to 2.51 million in 2012 which is a reflection of a - 61.09% decline. This is despite the fact that the Moldavia community remains the largest group of foreigners resident in Parma.

While for the financial crisis is undoubtedly the main reason of this trend, other factors are mentioned in the analysis done by Violi (2013). The president of the Senegalese community resident in Parma Abdou Ba quoted in Violi (Ibid), *“with onset of the economic crisis, many Senegalese are moving to Germany, the Scandinavian countries or France where there is work in the food industry especially since many Senegalese have gained experienced from working in the the ham and cheese industries in Langhirano-Parma”*

One of the reason given to explain the remittance behavior among the Indians, Gautam Talukdar the president of their community in Parma explains that increasingly many indian families are establishing business entities and making more investment here in parma than send the money back home.

On her part, Maria Nimerenco, the president of the Moldavia community explains that the increasing number of family re-unifications and the fact that many Moldavian families have purchased homes here explains the decline in remittances.

8.7. PARMA INITIATIVES FOR INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS

The population of immigrants in Parma has grown over the years to the current levels when they make up more than 10% of the Population. As Part of Emilia Romagna, Parma scores very highly in the index of attractiveness for immigrants, social and employment and this can be attributed to the vast initiatives by the government, religious, business and civil society and most importantly by the immigrants community to make it happen. In this section, I will highlight a number of projects, initiatives and strategies that have profoundly contributed to shaping the course of immigrant integration in Parma

8.7.1. ITALIAN LANGUAGE COURSES

Ability to speak Italian is key to employment and social integration for immigrants and their children. In the year 2012- 2013, a total of 116 training courses to teach Italian to foreigners were organized mostly by the Centro Territoriale Permanente (CTP) and mostly financed by and through the Province within the programmes scope for integration of immigrants. These courses benefited more than 2,000 people mainly women and youth mostly from India, Morocco, Moldova. In addition, and with the support of Fondazione Cariparma, a number of additional courses targeting high school students to improve their Italian language (level A2 and B1) in the schools.

Through the Centro per Impiego Parma, approximately 600 inter cultural mediation and support interventions were conducted during the year 2012-2013. These services are vital in supporting immigrants and other foreign residents identify appropriate employment and training opportunities available and facilitate social, cultural and employment inclusion.

8.7.2. INFORMA STRANIERI

Informastranieri is a service of information, guidance and advice to citizens of all nationalities on the opportunities for social and employment inclusion and integration in Parma. Immigrants are able to access information on employment opportunities, regional and national legislation, administrative procedures for residency permits, family reunification, application for citizenship, access to schools and health services. Also accessible is information for the nomad community, requests asylum and a linguistic mediation team of 20 intercultural mediators from 16 linguistic areas (Commune di Parma, 2013).

According to the press release from the Commune of Parma (Ibid) the services of informastranieri was consulted by 23.735 people in 2012. To cater for the growing demand and figures, the Commune of Parma has undertaken to improve the structure of the premises which renovation works undertaken between May and September 2013.

The image below aims to demonstrate the kind of information and services that this portal focuses on providing.

Figure 36: A Screenshot of the role of Informa Stranieri



Source:

<http://stranieri.comune.parma.it/tportalparma/application/tportal/engine/stranieri.jsp?db=tportalparma&id=home1>

8.7.3. INTERCULTURAL CENTER OF PARMA

At the beginning of February 2013 and after months of planning, the Intercultural Center of Parma was inaugurated as a place for immigrants and citizens alike to meet, share ideas, learn from, and with each other for mutual enrichment co. existence between people of different origins. The establishment of the center is a result of collaboration between the province, civil society and over forty associations and cooperatives.

In the words of the project coordinator, "It's a great satisfaction to see a project from the paper and get tangible results such as the setting up of a meeting place , which is really something very concrete . The refurbishment of the Intercultural Center is solely the "work" of volunteers who choose to participate in this experience . There are many organizations, of which only half composed of foreigners ... Day after day, side by side , the volunteers sanded, plastered , painted ... and now that everything is ready, the first big bet is won. Now the challenge is that this space be able to receive and give shape to the ideas of everyone, regardless of skin color" (Gazzetta di Parma,2013)

Situated in via Bandini 6, Parma, the center is further testimony of the commitment and initiatives both from the provincial administration and the civil society actors to further integration and multi - cultural exchange of ideas and ideals.

8.7.4. MULTI CULTURAL FESTIVAL (FESTIVAL MULTICULTURALI)

In 2013, this festival organized the 17th edition dubbed “*six days to travel the world without leaving home*” in reference to the activities and diversity that has come to be associated with these events. Organized through the Forum Solidarieta Parma, this event is each year organized through the collaboration of the political leadership of the Province of Parma, civil society organizations, immigrant associations and cooperatives and hundreds of volunteers who for months work together in organizing the logistical, administrative and actual events.

By showcasing the diverse cultures and uniting people of different origins to work and learn together, this very popular family event has contributed to building bridges between the immigrant community and natives. Though the programmes run in schools, public debate and media campaigns, this festival has contributed to promoting the idea that immigrants are an integral part of society while offering students exposure to other cultures, cuisines and way of life.

8.7.5. IMMIGRANT ASSOCIATIONS AND COOPERATIVES IN PARMA

A total of 39 associations and cooperatives made of, by and for immigrants are registered as with Commune di Parma. The full list of officially registered association is attached to this document as appendix 2.. The list shows a higher tendency for associations to form on a country-by-country basis with some of the countries with large immigrant populations covered by more than one association.

During this study, it was difficult to find concrete information on the activities, functioning and sustainability strategies for almost all the associations and cooperatives. In my opinion, the associations and cooperatives for, by and in the interest of the immigrant community in any political setting plays a key role in their social cultural and political integration and as such it would be of interest to undertake further study on their functioning, levels of transparency and ownership by the immigrant community themselves. Only then, can their role in supporting the integration processes and initiatives in the Province and in the city of Parma be rightly attributed and quantified.

8.7.6. TAVOLO IMMIGRAZIONE E CITTADINANZA - PARMA (2010- 2013)

Inaugurated on April 22, 2010, the team of the “Tavolo immigrazioni” was composed of six representatives of immigrant communities resident in Parma from Asia, Africa, America and Europe. The team was instituted as a platform for political advocacy and interaction on issues of interest to the social, civic and political participation of immigrant’s and the political leadership of Commune of Parma and in the Province of Parma.

Despite the number of activities and initiatives undertaken in the past three years, this team ceased to exist and closed their offices in March 2013 citing the change and lack of political good and the commitment of the current political leaders to dialogue with the immigrant community (Trentadue 2013).

Despite the closure, it is important to highlight a number of initiatives undertaken by the organization in promoting the integration and civic participation of immigrants in Parma. Key among these include

- The campaign “**Sono parmigiano anch'io** (directly translated as **I am also parmigiano**) with an aim of highlighting the fact that immigrants of Parma, new citizens of Parma desire to participate in the political, social and cultural life of the city especially since many of them have become Italian and therefore have the right to vote and participate in the political and civil affairs in the province.

This campaign has gained momentum across all spectrums of the political and social divide culminating in the commune of Parma taking initiative to confer honorary citizenship to all children born to immigrant parents' resident for at least five years. In a press release and meeting between the deputy mayor Nicoleta Paci and representatives of the immigrant community, she is quoted as having affirmed that *“Ideally we would like to recognize the jus soli as in many other European countries, but because the municipalities have no jurisdiction in the matter, we have decided to perform a gesture of high symbolic value by granting civic citizenship to the children of foreigners born in Parma... the function is to be held twice a year, in spring and in autumn, with a public ceremony to give emphasis to the issue of these children who are ideally Italian”* (commune di Parma, 2013).

- **1 maggio 2012 Festa degli immigrati lavoratori (e non lavoratori)** directly be translated as **1st May: Immigrant workers (and non workers Day)** with an aim of highlighting the contribution of immigrants to the economic, social and cultural development in Parma. This event was organized after the city election campaign in which the political discussion on Immigrants offered a portrait of criminals. This even aimed at highlighting the role of immigrants as employees and tax payers hence contributors to the economic and social welfare development in Parma (Olufemi 2012)

A critical analysis at the reasons for why this initiative failed point to the real challenges that need to be addressed if real integration is to be realised. While on the part of the immigrants, democratic and ownership issues emerged, at the level of the institutions, the reluctance and hesitation of the political and civil institutions to open up to immigrant participation. Attached to this thesis as appendix 3 is a copy of the letter authored by the core members at the closure of this initiative.

8.7.7. OTTOBRE AFRICANO PARMA

Initiated 10 years ago by the association "Le Réseau" in Parma, The African Festival in October was born in Parma to promote mutual understanding, cooperation and co-existence based on respect, cultural exchange and communication. Each year in the month of October, a series of literary, theatrical, artistic events and public discussions are organized in collaboration with various political structures, businesses, civil society associations and cooperatives.

With the onset of the financial crisis, this festival like many other such initiatives are increasingly faced with declining financing hence its long term sustainability thrown into balance. Indeed this event, which for many is considered a major cultural events of city of Parma, scaled down on scope of events choosing to hold debates and public talks as opposed to the popular public exhibitions and recreational events that came to be associated with this very popular family event for the most part of its 10 years of existence.

CONCLUSIONS

This study set out to understand how the global financial crisis that rocked the global economy since the summer of 2007 has impacted on immigrants in Europe. Further the study focused on the case study of Parma and using the data available through the provincial office, statistical portal and available publication, I attempted to construct the impact of the financial crisis on immigrants at all the three levels outlined above.

First and foremost, it is only possible to measure the short term effects of the financial crisis on immigrant livelihoods as the real impact study can only be undertaken with time. The effects such as increased unemployment, reduction in disposable income and change in public perceptions are already visible and quantifiable at the European level and Italy country level and at the province of Parma level. However the long term impact of these on immigration and immigrants in general remains to be seen.

What I found is that the effect of the financial crisis cut across all levels of analysis (Europe, Italy, Parma) with glaring similarities in impact rather than differences, as I will outline here below.

9.1. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE RATES AMONG IMMIGRANTS

- As I went into this study, I set out to understand decisions immigrants take once they lose their jobs and not able to financially support themselves in their countries of residence. What I have learnt is that it is not true that many immigrants decide to return to their home countries. In fact attempts to implement such schemes in Spain and Greece did not yield positive results.
- What I found is that most immigrants prefer to change countries to those economies where it is easier to find employment such as German, Switzerland, France, the Scandinavian countries and UK. This is particularly true in the case of Italy where majority of the immigrants have left Italy but in general remained in Europe.
- Within Italy, there are a number of immigrants who have been recorded to change residence between regions and Provinces, however the extent to which this can be scientifically proved is limited and needs to be further studied.
- According to the Istat population balance sheet (Istat bilancio demografico 2009), the number of people of foreign nationality who withdrew from the Italian municipal demographical registers declaring they were going abroad increased by (+19,4 %) in 2009. In 2010, the number of foreign residents deleted from the municipal registers due to “un traceability” increased from 32,000 to 56,797 hence pointing to possible relocation.
- The yearly ISMU report for 2011 shows that the yearly growth in number of foreign citizens in Italy was around 390,000 per year in the period 2003-2009 only to drop to 335,000 in 2010.
- The rising unemployment and economic uncertainty has not altogether caused a stop to new arrivals but rather a slight decline in numbers of immigrants arriving.

- In Parma, the Eastern Europe countries of Moldavia, Romania and Albania represent 35% of all the immigrants resident in the province.
- A considerable number of new arrivals in the past 6 years are mainly refugees seeking refugee following conflict and unrest in the North Africa (the Arab spring) and the Middle East (Syria).
- Another main lesson is the change in gender composition of the immigrant population. Statics at the EU, Italy and even for Parma show that women are increasingly making up the larger percentage of the immigrant population. This presents a change in the traditionally held paradigm that men were more likely to migrate than women. However, the collapse of the construction and manufacturing sectors historically dominated by men since the financial crisis had caused a change as women are migrating more to work in the health care and assistance services sectors across Europe. The implications of this structural change needs to be further studied and analysed.

9.2. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND UNEMPLOYMENT OF IMMIGRANTS

- The Literature shows that Immigrants have suffered higher rates of unemployment when compared to the native EU population.
- While unemployment rates for nationals rose by 1.8 percentage in 2008, the rates for nationals of other EU countries rose by 2.8 percentage; and for non-EU migrants, unemployment rates rose by 5 percentage during 2008. By the second quarter of 2009, the gap between nationals and non-EU migrants had widened to 11 percentage points according to Koehler et. al. 2010.
- An OECD recent publication even states that the worst effects of unemployment have been felt by immigrants from Latin America and North Africa with the rate as high as 27 % among North African immigrants in 2012.
- The above view is shared by the Regional Observatory on the Labour Market for Veneto and Piemonte (2009) which show that the crisis has hit migrant workers of African nationality comparatively harder in terms of recruitment. For example comparing the data for June 2008 and June 2009, it is evident that African migrants had a -40 per cent variation in recruitment compared to Asian migrants at 20 per cent (ORML, 2009).
- The rate of un employment among immigrant male workers has almost doubled since the onset of the financial crisis. While the rate of unemployment among women immigrant was 13.4% in 2006 and increased by 4 points by 2012, the rate of un employment among immigrant men has more than doubled from the 5.4% in 2006 to 13.6% in 2012.
- The Rapporto Annuale sull'Economia dell'Immigrazione 2013 very recently released by the Fondazione Leone Moressa (FLM 2013) shows that from 2008 to 2012, there was an increase in the unemployment rate of foreigners by 5.6 percentage points from 8, 1% to 14.1% and an increasing wage gaps between Italians and foreigners of up to € 336 for the same job under similar conditions and that Immigrant workers represent 10% of the total labour force.
- Another report Rapporto Annuale sull'Economia dell'Immigrazione by Fondazione Leone Moressa (2013) shows that about 32,000 foreigners left Italy in 2011 resulting in a total loss of income amounting to 86 million Euros in taxes to the state coffers. The report emphases that

despite the crisis, foreigners workers who approximately are 2.3 million immigrant workers (10.1% of total employment) are still an asset to the country considering they account for 5.4% of the total declared income (43.6 billion Euro) and pay income tax of € 6.5 billion (4.3% of the total of the net)

- In just one year 2011- 2012, the unemployment rate among immigrants in Parma almost doubled from 7.2% to 13.3%.
- Since most immigrants lack the social and political capital and support systems in the countries of residence, it is through employment that they are able to find economic independence. Therefore the lack of income to meet their day to day basic needs increased their levels of vulnerability and the levels of vulnerability of society as a whole.
- As a result of rising unemployment, more immigrants have reverted to irregular unemployment which is available as many struggling companies and business use this mode to avoid paying government taxes. The danger with this is that there is no job security and no protection mechanisms in case the need arise (as often is the case).

9.3. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND REMITTANCES TO SENDING COUNTRIES

- As the incomes available to the immigrants decline year after year, the amount of money they are able to send back home to support their families has gradually declined. Many households and governments across the world who depend on immigrant remittances as a source of income have registered drastic declines in the years since the financial crisis (2007 to date).
- The analysis shows that total remittances to most countries at the level of analysis (EU, Italy and Parma) have declined since 2007.
- In 2009, the majority of Member States recorded decreases in the outflow of workers' remittances with the highest falls observed in Spain (from 7.9 bn euro to 7.1 bn) and France (from 3.4 bn to 2.8 bn).
- On the other hand the largest increase was registered in Italy (from 6.4 bn to 6.8 bn).
- Total EU27 outflows amounted to 30.3 billion euro in 2009, compared with 32.6 bn in 2008 (-7%). These figures include both intra-EU27 and extra-EU27 flows. The decrease in workers' remittances in 2009 compared with 2008 was almost the same for extra-EU27 flows (-7%) and for intra-EU27 flows (-6%).
- China Romania and Philippines top the list of receiving countries in Italy. For the case of Parma, Romania, Senegal and Moldavia are the 3 top recipient counties.
- When compared to the national statistics of remittances from Italy in 2012, the decline of 14% in remittances from Parma is double the national decline of 7.6% in the same period considering that official remittances amounted to 7 billion and € 394 million in 2011 compared to 6.833 billion in 2012: 7.59%.
- It is evidenced that from 2000 to 2011, the volume of remittances to foreign countries steadily grew each year except in 2010 when for the first a decline of (-2.6%) was recorded.
- The growth in volume of remittances picked up and grew between 2010 and 2011 at a growth rate of 12.5% which is higher than the growth recorded between 2007 and 2008 (+5.6%) and between 2008 and 2009 (+5.8%)

- The volume of remittances from Italy had seen constant growth, at least until the start of the financial crisis in 2008. In proportional terms, this growth was even greater than the growth in Italy's resident immigrant population. The number of foreign citizens resident in Italy increased at an average rate of 17.4% from 2003 to 2007. Over that same period, remittances sent from Italy grew at an average rate of 26%
- At the regional level, Lombardi is in first place with 1.4 billion in remittances. This is a reflection of the over 82,000 foreign companies operating on the territory (Camera di Commercio 2013). The report shows that almost all the money sent from Milano and the other provinces (especially Brescia and Bergamo) is destined for China (450 million).

9.4. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AS A CAUSE IN RISING XENOPHOBIA

- It is not directly measurable that the financial crisis has negatively shaped people and public opinions in Europe. Although the public discussion in the media seems to indicate this, there are very little facts to support this view.
- What the available literature shows is that the financial crisis has reinforced, rather than caused increased public resentment of migration. Indeed, in some countries where migration was already an issue of high salience during the pre-crisis period, the economic crisis of 2010 has helped to propel immigration discussions into the mainstream public discourse as an issue of migration of concern.
- These sentiments are further fuelled by media coverage of refugee arrivals at the shores of Italy as opposed to coverage of the contribution and role of regular resident immigrants.

9.5. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION

- The global recession is having a major impact on immigrant integration across Europe. Under severe budget pressure, many governments are pursuing austerity programs and policies and the social welfare programmes from which many in society benefit have not been spared.
- The ability to find and keep a job is vital to immigrant integration. In fact for Italy and Parma more specifically, the labour market is main channel for integration of immigrants
- Integration of immigrants is a complex, multi leveled initiative that is defined, envisaged and approached differently. Although the EU has defined guiding principles for member states, the actual implementation is a competence of the member state and even at the country level, the regional and provincial administrative levels share this competence. As such even within a single country such as Italy, regional approaches, initiatives and differences exist and persist for the simple reason that each locality is diverse and its reality, challenges and opportunities differ. It is therefore difficult to measure integration at all levels. However the progress made by the EU, Governments and CSOs in developing the tools and instruments to measure this is commendable. There is however greater need for involvement of immigrants in this process.
- Immigrants should not be considered as objects to be integrated into the host societies but rather must be looked at as active participants with potential to identify and contribute to their process of integration.

- The success of immigrant integration policies are very much dependent on the good will and sustenance of the political leadership. It is actually fact that with the rise in the extreme right political parties and their anti - immigration rhetoric contribute to promoting immigrants as “criminals”, lawless non tax paying persons. It is therefore true to fear that the gains registered across Europe in regards to immigrant integration could be reversed leading to social alienations and discrimination across Europe.
- The role of the civil and religious organizations in the receiving, settling and integration of immigrants is commendable. In the case of Italy, organizations such as Caritas and in the case of Parma, Forum Solidarieta and the many immigrant associations have and continue to play a fundamental role in immigrant integration. The challenge for many of these organizations is declining funding hence the need to scale down on many activities and reduce staff in the case of increasing needs.
- Existence of strong, dynamic and democratically elected and managed associations are the key to effective integration. the current structures remain very fragmented based on country or region of origin not to mention the democratic leadership challenges and issues.

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ANNEX I

EU LEGISLATION OF IMMIGRANTS

(accessed online from http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/immigration/index_en.htm)

I. DIRECTIVE 2003/86/EC ON THE RIGHT TO FAMILY REUNIFICATION

A SUMMARY

The Directive aims to establish common rules of law relating to the right to family reunification. The intention is to enable family members of third-country nationals residing lawfully on the territory of the European Union (EU) to join them in the Member State in which they are residing. The objective is to protect the family unit and to facilitate the integration of nationals of non-member countries.

The Directive does not apply to Ireland, Denmark and the United Kingdom. In addition, it does not preclude any more favourable conditions recognised by national legislation. Third-country nationals who hold a residence permit valid for at least one year in one of the Member States and who have the genuine option of long-term residence can apply for family reunification. However, this Directive does not apply to family members of a Union citizen, or to third-country nationals applying for recognition of refugee status whose application has not yet given rise to a final decision or who are under a temporary form of protection.

The following are eligible for family reunification:

- the sponsor's spouse;
- the minor children of the couple (i.e. unmarried children below the legal age of majority in the Member State concerned), or of one member of the couple, where he or she has custody and the children are dependent on him or her, including adopted children.

The Member States remain free to authorise, under certain conditions, family reunification of:

- first-degree ascendants in the direct line (father and mother of the foreign national);
- unmarried children above the age of majority;
- Un married partners.

Polygamy is not recognised; only one wife can benefit from the right to reunification. Likewise, children of the ineligible wives are excluded from the right to reunification, unless their greater interest warrants it (pursuant to the 1989 Convention on Children's Rights). Member States are also permitted to require the third-country national and his/her spouse to be of a minimum age (subject to a maximum of 21 years), before they can exercise the right to family reunification.

Procedure

The Member States determine whether it is the foreign national, or the family members who wish to join him/her, who is to submit the application for family reunification. Except in special cases, the family member to be reunited must remain outside the EU during the procedure. The application must be accompanied by documentary evidence of the family relationship and of compliance with the conditions laid down. The application must be examined within six months after submission.

The person concerned may be required to have accommodation that meets general safety and health standards, sickness insurance and stable resources sufficient to maintain himself/herself and the members of his/her family. Furthermore, he/she may be required to abide by integration measures under national law, as well as to have resided in the Member State in question for a certain period of time (two years maximum) before being joined by the family members.

A family member may be refused entry or residence on grounds of public policy, internal security or public health. This also applies in the case of fraud (falsification of documents, marriage of convenience, etc.). The same grounds may justify the withdrawal or non-renewal of a permit that has already been granted.

Persons whose permit is refused, withdrawn or not renewed must have the right to mount a legal challenge. Particular conditions are applied to the family reunification of refugees, especially regarding the concept of “family member”, the documents required to prove family links, conditions relating to housing, sickness insurance, stable resources and compliance with integration measures.

Rights of family members

Family members of the foreign national are entitled to a residence permit of the same duration as that of the person they have joined and, on the same terms as that person, to access to education, employment and vocational training. After five years of residence (not later), the spouse or unmarried partner and any children who have reached majority are entitled to an autonomous residence permit. National law establishes the conditions relating to the granting and duration of the autonomous residence permit. Member States may limit the granting of the permit in cases of breakdown of the family relationship.

2. DIRECTIVE 2003/109/EC ON A LONG-TERM RESIDENT STATUS FOR NON-MEMBER NATIONALS;

Background

At the Tampere European Council of 15-16 October 1999, EU countries emphasized the need to give equitable treatment to non-EU nationals legally resident in the EU. In particular, all non-EU nationals who have resided in an EU country for a given period of time should be granted a set of uniform rights that are as near as possible to those enjoyed by EU citizens (point 21 of the Tampere conclusions). The directive is also designed to give full effect to Article 79 TFEU by setting out the rights of non-EU nationals legally residing in an EU country to reside in the other EU countries.

SUMMARY

By creating a single status for long-term resident non-European Union (EU) nationals *, the directive approximates the laws of EU countries and ensures equal treatment throughout the Union, whatever the EU country of residence.

The directive applies to all non-EU nationals residing legally in the territory of an EU country. Some categories of individuals are excluded from its scope because their situation is precarious or because they are resident on a short-term basis (refugees, asylum seekers awaiting a decision on their status, seasonal workers or workers posted for the purpose of providing cross-border services, persons who have been granted temporary protection or a subsidiary form of protection and persons residing in order to pursue studies or vocational training).

EU countries must apply the directive in accordance with the principle of non-discrimination pursuant to Article 10 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

Long-term resident status

EU countries must recognize long-term resident status after five years of continuous legal residence. Absences from the EU country for periods of less than six consecutive months (and not exceeding ten months in total within the five-year period) or for specific reasons provided for by national law (e.g. military service, secondment for work purposes, serious illness, maternity, research or studies) will be regarded as not interrupting the period of residence.

In order to obtain long-term resident status, non-EU nationals must prove that they have, for themselves and their family (if dependent):

- stable resources sufficient to live without recourse to the social assistance system of the EU country concerned;
- sickness insurance.

EU countries may require non-EU nationals to comply with further integration conditions (such as sufficient knowledge of a national language of the EU country concerned).

EU countries may refuse to grant long-term resident status on grounds of public policy or public security.

The competent authority must take a decision on whether to grant long-term resident status no more than six months after the application is lodged. Decisions to reject an application must be notified in writing to the person concerned, in accordance with the procedures under national legislation, stating the reasons and indicating the redress procedures available and the deadline for action on the part of the applicant. Long-term residents will receive a permanent residence permit that is standard for all EU countries, valid for at least five years and automatically renewable.

Long-term resident status may be withdrawn only on certain grounds that are set out in the directive (absence from the EU territory for more than 12 consecutive months, fraudulent acquisition of the status or adoption of a measure to expel the person concerned).

Persons who have acquired long-term resident status will enjoy equal treatment with nationals as regards:

- Access to paid and unpaid employment, conditions of employment and working conditions (working hours, health and safety standards, holiday entitlements, remuneration and dismissal);
- Education and vocational training, recognition of qualifications and study grants;
- Welfare benefits (family allowances, retirement pensions, etc.) and sickness insurance;
- Social assistance (minimum income support or retirement pensions, free health care, etc.);
- Social benefits, tax relief and access to goods and services;
- Freedom of association and union membership and freedom to represent a union or association;
- Free access to the entire territory of the EU country concerned.

In certain cases, EU countries may restrict equal treatment with nationals with respect to access to employment and to education (e.g. by requiring proof of appropriate language proficiency). In the field of social assistance and protection, EU countries may limit equal treatment to core benefits. They are nevertheless free to add to the list of benefits in which they grant equal treatment with nationals as well as to provide equal treatment in additional areas.

Long-term residents enjoy enhanced protection against expulsion. The conduct on which expulsion decisions are based must constitute an actual and sufficiently serious threat to public policy or public security. Such decisions may not be founded on economic considerations. EU countries undertake to consider specific factors before taking a decision to expel a long-term resident (age of the person concerned, duration of residence, etc.).

The provisions of the directive do not prevent EU countries from issuing permanent residence permits on terms that are more favourable than those set out in the directive. Nevertheless, such residence permits do not confer the right of residence in the other EU countries.

Right of residence in the other EU countries

A long-term resident may exercise the right of residence, for a period exceeding three months, in an EU country other than the one that granted him/her the status, subject to compliance with certain conditions, including

- Exercise of an economic activity in an employed or self-employed capacity;
- Pursuit of studies or vocational training;
- Other purposes.

However, an EU country may limit the number of residence permits if, at the time of the adoption of this directive, limitations for the admission of non-EU nationals are already set out in existing national law. At the same time, for reasons of labour market policy, EU countries may give preference to Union citizens.

The above conditions do not concern employees posted for the purpose of cross-border provision of services or providers of cross-border services.

When the application for a residence permit is lodged, the competent authorities in the second EU country * may require the presentation of certain documents (such as the long-term residence permit, an identity document, an employment contract, documentation with regard to appropriate accommodation, etc.) and evidence of stable and regular resources and medical insurance.

The family members * of the long-term resident may accompany him/her to the second EU country or join him/her there on condition that they already formed a family in the first EU country *. If this is not the case, Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification applies.

The second EU country may refuse applications for residence only where there is an actual threat to public policy, public security or public health. In the case of public health, the directive allows EU countries to require a medical examination in order to certify that the persons in question do not suffer from any diseases that are the subject of protective provisions in the host country. The directive also provides for a series of procedural guarantees, such as the statutory period for examining applications for residence permits, the arrangements for notifying interested parties, redress procedures and the conditions governing expulsion.

As soon as they enter the second EU country, long-term residents enjoy all the benefits that they enjoyed in the first EU country under the same conditions as nationals.

Long-term residents living in the second EU country will retain their status in the first EU country until they have acquired the same status in the second EU country. If they so wish, they may apply to be considered as long-term residents in the second EU country after having legally resided there for a period of five years.

As a general rule, the first EU country is obliged to readmit, together with their family members, long-term residents whose residence permits have been withdrawn by the second EU country.

3. DIRECTIVE 2004/114/EC ON THE ADMISSION OF STUDENTS;

SUMMARY

One of the objectives of Community action in the field of education is to promote Europe as a world centre of excellence for studies and vocational training. Promoting the mobility of third-country nationals to the Community for the purpose of studies is a key factor in that strategy. The approximation of the Member States' national legislation on conditions of entry and residence is part of this.

This Directive determines the rules concerning the procedures for admitting third country nationals to the territory of the Member States, for a period exceeding three months for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated training or voluntary service.

The Directive distinguishes four categories of third-country nationals:

- Students;
- School-pupils;
- Unremunerated trainees;
- Voluntary workers (volunteers).

The admission of students primarily concerns higher education as that is the level at which international mobility is most common.

Apart from determining the specific conditions for admission of each of these four categories, the Directive defines the principal criteria for the admission of third-country nationals for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated training or voluntary service, in particular the availability of adequate financial resources and admission to an educational establishment, participation in a pupil exchange scheme, signature of a training agreement or participation in a voluntary service scheme, as the case may be.

Certain categories of people are excluded from the scope of the Directive:

- Asylum-seekers and persons enjoying subsidiary forms of protection or temporary protection schemes;
- Third-country nationals who are family members of Union citizens who have exercised their right to free movement within the Community;
- Third-country nationals who enjoy long-term resident status in a Member State in accordance with Council Directive 2003/109/EC and exercise the corresponding right to reside in another Member State in order to study or receive vocational training.

Admission conditions

The Directive determines the basic conditions for admitting third-country nationals for the purpose of study:

- The applicant must have been accepted by an establishment of higher education;
- The applicant must have sufficient resources to cover his/her subsistence, study and return travel costs;
- The applicant must have sufficient knowledge of the language of the course to be followed (a flexible condition left to the discretion of the Member States);
- Prior payment of the fees charged by the establishment (a flexible condition left to the discretion of the Member States).

As regards the admission of a third-country national already admitted as a student in another Member State, the Directive establishes a right to be admitted to another Member State where he wishes to pursue his studies. To ensure that third-country nationals do not abuse their student status by excessively prolonging their stay in the European Union, the additional course of study must be adequately related to the studies already completed.

For third country nationals who are secondary school pupils, the Directive covers only organised mobility through exchange schemes managed by specialised organisations.

The following conditions apply:

- Age limits are set by the Member State concerned;
- The exchange organisation must be recognised by the Member State concerned;
- The exchange organisation must accept responsibility for subsistence, study, healthcare and return travel costs;
- The admission document depends on the choice of host family. The Member State retains some room for manoeuvre to reserve exchanges for third countries that offers exchange possibilities for its own school pupils.

The Directive determines the following conditions for unremunerated trainees:

- The applicant must have sufficient resources to cover his/her subsistence, training and return travel costs;
- If the Member State so requires, the applicant must receive basic language training so as to acquire the knowledge needed for the purposes of the placement.
- Third-country nationals in the category of unremunerated trainees or volunteers who are considered, by virtue of their activities or the kind of compensation or remuneration received, as workers under national legislation are not covered by this Directive.

The Directive provides for the following conditions where a third-country national applies to be admitted to a voluntary service scheme:

- age limits are set by the Member State concerned;
- an agreement giving a description of tasks, the conditions in which the volunteer is supervised in the performance of those tasks, the working hours, and the resources available to cover travel, subsistence and accommodation costs throughout the stay;
- the organisation responsible for the voluntary service scheme must accept responsibility for the volunteer's activities and for subsistence, healthcare and return travel costs;
- the volunteer must, if the host Member State specifically requires it, receive a basic introduction to the language, history and political and social structures of that Member State.

Validity and renewal of residence permits

The period of validity of residence permits varies according to the category:

- Students: a residence permit is issued to the student for a period of at least one year and renewable if the holder continues to meet the conditions. Where the duration of the course of study is less than one year, the permit is valid for the duration of the course;
- school pupils: no more than one year;
- Unremunerated trainees: the duration of the placement is for a maximum of one year. In exceptional cases, it may be renewed, once only and exclusively for such time as is needed to acquire a vocational qualification recognised by a Member State;
- Volunteers: no more than one year. In exceptional cases, if the duration of the relevant programme is longer than one year, the duration of the validity of the residence permit may correspond to the period concerned

Rights of third-country nationals

The Directive provides that students shall be entitled to be employed and may be entitled to exercise self-employed economic activity. However, access to economic activities for the first year of residence may be restricted by the host Member State.

Procedure and transparency

A decision on an application to obtain or renew a residence permit is subject to the following rules of transparency:

- a decision on a residence permit must be adopted, and the applicant must be notified of it, within a period that does not hamper the pursuit of the relevant studies, whilst leaving the competent authorities sufficient time to process the application;
- if the information supplied in support of the application is inadequate, processing of the application may be suspended and the competent authorities must inform the applicant of any further information they need;
- any decision rejecting an application for a residence permit must be notified to the third-country national concerned. The notification must specify the possible redress procedures available;
- where an application is rejected or a residence permit issued in accordance with this Directive is withdrawn, the person concerned shall have the right to mount a legal challenge before the authorities of the Member State concerned.

The Directive provides for an agreement on a fast-track procedure for issuing residence permits or visas to students and school pupils between the authority of a Member State with responsibility for the entry and residence of third-country nationals and an establishment of higher education or an organisation operating pupil exchange schemes.

4. DIRECTIVE 2005/71/EC FOR THE FACILITATION OF THE ADMISSION OF RESEARCHERS INTO THE EU;

SUMMARY

One of the objectives of Community action in the field of education is to promote Europe as a world centre of excellence for studies and vocational training. Promoting the mobility of third-country nationals to the Community for the purpose of studies is a key factor in that strategy. The approximation of the Member States' national legislation on conditions of entry and residence is part of this.

This Directive determines the rules concerning the procedures for admitting third country nationals to the territory of the Member States, for a period exceeding three months for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated training or voluntary service.

The Directive distinguishes four categories of third-country nationals:

- students;
- school-pupils;
- unremunerated trainees;
- voluntary workers (volunteers).
- The admission of students primarily concerns higher education as that is the level at which international mobility is most common.

Apart from determining the specific conditions for admission of each of these four categories, the Directive defines the principal criteria for the admission of third-country nationals for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated training or voluntary service, in particular the availability of adequate financial resources and admission to an educational establishment, participation in a pupil exchange scheme, signature of a training agreement or participation in a voluntary service scheme, as the case may be.

Certain categories of people are excluded from the scope of the Directive:

- asylum-seekers and persons enjoying subsidiary forms of protection or temporary protection schemes;
- third-country national who are family members of Union citizens who have exercised their right to free movement within the Community;
- third-country nationals who enjoy long-term resident status in a Member State in accordance with Council Directive 2003/109/EC and exercise the corresponding right to reside in another Member State in order to study or receive vocational training.

Admission conditions

The Directive determines the basic conditions for admitting third-country nationals for the purpose of study:

- the applicant must have been accepted by an establishment of higher education;
- the applicant must have sufficient resources to cover his/her subsistence, study and return travel costs;
- the applicant must have sufficient knowledge of the language of the course to be followed (a flexible condition left to the discretion of the Member States);
- prior payment of the fees charged by the establishment (a flexible condition left to the discretion of the Member States).

As regards the admission of a third-country national already admitted as a student in another Member State, the Directive establishes a right to be admitted to another Member State where he wishes to pursue his studies. To ensure that third-country nationals do not abuse their student status by excessively prolonging their stay in the European Union, the additional course of study must be adequately related to the studies already completed.

For third country nationals who are secondary school pupils, the Directive covers only organised mobility through exchange schemes managed by specialised organisations.

The following conditions apply:

- age limits are set by the Member State concerned;
- the exchange organisation must be recognised by the Member State concerned;
- the exchange organisation must accept responsibility for subsistence, study, healthcare and return travel costs;
- the admission document depends on the choice of host family. The Member State retains some room for manoeuvre to reserve exchanges for third countries that offers exchange possibilities for its own school pupils.

The Directive determines the following conditions for unremunerated trainees:

- the applicant must have sufficient resources to cover his/her subsistence, training and return travel costs;
- if the Member State so requires, the applicant must receive basic language training so as to acquire the knowledge needed for the purposes of the placement.
- Third-country nationals in the category of unremunerated trainees or volunteers who are considered, by virtue of their activities or the kind of compensation or remuneration received, as workers under national legislation are not covered by this Directive.

The Directive provides for the following conditions where a third-country national applies to be admitted to a voluntary service scheme:

- age limits are set by the Member State concerned;

- an agreement giving a description of tasks, the conditions in which the volunteer is supervised in the performance of those tasks, the working hours, and the resources available to cover travel, subsistence and accommodation costs throughout the stay;
- the organisation responsible for the voluntary service scheme must accept responsibility for the volunteer's activities and for subsistence, healthcare and return travel costs;
- the volunteer must, if the host Member State specifically requires it, receive a basic introduction to the language, history and political and social structures of that Member State.

Validity and renewal of residence permits

The period of validity of residence permits varies according to the category:

- Students: a residence permit is issued to the student for a period of at least one year and renewable if the holder continues to meet the conditions. Where the duration of the course of study is less than one year, the permit is valid for the duration of the course;
- School pupils: no more than one year;
- Unremunerated trainees: the duration of the placement is for a maximum of one year. In exceptional cases, it may be renewed, once only and exclusively for such time as is needed to acquire a vocational qualification recognised by a Member State;
- Volunteers: no more than one year. In exceptional cases, if the duration of the relevant programme is longer than one year, the duration of the validity of the residence permit may correspond to the period concerned.

Rights of third-country nationals

The Directive provides that students shall be entitled to be employed and may be entitled to exercise self-employed economic activity. But access to economic activities for the first year of residence may be restricted by the host Member State.

Procedure and transparency

A decision on an application to obtain or renew a residence permit is subject to the following rules of transparency:

- a decision on a residence permit must be adopted, and the applicant must be notified of it, within a period that does not hamper the pursuit of the relevant studies, whilst leaving the competent authorities sufficient time to process the application;
- if the information supplied in support of the application is inadequate, processing of the application may be suspended and the competent authorities must inform the applicant of any further information they need;
- Any decision rejecting an application for a residence permit must be notified to the third-country national concerned. The notification must specify the possible redress procedures available;

- Where an application is rejected or a residence permit issued in accordance with this Directive is withdrawn, the person concerned shall have the right to mount a legal challenge before the authorities of the Member State concerned.

The Directive provides for an agreement on a fast-track procedure for issuing residence permits or visas to students and school pupils between the authority of a Member State with responsibility for the entry and residence of third-country nationals and an establishment of higher education or an organisation operating pupil exchange schemes.

5. DIRECTIVE 2008/115/EC FOR RETURNING ILLEGALLY STAYING THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONALS

SUMMARY

This directive provides Member States with common standards and procedures for returning third-country nationals staying illegally on their territories, with certain exceptions. Member States must however ensure that the treatment and level of protection of third-country nationals excluded from the scope of the directive corresponds at least to certain of its provisions on coercive measures, removal, health care and detention. In all cases, Member States must respect the principle of non-refoulement and take into consideration the best interest of children, family life and the health of the person concerned.

A return decision must be issued by a Member State to the third-country national staying illegally on its territory. If the third-country national has a valid residence permit or equivalent from another Member State, s/he must immediately return to that Member State. If another Member State takes back an illegally staying third-country national under a bilateral agreement, that Member State will be responsible for issuing the return decision. Due to compassionate, humanitarian or other reasons, a Member State may provide an illegally staying third-country national with an autonomous residence permit or an equivalent right to stay. Member States should not issue return decisions before the pending procedures for renewing such permits have come to an end.

The return decision must allow for a period of voluntary departure of between seven and 30 days for the illegally staying third-country national. Member States may require that this period is applied for by the person in question. In particular circumstances, the period for voluntary departure may be prolonged. Member States may also impose certain obligations on the third-country national for the duration of this period in order to prevent him/her from fleeing. When the illegally staying third-country national risks fleeing, has submitted a fraudulent application or poses a risk to public/national security, the Member State may grant a shorter period of voluntary departure or no period at all.

If no period is granted, or if the third-country national has not complied with the return decision within the period granted, the Member State must enforce his/her removal. Coercive measures that are proportionate and do not exceed reasonable force may be used only as a final solution to remove third-country nationals. The removal of a third-country national must be postponed if it breaches the

principle of non-refoulement or if the return decision has been temporarily suspended. Member States may also postpone removals in particular circumstances.

An entry ban may be given together with a return decision. However, it must be provided when no period of voluntary departure is granted or when the illegally staying third-country national has not complied with the return decision. The duration of the entry ban must be set on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the particular circumstances of the person concerned. In principle, the duration may not be longer than five years, unless the third-country national poses a threat to public/national security. Member States may choose to withdraw or suspend an entry ban for particular reasons. In humanitarian cases, they may even decide to not issue such a ban.

Decisions on returns, entry bans and removals must be provided in writing and accompanied by information on available remedies. On request, the Member State must provide a translation of these to the third-country national, unless it issues decisions by means of a standard form.

Third-country nationals must be given the possibility to appeal against or seek review of return decisions, as well as to obtain legal assistance/representation free of charge. The decisions are to be reviewed by a competent judicial or administrative authority or a competent body composed of members who are impartial and who enjoy safeguards of independence. The review body will have the power to temporarily suspend the enforcement of the decisions.

In specific cases, and when less coercive measures are not sufficient, Member States may detain a third-country national during the return procedure if s/he risks fleeing or avoids/obstructs the preparation of return or the removal process. Detentions are ordered in writing by administrative or judicial authorities and must be reviewed regularly. The detention period must be as short as possible and not more than six months. Only in particular circumstances, when the removal of a third-country national might exceed the time limit set, Member States may prolong detention by a maximum of 12 months.

Specialised detention facilities are to be used for the purpose; however, if this is not feasible, Member States may use prison accommodation with separate quarters for the third-country nationals.

6.DIRECTIVE 2009/50/EC CONCERNING THE ADMISSION OF HIGHLY SKILLED MIGRANTS

SUMMARY

The object of this directive is to improve the European Union's (EU) ability to attract highly qualified workers from third countries. The aim is not only to enhance competitiveness within the context of the Lisbon strategy, but also to limit brain drain. It is designed to:

- facilitate the admission of these persons by harmonising entry and residence conditions throughout the EU;
- simplify admission procedures;

- Improve the legal status of those already in the EU.

The directive applies to highly qualified third-country nationals seeking to be admitted to the territory of a Member State for more than three months for the purpose of employment, as well as to their family members.

Entry conditions

To be allowed into the EU, the applicant must produce:

- a work contract or binding job offer with a salary of at least 1,5 times the average gross annual salary paid in the Member State concerned (Member States may lower the salary threshold to 1,2 for certain professions where there is a particular need for third-country workers);
- a valid travel document and a valid residence permit or a national long-term visa;
- proof of sickness insurance;
- for regulated professions, documents establishing that s/he meets the legal requirements, and for unregulated professions, the documents establishing the relevant higher professional qualifications.
- In addition, the applicant must not pose a threat to public policy in the view of the Member State. S/he may also be required to provide his/her address in that Member State.

Member States will determine the number of third-country nationals they admit.

Admission procedure, issuance and withdrawal of the EU Blue Card

Member States are free to decide whether the application for an EU Blue Card has to be made by the third-country national and/or his/her employer. If the candidate fulfils the above conditions and the national authorities decide to admit him/her, s/he is issued an EU Blue Card, which is valid for a standard period of one to four years. The application will be accepted or rejected within 90 days of filing. If the application is accepted, the applicant will be given every facility to obtain the requisite visas.

The application for an EU Blue Card can be rejected if it was drawn up on the basis of false or fraudulently acquired documents or if, given the state of the labour market, the Member State decides to give priority to:

EU citizens;

Third-country nationals with a preferred status under Community law whom are legal residents or who are EC long-term residents and wish to move to that Member State.

The application may also be rejected on the grounds of volumes of admission established by the Member State, ethical recruitment or if the employer has been sanctioned due to undeclared work or illegal employment.

The EU Blue Card may be withdrawn if the holder does not have sufficient resources to maintain him-/herself and family members without social assistance or if s/he has been unemployed for more than three consecutive months or more than once during the period of validity of the card.

Rights and residence in other Member States

With this card, third-country nationals and their families can:

- enter, re-enter and stay in the issuing Member State and pass through other Member States;
- work in the sector concerned;
- enjoy equal treatment with nationals as regards, for example, working conditions, social security, pensions, recognition of diplomas, education and vocational training.

After two years of legal employment, they may receive equal treatment with nationals as regards access to any highly qualified employment. After 18 months of legal residence, they may move to another Member State to take up highly qualified employment (subject to the limits set by the Member State on the number of non-nationals accepted).

The procedure is the same as that for admission to the first Member State. An EU Blue Card holder and his family can, however, freely enter and stay in a second Member State, but must notify the authorities there within one month of their arrival. The second Member State may decide not to allow the third-country national to work until a positive decision on his/her application has been taken. However, the application may already be presented to the authorities of the second Member State while the EU Blue Card holder is still residing and working in the first Member State.

Implementation and reporting obligations

Starting from 2013, the Commission annually collects statistics from the Member States on the number of third-country nationals to whom an EU Blue Card has been issued, renewed, withdrawn or refused, on their nationalities and occupations, and on their families.

Starting from 2014, it reports on the application of the directive to the European Parliament and the Council every three years and proposes any changes it deems necessary.

Background

In its policy plan on legal migration, which was presented on 21 December 2005, the Commission made five legislative proposals concerning different categories of third-country nationals. This directive is the first of these proposals.

6. STOCKHOLM PROGRAMME AND ACTION PLAN (COM 2010) 171 FINAL)

The Stockholm Programme was adopted during the economic crisis as a follow-up to both the Tampere and Hague Programmes. The new programme signifies the priority given to migration issues

in Europe, issues that range from migration and development to labour migration, to irregular migration and integration (EC2010).

The Stockholm Programme differs from previous programmes in its migration priorities. The Global Approach to Migration, or the external dimension of the EU's migration policy based on partnership with third countries, is the EU policy area which has grown the most over the last few years and is the new Stockholm Programme's top priority (Koehler et al. 2010)

The Stockholm Programme, however, makes no reference to further developing a common labour migration strategy, despite the Swedish Presidency's push for a more coordinated effort in this area (the European Blue Card system for skilled migration, though not part of the Stockholm Programme, will come into effect in mid-2011). The Stockholm Programme does emphasize equal rights between third-country nationals and EU nationals and places greater emphasis on integration.

Furthermore, in April 2010, the EC issued an Action Plan for the implementation of the Stockholm Programme between 2010 and 2014, though the Plan is yet to be endorsed by the European Parliament and the Council. In particular, the EC communication states that the economic crisis should not prevent the EU from "consolidating a genuine common immigration and asylum policy... with ambition and resolve." In this respect, the EC intends to focus on developing community legislation in the field of seasonal employment and admission of third-country nationals in the framework of intra-corporate transfer.

Moreover, the EC intends to foster debate on specific areas of migration policy by issuing communications on increased coherence between immigration policy and other relevant EU policies, in particular on strengthen the link between the development of migration policy and the Europe 2020 strategy and address labour shortages through migration in EU Member States, and on an EU agenda for integration, including the development of a coordination mechanism.

APPENDIX II

IMMIGRANT ASSOCIATIONS IN CITY AND PROVINCE OF PARMA

ASSOCIAZIONI DI IMMIGRATI A PARMA E PROVINCIA (sourced from commune di Parma)

1.ASSOCIAZIONE ALBANESI PARMA

Sig. Nelo Neki Via Colombo, 31 - 43100 Parma

Sig. Noti Pandheli - Viale Piacenza, 77 - 43100 Parma

TEL. 348/4925753 cell. 329 4757075

2.A.I.P.P. ASSOCIAZIONE IMMIGRATI DI PARMA E PROVINCIA

Sig. Seck Mactar Via Del Garda, 8 - 43100 - Parma

cell. 339/6748306 320/9051476 Tel. 0521488147

mactar@libero.it

3.A.B.E.R. ASSOCIAZIONE DEI CITTADINI BURKINABE? EMILIA ROMAGNA

Sig. Jean Baptiste Compaore Via Alessandria, 13 ? 43100 Parma

tel. 0521/941585 - Cell. 338 6351800

4.A.G.E.R. ASSOCIAZIONE GUINEANI IN EMILIA ROMAGNA

Sig. Joseph Dusser Via I. Cocconi, 26 ? 43100 Parma

Cell. 348/8955895

5.A.C.I.P. ASSOCIAZIONE COMUNITÀ IVORIANA DI PARMA E PROVINCIA

Sig. Yao Appolinaire Via Martiri di Cefalonia, 10 ? 43100 Parma

TEL. 0521/244443 cell. 338/5328366 / 3351238639

habbryao@hotmail.com habbryao@hotmail.com

6.ASSOCIAZIONE CULTURALE STUDENTI ALBANESI VOXAQUILA

TEL. 3200655207 info@voxaquila.org

7.A.C.G.I. - ASSOCIAZIONE DEI CITTADINI DI GOHOUE-GLODE? IN ITALIA

Sig. Guehi Alain Djie Via Cremonese, 220 - 43100 Parma

cell. 329/2154341

bonkey@libero.it

8.ASSOCIAZIONE DEI SENEGALESI DELLA PROVINCIA DI PARMA GUY GI

Sig. Ousseynou Mbengue (Oscar)

TEL. 0521/921225 Cell. 347 1180286 / 320 8728962

oscar_61@libero.it

9.ASSOCIAZIONE ECUADOR SENZA FRONTIERE

Sig. Patricio Merizalde Via Leoncavallo, 4 ? 43100 Parma

cell. 333/5915887

10.ASSOCIAZIONE FILIPPINA

Sig.ra Marcella Mondero Via La Spezia, 273 ? 43100 Parma

TEL: 0521/959045

mondero@libero.it

Sig.ra Gloria Adora Oliver Piazza Deledda, 3 ? 43100 Parma

Cell. 3402262757

adora_oliver@er.cgil.it

11.ASSOCIAZIONE GHANESE DI PARMA E PROVINCIA GHANA NATIONAL ASSOC. (GHASPAP)

Via Guido Picelli, 3 - 43010 Pontetaro ? Fontevivo (Parma)

Sig. Sarkodie Adu (presidente) tel 0521 817292

Via Benassi n.1 Casale di Mezzani- 43055 Mezzani

Tel 0521 316050 Cell. 348 7529019

workhappinessco@yahoo.it ghaaspap@yahoo.it

Sig. Tagoe Reginald Danso (segretario) Via Guido Picelli, 2 - 43010 Pontetaro

Cell 329 1573509 Tel. 0521615346

r.tagoe@tele2.it

Sig. Ekow Bernasko Appu (vice presidente) Piazzale Chaplin, 3 ? 43100 Parma

TEL. 0521/290411

12.ASSOCIAZIONE GIOVANI MUSULMANI IN ITALIA

Sig.ra El Fasi Laila Piazza Basso Legno, 11 - 43100 Parma

cell. 328.3234197 ? 338/6236072

gmi_parma@hotmail.it khalidjbabdi@hotmail.it

13.ASSOCIAZIONE IMMIGRATI TUNISINI - VERDI

Sig. Ben Jedou Belgacem Via Parigi, 27 ? 43100 Parma

asstuverdi@libero.it

TEL. 0521/242096 Cell. 339.8729628

14.ASSOCIAZIONE LATINO AMERICANA

Sig. Carlos Vazquez/ Doris Torrens Via Menotti, 4 ? 43100 Parma

TEL. 0521/379116

15.ASSOCIAZIONE LE RESEAU

Sig. Cleophas Adrien Dioma c/o Call Center via Borghesi, 11/A - 43100 Parma

cell. 333.2246672

lereseauparma@yahoo.it

16.ASSOCIAZIONE LIBERTANGO

Sig. Nicolas Spinosa / Sig.ra Leonor Grossi Via I. Cocconi, 2 ? 43100 Parma

TEL. 0521/776943 340/7760344

noscospil01@interfree.it libertangopr@hotmail.com

17.ASSOCIAZIONE NIGERIANI DI PARMA

c/o Parrocchia Borgo Felino, 4 ? 43100 Parma

Sig. Oladipo A. Kazeem Cell. 349.5513924

Sig.ra Catherine Ozigagu Cell. 339.8122195

18.ASSOCIAZIONE PERUVIANA DI PARMA

Sig. Fernando Magallanes Roca (Presidente) Via Emilio Taverna, 2 ? 43100 Parma

Tel. 0521 775142

Sig.ra Liliana (Segretaria) ? 339 2023774

associazioneperuvianaparma@hotmail.it

Sig. Persy Plasencia (ex Presidente) Via Mordacci, 41 ? 43100 Parma

TEL. 0521/994070 - cell. 338.7569964

percy.plasencia@libero.it

19.ASSOCIAZIONE VAGAMONDE

Strada Quarta, 23 ? 43100 Parma

TEL. 0521/494598

Sig. Viorica Revenco Cell. 328.4719115

Sig.ra Fanny Loayza Cell. 338.59816232

vagamonde@libero.it

20.Sede di ROSE & PANE - punto d'incontro.

Luogo d'incontro gestito dalle volontarie dell'Associazione Vagamonde rivolto a tutte le donne cell. 3336164577 (segreteria telefonica attiva 24h su 24h) - orari di apertura Martedì dalle 9.30 alle 12.30 e Giovedì dalle 14.30 alle 18.00.

21.COMUNITÀ ERITREA

c/o Ristorante Africa 2 Viale Mentana, 80 ? 43100 Parma

Sig. Alfredo Andorlini

Sig. Mesfin Stefano

TEL. 0521/286827 333/6399157

stephaaraya@hotmail.com

22.NERI PER FORZA

Sig. N?Brah Kouame Celestin Viale Piacenza, 60 ? 43100 Parma

cell. 3294079691 ? 392 4727180

23.UNIONE IVORIANI DI PARMA

Sig. Philippe Dafra

TEL. 0521/822096

24.UNIONE SOMALA DI PARMA

Presidente: Sig. Ali Nassir Vicepresidente: Omar Ahmed Via Isonzo,7 ? 43100 Parma

TEL. 0521/782366 Cell. 333-2400544

25.PHILIPPINO COMMUNITY OF PARMA

Sig. Corachea Via Zanguidi, 5 ? 43100 Parma

TEL. E FAX 0521/969198

26.ASSOCIAZIONE IMMIGRATI DI PARMA E PROVINCIA (AIPP ? CIAD)

Sig. Taher Issa Via Emilia Ovest, 77 43100 ? Parma

cell 347/4491574

taherissa2003@yahoo.sr

27.ASSOCIAZIONE INTERCULTURALE MILLEUNMONDO

Sig.ra Elona Haxhirai Viale Rimembranze, 8 43100 ? Parma

Cell 347 0350836

milleunmondo@hotmail.com

Sig. ra Amancay Casas Via Farini, 15 - 43100 - Parma cell. 338/2405976

tel. 0521/284372 Fax 0521/284372

28.PERCHE' NO?

Sede Legale Via Grado, 12 ? 43100 Parma tel 0521 460320

c/o Guillaume Nkouh (Presidente)

tel. 3492885547 - 0521 802185 - 0521 221128

perchenoaparma@libero.it

29.UNIONE COMUNITÀ E ORGANIZZAZIONI ISLAMICHE ? MOSCHEA

Ass. Comunità Islamica di Parma e Provincia B.go S. Giuseppe, 26/A 43100 ? Parma
0521/236584

islampr@libero.it zacmar1427@hotmail.it

Responsabile: Mansouri Farid Via 4 Novembre ? 43058 Sorbolo
cell 348/5908947

30.ASSOCIAZIONE DEI CAMERUNENSIS DI PARMA E PROVINCIA (A.C.P.P.)

Sig. Leuga Jacovie c/o Legambiente

Vicolo Santa Maria, 1/A ? 43100 Parma

Cell. 328 5648636

aurelien385@caramail.com

Sig. Pitchou T. Aurelien (Presidente) cell. 328 8663077

Cell. 333 4652696)

31.ASSOCIAZIONE PER LO SCAMBIO CULTURALE CINESE-ITALIA Hua Yang

sig. Yu Shao Fei

cell. 3386657555 33482358288

yyyqqq@hotmail.com

c/o ARCI Via Testi, 4 ? 43100 Parma

Sig. Iotti cell. 348 2487216

iottimax@tin.it

32.ASSOCIAZIONE MWASSI

Sig.ra Claudine Irahoza Via Saffi, 13 ? 43100 Parma

Cell. 339/8619189

claudine4@virgilio.it

33.COMUNITA? MOLDAVA ? Associazione Ferdinando Santi

Sig.ra Nimerenco Maria

Via F. Orlandi, 34 ? 43100 Parma

Cell 335 6804866 tel 0521 460740

34.ASSOCIAZIONE LA MAISON DES ENFANTS DE LA COTE D'IVOIRE

Sig. Vincent Depaul Kanga

Strada Chiesa di Baganzola, 40 ? 43100 Parma

Tel 0521/602703 cell 339/4183728

Vice Presidente Sig.ra Paola Mambriani (cell 338 3178966)

Email: vincent.k@virgilio.it maisondesenfantsci@tiscali.it

35.ASSOCIAZIONE ?Soul Winning Evangelical Church?

Sig.ra Ester Olaynju

Via Del Garda, 8

43100 Parma

36.SCANDERBEG

- Associazione Albanese a Parma

Via Ruggero, 21/a

43100 Parma

Tel 0521 291583 fax 0521 044901

Email: info@scanderbeg.org www.scanderbeg.org

Sig. Lika Durim ? Via San Pier Damiani, 21/a Parma

Cell. 347 0815900 393 9298259

37.ASSOCIAZIONE NIGERIANA

Via Don Bosco, 1 ? 43100 Parma

38.COMUNITA? ELLENICA DI PARMA E REGGIO EMILIA

Via Testi, 4/a

Presidente: Dott. Vassilis Tsantes

Segretaria: Korina Karamalakou

segretaria@ellines-pr.it

tel 3287443642

39.ASSOCIAZIONE KURDISTAN AZAD

Viale Toscanini, 2/A c/o CIAC ? 43100 Parma

alyel@libero.it

APPENDIX III

INFORMATION TAVOLO IMMIGRAZIONE E CITTADINANZA PARMA

(Lettera chiusura esperienza Tavolo Immigrazione e cittadinanza Comune di Parma accessed online from <http://static.repubblica.it/parma/lettera%20chiusura%20Tavolo%20Immigrazione-I.pdf>)

In qualità di membri del Tavolo Immigrazione e Cittadinanza, abbiamo deciso di scrivere una lettera che sottoponiamo all'attenzione del Sindaco di Parma, Federico Pizzarotti, dell' Assessore ai servizi sociali la sig.ra Rossi, della Giunta comunale e della cittadinanza tutta.

Dopo aver atteso invano un invito da parte dell' Amministrazione Comunale per parlare dell'esperienza del Tavolo Immigrazione crediamo sia giunto il momento di scriverVi . Nella Giunta Ubaldi, l'Assessore Maria Teresa Guarnieri aveva già cercato, con tanta difficoltà, di creare una consulta degli immigrati attraverso l'organizzazione di elezioni tra le comunità di stranieri della città di Parma per scegliere i membri della consulta che avrebbe rappresentato le istanze dei migranti presso la Giunta stessa . Malgrado la sua buona volontà e l'impegno di tutti non è stato possibile arrivare a quelle elezioni. Sarebbe stata una cosa molto complessa, impegnativa, costosa e soprattutto le comunità non erano non erano abbastanza organizzate da portare avanti tale progetto.

Con la Giunta Vignali e, in particolar modo, con l'Assessore Lasagna si era passati ad una soluzione più pratica ed immediata: il Tavolo Immigrazione. Il Tavolo Immigrazione era un tentativo di portare gli immigrati a partecipare alla vita politica, sociale e culturale della città. Doveva essere una cosa progressiva. Prima la creazione di un Tavolo Immigrazione e poi i membri dello stesso dovevano impegnarsi a incontrare e a discutere con le associazioni e comunità di stranieri per poi arrivare alla creazione di un forum delle associazioni e comunità di immigrati.

I membri scelti sarebbero stati quasi come dei consulenti (non pagati) dell'Amministrazione Comunale, una sorta di interfaccia tra il mondo politico e il mondo degli immigrati. Dopo consultazione si è arrivati alla formula di scegliere persone che avevano maturato una certa esperienza, non solo con le associazioni ma anche con le Istituzioni e con la città. Dovevano essere persone capaci di conoscere e saper "leggere" la realtà della città di Parma.

Il Tavolo Immigrazione è dunque nato il 22 aprile 2010 e risultava composto da un gruppo di persone, ovviamente residenti a Parma, che provenivano da diverse parti del mondo: Africa, America, Europa, Asia.

Dopo la nascita del Tavolo abbiamo pensato di presentarci alla città, andando incontro alle diverse Autorità e Istituzioni di Parma. Abbiamo incontrato il Prefetto, la Provincia e in particolar modo l'Assessore Marcella Sacconi, l'Ufficio Immigrazione della Questura, i sindacati. E pian piano abbiamo

iniziato una serie di incontri con i rappresentanti delle comunità. Uno degli obiettivi principali del gruppo era anche arrivare ad avere una sede dove incontrare le persone, parlare, discutere ed immaginare delle proposte da presentare alla politica. Come in ogni nuova impresa non sono mancate alcune difficoltà di percorso: difficoltà a capire come funziona la politica, difficoltà nell'entrare veramente nelle problematiche dell'immigrazione, difficoltà nell'organizzazione interna del gruppo. Poi, avendo tutti altri obblighi personali e lavorativi, l'impegno dentro il Tavolo era limitato. Nonostante tutto, abbiamo sempre cercato di dare il massimo per portare a buon termine questo progetto perché eravamo convinti della giustezza della nostra scelta ad entrare nel gruppo.

Nessuno di noi era pagato per questo lavoro. Il Tavolo Immigrazione non era una cosa perfetta ma per una volta qui a Parma una Giunta Comunale aveva provato a dare una certa legittimità ad un gruppo organizzato d'immigrati dando loro il mandato di lavorare per trovare risposte e soluzioni alle problematiche che portava la presenza di persone straniere nella città. Noi in quel breve tempo abbiamo cercato di portare avanti questo compito organizzando eventi, incontrando persone, confrontandoci con quelli che avevano voglia di confrontarsi con noi. Cercando il modo migliore di fare rete, gruppo e lavorare per il benessere di tutti quelli che vivono nella città. Il nostro compito non era solo legato all'immigrazione ma dovevamo anche essere in grado di dare il nostro punto di vista sui progetti che portava avanti l'Amministrazione Comunale.

Elenchiamo di seguito alcuni degli eventi e seminari che abbiamo organizzato:

- Sabato 12 giugno 2010 ore 10 Camera di Commercio di Parma - convegno "Immigrati e Politica: punti di vista, visioni, proposte"
- Sabato 1 ottobre 2011 Auditorium dell'Istituto Professionale Ipsia Primo Levi dalle 8.30 convegno

"Genitori immigrati e figli di seconda generazione"

- e co-organizzazione della settimana della cultura Indiana; co-organizzazione della settimana della cultura Argentina, co-organizzazione della settimana della cultura Albanese, co-organizzazione della settimana della cultura Russa.

Insieme ai tecnici del Comune abbiamo lavorato alla realizzazione di un periodico di informazione di nuovi cittadini di Parma. Questo giornale aveva come nome "Parma Culture" e ogni mese parlava di una comunità migrante presente nella città. Vogliamo sottolineare che all'inizio non abbiamo condiviso la formula ma eravamo all'inizio del mandato e non ce la siamo sentiti di andare contro le decisioni della nostra amministrazione. Dopo aver avuto la sede in via Melloni 1/b, l'abbiamo tenuta aperta con una programmazione settimanale al mattino e al pomeriggio compatibilmente ai nostri impegni lavorativi e personali. La sede diventava quasi uno sportello dove gli immigrati si potevano rivolgere, gli italiani potevano venire a chiedere informazioni. Le comunità potevano incontrarsi.

Che cosa è andato storto?

E' chiaro che il Tavolo Immigrazione era un "prodotto" della scorsa giunta comunale. Siamo entrati essendo consapevoli che potevamo essere strumentalizzati. Avevamo chiaro in testa i rischi che

comportava aver fatto una scelta del genere. Ma era giusto per noi provare. Iniziare un percorso diverso.

Malgrado, anche qui, la buona volontà dell'Assessore Lasagna, ci siamo trovati comunque a vivere delle difficoltà legate alla gestione dei rapporti tra noi e i tecnici comunali da una parte, dall'altra parte la diffidenza di una fetta del mondo delle associazioni aventi come tematica l'immigrazione verso una struttura nata sotto la proposta della Giunta Comunale. Una delle critiche era il fatto che i membri del Tavolo non erano stati scelti democraticamente. Una scelta chiaramente discutibile, ma conoscendo molto bene il mondo delle associazioni degli immigrati sapevamo che quasi tutte le associazioni di migranti avevano problemi interni di leadership, di organizzazione, di rappresentanza. Il nostro sogno era invece vedere se si poteva arrivare insieme a trovare soluzione a questi problemi prima di arrivare alla seconda fase: elezioni dei membri dei forum delle associazioni delle comunità straniere. Non ci siamo riusciti.

Possiamo dire che il breve tempo ma forse anche la nostra inesperienza a lavorare con la politica non ci ha aiutato. Il Tavolo è durato poco più di due anni e con la caduta e le dimissioni della Giunta Vignali ci siamo trovati quasi fuori. Anche se l'esperienza del Tavolo Immigrazione era imperfetta e ha avuto un finale infelice, crediamo comunque che sia stato un bel tentativo di portare le persone straniere a partecipare alla vita politica, sociale e culturale della città. Noi crediamo che non si può parlare di immigrazione e di integrazione senza gli immigrati. Noi eravamo immigrati e abbiamo vissuto tutti, o quasi, l'esperienza dell'immigrazione. Le nostre esperienze personali potevano aiutare la politica ad avere un approccio diverso verso le problematiche dell'immigrazione. Abbiamo volontariamente dato le nostre competenze e conoscenze, il nostro tempo alla nostra città impegnandoci in questa impresa. Non avendo la bacchetta magica abbiamo cercato di fare quello che è stato possibile fare. Oggi abbiamo deciso di chiudere ufficialmente questa nostra esperienza e ridare le chiavi alla nostra città. All'Amministrazione Comunale.

I membri del Tavolo Immigrazione e cittadinanza del Comune di Parma

Cleophas Adrien Dioma

Leonor Grossi

Asta Vinci

Ambrose Laudani Genthian Alimadhi

Farid Mansour

